




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SOFIA K. OGDEN
AND
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PREFACE

In psychology, denial is a concept originating with the psychodynamic theories of Sigmund Freud. According to Freud, three mental dynamics, or motivating forces, influence human behavior: the id, ego, and superego. These three forces all have different goals (id, pleasure; ego, reality; superego, morality) and continually strive for dominance, resulting in internal conflict. This conflict produces anxiety. The ego, which functions as a mediator between the two extremes of the id and the superego, attempts to reduce this anxiety by using defense mechanisms. Defense mechanisms are indirect ways of dealing or coping with anxiety, such as explaining problems away or blaming others for problems. Denial is one of many defense mechanisms. It entails ignoring or refusing to believe an unpleasant reality. Defense mechanisms protect one's psychological well-being in traumatic situations, or in any situation that produces anxiety or conflict. This new book presents original research in this exciting and thought-provoking field.

Chapter 1- The psychology of denial is examined within the political context. This chapter uses the issue of state-sanctioned torture to expand the psychological concept of denial beyond cognitive and psychoanalytic psychology to include factors drawn from social and political psychology. Historical and political perspectives are also incorporated, as are intra-psychic perspectives. The political issue of torture is an interesting focus for expanding the psychological understanding of denial because although torture is not legal in any country, it is practiced in two-thirds of the world's nations (Amnesty International, 2001). State-sanctioned torture is conducted with the implicit (if not explicit) support of each nation's government. However, no countries publicly acknowledge that their governments sanction torture, and its occurrence is often rigorously denied. This

chapter focuses on three manifestations of the denial of torture: 1) denial that torture is sanctioned; 2) denial of self-serving political motivations for sanctioning torture; and 3) denial of the humanity of the victims of torture. An analysis of these manifestations suggests a complex model is needed for understanding the psychology of denial in the political context. Several components of this model are drawn from psychoanalytic and information-processing perspectives. Constructs from cognitive psychology also include schema, e.g., the enemy image, and scripts, e.g., “the ticking time bomb scenario.” Additional components merit inclusion for understanding how denial operates in relation to torture, e.g., deindividuation; and social norms. Therefore, a consideration of the psychology of denial in relation to torture highlights a number of social psychological and societal factors that should be included in a model of the psychology of denial in the political context.

Chapter 2- Repression is typically associated in literature with terms such as non-expression, emotional control, rationality, anti-emotionality, defensiveness and restraint. Whether these terms are synonymous with repression, indicate a variation, or are essentially different from repression is uncertain. This chapter discusses the similarities and differences between these concepts elsewhere (Garssen, 2007). In addition, a multitude of questionnaires has been developed in this field, which presents yet another problem for evaluating studies. In the present review, this chapter critically discuss the various questionnaires used for measuring repression and related constructs, and then present our assessment on which scales are reliable and valid and which are not. The most appropriate repression measure is the Marlow Social Desirability (MC SD) scale, or the combination of the MC SD and an anxiety/distress scale. The question whether the MC SD scale alone, or the combination measure is the best repression measure remains unsettled. Future studies should apply several of the reliable and valid repression measures and study their interrelationships, as well as their relationships with several distress, personality and objective measures.

Key words: Repression, emotional control, defensiveness, questionnaires, review

Chapter 3- Numerous educational studies have lauded the importance of social bonds in schools and institutional ties as being crucial to students’ sense of self and to school achievement. The hidden curriculum [curriculum of exclusion] in schools however can undermine students’ identity development and result in academic disengagement. It follows that self-affirmation in school plays a positive role in student engagement and in their academic success. Using postmodernism as a theoretical framework, this chapter examines the processes and implications of the contemporary hidden curriculum. The authors propose a global

multicultural education as a positive school effect that helps validate students' sense of self while serving to improve school achievement. Chapter 3 argues that a transformative global multicultural education helps to nurture inclusion, thus reducing subsequent effects of social and cultural denial, and marginalization in schools. The implications of this chapter are important for teachers, administrators and all those interested in student success.

Chapter 4- Literature on repression is abundant with terms such as repression, non-expression of negative emotions, emotional control, rationality, type C response style and defensiveness. However, it is uncertain whether these terms are synonymous with repression, denote a variation, or are essentially different from repression. In addition, a multitude of questionnaires has been developed in this field, which presents yet another problem for evaluating studies.

Elsewhere this chapter discussed overlap of and differences between the various repression-related concepts (Garssen, 2007a) and critically reviewed eleven repression-related questionnaires (Garssen, 2009). The present study compares various repression questionnaires in two groups of women with breast cancer (N = 102 and 145). A secondary factor analysis yielded two factors, which were labelled: repression and anxious defensiveness. The relevance of this finding for future studies is that only scales belonging to the repression cluster are valid measures for measuring repression. The Marlowe Crowne Social Desirability scale is recommended as the most adequate repression measure.

Key words: Repression, cancer, emotional control, type C, defensiveness

Chapter 5- Research has indicated that African Americans are often displaced in schools and males in particular, are denied access to quality academic programs and are tracked into vocational training, and some are even forced out of schools. Since the establishment of the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) of 1975, there has been growing interest in understanding the relationship between African American male students and special education assessment. In this research the impact that the historic denial of educational equality and culturally responsive pedagogy has had on the disproportionately high placement of African American males in special education programs for the mentally disabled, and behaviorally and emotionally challenged. Our research reveals three primary catalysts for special education placement of African American male students: 1) persistent patterns of discrimination, 2) biases in assessments, and 3) social differences in students' behaviors and learning styles. The findings further reveal that the integration of culturally responsive and reflective arts education into teacher pedagogy and curriculum helps to mediate school disengagement, and addresses the multiple intelligences and learning styles of African Americans. This research has important implications for teacher education programs, as it

increases awareness and provides strategies and techniques for arts integration that may lead to higher levels of cognitive development and academic achievement in African Americans and the broader student population.

Chapter 6- From the first moment of consciousness in the intensive care unit when I did not recognize my husband or son to today, when I sit writing in my office, this journey continues to take me further than any of the doctors predicted and only my husband envisioned. Through redefinition of denial and acceptance has come continued success and reduced guilt. I, through denial, was able to focus on the positive aspects and reduce the negatives such as guilt, remorse, blame and preoccupation with shame, self-reproach and contrition.

Chapter 7- Political science has been described as a borrowing discipline. Social psychological theories are often used to explain public opinion, yet Festinger's theory of cognitive dissonance has received only limited attention in this branch of political science. In short, this argument outlines how to solve a psychological state of discomfort when one experiences inconsistency of having conflicting thoughts. I argue that Festinger's work can be helpful in explaining why some people agree with the dominating views in their countries, while others disagree. This paper is an elaboration of the theoretical arguments outlining the conditional adjustment hypothesis, a hypothesis which argues that confidence in institutions will indicate how disposed a person is to adjust to or react against the economic policies of his regime. In addition, I provide an overview over the use of Festinger's theory in political science. Derived from Festinger's work, the conditional adjustment hypothesis is thoroughly explained in this paper. My contention is that it can help us better to understand public opinion.

Chapter 8- Being diagnosed with a chronic illness or disability requires ongoing adjustment in order to adapt and cope successfully (Green-Hernandez et al. 2001; Lindsay 2008; 2009a; Paterson 2001). There is little doubt that coming to terms with such a diagnosis can be particularly difficult. Thus, shock and disbelief are often followed by a period of denial in which patients attempt to overcome the disruption to their lives (Bury 1982; Green-Hernandez et al. 2001). Denial can involve many different cognitive strategies including avoiding thinking about something, contradicting it, or focusing on alternative explanations (Kirmayer and Looper 2006). It is often an initial response that is used to fend off anxiety when encountering a life-altering event or threatening situation (Freud 1961; Joachim and Acron 2000; Martz et al. 2005; Rapley 1998; Treharne et al. 2004). Some researchers argue that denial can be a useful coping mechanism early on in the illness experience (Freud 1961; Kubler-Ross 1969); however, prolonged denial can cause strong, negative pathological connotations and hinder a successful adaptation (Fernando 2001; Seligman 2000; Telford et al. 2006).

Patient characteristics often influence how and the extent to which denial is experienced. For example, there is some evidence to support that patterns of denial vary by gender (Ketterer et al 2004), age (Treharne et al. 2004) and ethno-cultural status (Halstead et al. 1993; Roy et al. 2005; Njoku et al. 2005). Denial of emotional distress tends to be more common among men than women and may also contribute to a lack of clinician recognition and help seeking (Ketterer et al. 2004). In terms of ethno-cultural differences, Njoku et al. (2005) found that Latinos and African Americans used denial significantly more often than European Americans. Furthermore, differences in denial have also been found by length of time since diagnosis and age. In particular, patients who have been recently diagnosed tend to have greater denial than patients who have had their illness for longer (Treharne et al. 2004). Similarly, younger patients also report having greater difficulties coming to terms with their illness than older patients (Lindsay 2008; 2009b; Treharne et al. 2004).

Chapter 1

THE PSYCHOLOGY OF DENIAL IN THE POLITICAL CONTEXT: THE CASE OF TORTURE

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ABSTRACT

The psychology of denial is examined within the political context. We use the issue of state-sanctioned torture to expand the psychological concept of denial beyond cognitive and psychoanalytic psychology to include factors drawn from social and political psychology. Historical and political perspectives are also incorporated, as are intra-psychic perspectives. The political issue of torture is an interesting focus for expanding the psychological understanding of denial because although torture is not legal in any country, it is practiced in two-thirds of the world's nations (Amnesty International, 2001). State-sanctioned torture is conducted with the implicit (if not explicit) support of each nation's government. However, no countries publicly acknowledge that their governments sanction torture, and its occurrence is often rigorously denied. This chapter focuses on three manifestations of the denial of torture: 1) denial that torture is sanctioned; 2) denial of self-serving political motivations for sanctioning torture; and 3) denial of the humanity of the victims of torture. An analysis of these manifestations suggests a complex model is needed for understanding the

psychology of denial in the political context. Several components of this model are drawn from psychoanalytic and information-processing perspectives. Constructs from cognitive psychology also include schema, e.g., the enemy image, and scripts, e.g., “the ticking time bomb scenario.” Additional components merit inclusion for understanding how denial operates in relation to torture, e.g., deindividuation; and social norms. Therefore, a consideration of the psychology of denial in relation to torture highlights a number of social psychological and societal factors that should be included in a model of the psychology of denial in the political context.

OVERVIEW

Denial is often discussed as an intra-psycho defense mechanism in relation to an individual’s personal environment and history. Whereas denial operates at a psychological level, it is influenced by the matrix of conditions in which individuals operate. Therefore, in considering denial in relation to political issues such as torture, the development of an understanding of the psychology of denial must consider a larger context than the individual’s personal environment and history. Influences disclosing negative information are particularly powerful as people are inclined to attend to, learn from, and utilize negative information significantly more than positive information in their evaluations (Ito et al., 1998; Vaish et al., 2008). These societal-level factors influence defense mechanisms operating at the intrapsychic level--such as denial. This chapter therefore discusses denial within the context of these societal-level factors.

Media and government (and their interaction) are important players in affecting the psychology of citizens (Jackson, 2007). The relative freedom of the media and structures of political representation inherent in democracies allow for a unique interactive construction of meaning between citizens and institutions. Many other social institutions such as religious groups and political parties also play important roles. Together, the resulting social norms and taboos directed by these institutions have profound influence over the psychology of denial. Government and media have far-reaching effects on the psychology, and therefore, upon the behavior of the people, including implicit and explicit support for particular policies. Democracies are of particular interest for considering the political psychology of denial because presumably the thoughts and actions of citizens living within democratic societies can have tremendous influence upon the sanctioning of political acts such as torture.

This chapter focuses on the interplay between social institutions and mechanisms of denial as it pertains to the issue of torture in democratic societies.

It begins with an overview of the psychological perspectives of denial, applies the construct of denial to the enactment and sanctioning of torture, and then concludes with a summary of recommendations for expanding the psychological understanding of denial in the context of the politics of torture in democratic societies.

PSYCHOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES ON DENIAL

Psychological Definition of Denial

As a construct, denial has a long history in psychological parlance. A number of authors have noted a vast diversity of meanings and uses attributed to the term (Wheeler and Lord, 1999; Moyer and Levine, 1998; Manousos and Williams, 1998). In fact, its psychological utility is often constrained by the definition used. Psychoanalytic and cognitive investigations of denial have been most prominent, yet humanistic, behavioral, and neuropsychological explanations are also presented in the literature. Others have seen the range of definitions of denial as indicative of a varied and dimensional construct requiring subcategories and specificity of intersychic and intrapsychic contexts.

Psychoanalytic Theory

A fundamental question punctuating the denial rhetoric is whether one can be aware of his/her denial (Brenzitz, 1983; Manousos and Williams, 1998). Psychoanalytic theorists, beginning with Freud (1923) suppose that a denier utilizes the defense mechanism of denial to allay anxiety, and these counter-cathartic activities are *unconscious* and *pathological* operations of the ego (Sperling, 1958). In this line, Anna Freud (1961) saw denial as a fundamental “pre-stage” defense, originating in the narcissistic phase and evolving into a full defense mechanism in adulthood. In this stage, a child is in absolute rejection of all things disagreeable, even if they are ultimately adaptive. This thread can continue to adulthood, where external information may be acknowledged, yet unconsciously deemed as threatening and ultimately denied.

As Freud (1989) pointed out in his book *Totem and Taboo*, the taboo nature of certain actions that would be illegal if an individual performed them can be denied, transformed and considered legitimate if a whole group (e.g., society)

assumes responsibility. Thus, in Freud's conceptualization of denial, societal forces can play an important role.

Goldberger (1983) corroborates that strict psychoanalytic denial (or "disavowal") is an unconscious response to threatening external stimuli, drawing a contrast with *repression* – a wholly internal process. Thus, in Goldberger's conceptualization, denial requires some awareness of the threatening stimuli while blunting awareness of one's *response* to the threat, which contrasts with repression--in which there is no awareness of the threat. In a differing opinion, Erdelyi (2006) considers denial a *form* of structured repression, emphasizing that it is a "defensive failure of insight" (p. 504). A person may read stimuli from either internal or external origins, yet fail to draw a deeper (latent) meaning. Denial becomes a repression of value and consequence - not merely information. This is reminiscent of Sperling's (1958) early descriptions of denial catalyzing *neuroses* and *perversions*. He explains that it is the "meaningfulness" that is left aside in the denial of external objects. Sperling describes a second form of denial - those leading to *psychoses* - where a subject outright rejects the existence of an object. As defense mechanisms, their ultimate trajectory is pathological, whether psychotic or neurotic. In psychoanalytic terms, both neurotic and psychotic forms of denial are *unconscious* processes, or as one author illustrates, a "denial of denial" (Brennitz, 1983):

Isn't a certain amount of such "denial of denial" inherent in all denials? Isn't the fact that a person is unaware of what he is doing an important ingredient of the denial process itself? In the same way that in the context of intrapsychic defense mechanism a certain amount of repression...is essential, so when dealing with defenses against external information, their defensive nature must be hidden from the person utilizing them. Although the termination of an unsuccessful attempt at denial may lead to awareness, this is not the case while the defense is still operative. (p. 99)

Dorpat (1983) hypothesizes a "cognitive arrest" process as the key act of the denial defense. He characterizes a four-part system consisting of (1) preconscious appraisal of danger or trauma, (2) a responding painful affect, (3) the arrest of rational thought and communication about the objective reality, and (4) screening behavior that asserts an opposite and positive reality to the negative reality rejected by cognitive arrest. Here again the process of denial involves the explicit rejection of awareness of either meaning and/or the objective reality that precipitated this reaction.

Manousos and Williams (1998) address the quandary of awareness by distinguishing between someone issuing a denial and one who themselves is “in denial.” The former is a conscious undertaking, while the latter is an unconscious process characterized by unawareness of the psychic defense. At the same time, the authors admit that a denier of any kind must reject a known truth:

Denial is the negation of something in terms of action or talk; it is not to be confused with ignorance, prevarication or simple avoidance. It is logically impossible to deny what is not known; in order to use the term appropriately their needs to be evidence of a person having the relevant knowledge. The classification is complicated by other denial-like processes—like, for example, delusions. (p. 16)

Manousos and Williams (1998) utilize an information-processing model to illustrate the many levels at which a person may learn or know information, yet remain removed enough to enact denial of its existence. Stimuli may be “known” without entering full consciousness, whether at: the (1) person-world interface, (2) the stage of perception and recognition, (3) the process of contextualization, or (4) the integration in memory or into greater meaning.

This information-processing model of Manousos and Williams resembles Breznitz’s (1983) seven-stage model. In it, each subclass of denial is related to a specific inquisitive response to threatening information (e.g., is there information, is the information threatening, is the information threatening to me, is the information threatening now, can I cope with this threatening information, am I anxious in response to this threat, and is my anxiety relevant to the situation). The incoming information can be either external or internal, but it is the unconscious question that is asked of the information that dictates the mode of denial. The seven types of denial responses include: denial of information, denial of threatening information, denial of personal relevance, denial of urgency, denial of vulnerability/responsibility, denial of affect, and denial of affect relevance. In slightly different ways, Dorpat, Manousos and Williams, and Breznitz all describe processes of cognitive inattention to an object that is perceived by the individual. After some level of perception occurs, attention can be attenuated at different stages of unconscious consideration.

Cognitive Dissonance

Some cognitive theorists have suggested that denial acts as a mechanism to reduce cognitive dissonance (Gosling et al., 2006; Wheeler and Lord, 1999). For example, Wheeler and Lord suggest that denial allows information to integrate slowly, avoiding the impact of an immediate and traumatic introduction to one's system. This suggestion roots in Horowitz's (1983) *completion tendency theory* that an individual holds information that suggests dissonance in active memory and then *slowly* integrates the information over time to alleviate peak emotionality.

Gosling et al. (2006) utilize empirical measures to suggest that denial of responsibility is an adaptive technique for reducing dissonance. Using techniques devised by Simon et al. (1995) to investigate the use of trivialization as a mode of dissonance reduction, the authors investigate denial's utility to achieve this as compared with other modes, such as trivialization and attitude change. Given a choice, participants choose to deny responsibility for a counterattitudinal decision in a manner similar to the other established modes of dissonance reduction. Their research further suggests that the denial of responsibility reduces the negative self-directed affect that can occur after a counterattitudinal behavior occurs. While diminishing the *pathological* role of denial, Gosling et al. embrace the psychodynamic notion of *unconscious* disengagement from the offending stimuli – except here the ultimate role of denial focuses on reducing cognitive dissonance.

Denial and Adaptation

Although psychoanalytic purists may view denial as pathology, some theorists suggest it may have positive functions as well (Goldberger, 1983; Lazarus, 1983; Wheeler and Lord, 1999). Goldberger (1983) proposes it conserves energy by postponing action. This may be particularly helpful in medical realities such as terminal illness. In fact, a great deal of the literature on the utility of denial comes from medicine and behavioral health. Moyer and Levine (1998) address the inconsistency of definitions of denial in the psychosocial oncology literature and review a number of studies showing adaptive and maladaptive consequences of denial. In quoting Meyerowitz (1983), the authors describe the notion that among cancer patients there is an “optimal amount of denial whereby only some aspects of reality can be safely denied at different points in the process of adaptation” (as quoted in Moyer and Levine, 1998, p. 121). Similarly, among men experiencing moderate to severe symptoms

of pain associated with acute myocardial infarction, denial of the actual cause of their symptoms was the modal response (Olin & Hackett, 1964). In the medical context, denial may be a normative part of the process of integrating a potentially life threatening diagnosis, and at times, it may be adaptive.

Adaptive or not, an individual's denial upholds existing cultural norms, while simultaneously risking the possibility of allowing maladaptive or counter-normative behaviors. In medical settings, patients may deny their terminal state in order to maintain the normative outlook of a long and healthy life, while simultaneously experiencing the body's decline.

A focus on the consequences of denial in the medical context highlights the importance of the context in which denial occurs. As will be discussed subsequently, the consequences of denial in the political context can be highly detrimental to society as well as to the individual. This will be illustrated by focusing on factors involved in the psychology of denial in the context of enacting, supporting and/or allowing the sanctioning of torture in the political realm. To understand how denial might have its influence, a clearer discussion of torture must be first elucidated.

THE DENIAL AND TORTURE VIEWED WITHIN HISTORICAL, POLITICAL AND ETHICAL PERSPECTIVES

A Brief History of the Practice of Torture

Historically, torture has been used to obtain confessions and to exert control over persons or populations. Each major example of a politically driven torture campaign is viewed as a shameful era of history, even if the stated purpose at the time is idealistic. While the torturing regime may try to justify the campaign by suggesting utopian motives, each campaign of torture is ultimately viewed as a form of power dominance through terror.

Examples are seen throughout history. Forrest (1996) reported that in Ancient Greek and Roman civilizations, the testimony of slaves was considered unreliable unless extorted through the use of torture. Furthermore, a confession was regarded as necessary to determine the guilt of the accused. Reports of judicial torture have also been recorded in ancient Chinese, Egyptian, and Assyrian historical documents. There is no evidence of torture being employed by the early Christian Church, although by the 11th Century, heretics were being tortured to force them to recant. As time progressed, so did the widespread use of torture. During the

Middle Ages in Europe, both secular and religious courts tortured in order to obtain what was considered to be a strong proof of guilt or confession. During the later Middle Ages, torture was a dominant part of the Spanish Inquisition. For the Inquisitors, torture was a means to obtain confessions and to demonstrate the power of the Spanish Monarchy. Because the confession was “true and free,” the torture ceased once a prisoner confessed (Peters, 1989).

It was not until the Enlightenment in Europe, a time associated with the rising of humanitarianism that countries began to recognize torture as immoral. According to Peters (1996), “torture had been outlawed in most European countries by the end of the 1700s, although the eradication may have been a result of the perception that torture was insufficient as much as to the belief that it was immoral” (p. 76).

Despite laws and conventions against torture, countless recent examples of torture have been documented. In a survey conducted during the period from the beginning of 1997 to mid-2000, Amnesty International found reports of torture or ill-treatment enacted by national officials in more than 150 countries. In more than 70 countries, acts of torture or ill treatment were widespread or persistent. In more than 80 countries, people reportedly died as a result (Amnesty International, 2009).

The major cases of politically driven torture in the 20th century have continued the theme of power and domination over groups of people. From the start of the 20th century, the Belgians intimidated and dominated the Congolese by torturing the people, including children, using the chicotte, a whip of sun-dried hippopotamus hide cut into a long sharp-edged cork-screw strip, for the most minor of offenses (Hochschild, 2007). Stalin demonstrated his power and incited fear in the Soviet Union through the show trials, in which defendants publicly confessed to numerous false accusations, and most were subsequently sentenced to death. Their cooperation was a result of torture and threats of more torture if they refused to comply (Hingley, 1981). The Nazis terrorized and controlled people through the implementation of a plethora of torture techniques used in the concentration camps (Rejali, 2007). In 1942, the Nazis began using an “enhanced” method referred to as the ‘Third Degree’ in interrogations to elicit confessions from prisoners. Furthermore, the Third Reich transformed torture into a medical specialty (Peters, 1996). Nazi SS doctors conducted cruel and inhumane pseudoscientific medical experiments utilizing thousands of concentration camp prisoners, including pregnant women and children. After being subjected to experiments pertaining to such extremes as hypothermia, poison, chemical burns, infectious diseases, or high-altitude, most victims died or were permanently crippled. In Cambodia, Pol Pot demonstrated his power through the Tuol Sleng

Prison, also known as S-21, by torturing and executing more than 14,000 “enemies of the Democratic Kampuchea or those who posed a threat to the Khmer Rouge from 1975 to 1979;” only 7 prisoners survived (Hawk, 1992). In Argentina, during the Dirty War from 1976-1983, the military dictatorship demonstrated its power by terrorizing the people, when thousands were tortured and disappeared (Encyclopedia Britannica, 2009). Still, torture has continued into the 21st century, with the United States as an example of a transgressor in the Abu Ghraib and Guantanamo Prisons.

Each of these instances of torture periods reflects a dark period for the government that sanctioned the practice. Yet, in each instance, the stated purpose reflects an ideal held high by the torturing power: faith in Jesus Christ, or commitment to the Communist Party, or production of a “master race,” or a “war on terror.” But, in each example, the real purpose of torture has been consistent with what is generally seen in the history of torture: the torture is performed for domination and confession.

Democratic Governments and the Denial of Torture

Governments deal with the topic of torture differentially depending on their structure and level of involvement in this illegal activity. In democracies (especially those which are signatory to conventions against torture), there are particular incentives to deny that torture is sanctioned. In the context of politically driven torture, mechanisms have evolved to reduce public outcry (Cohen, 1996). Many of these mechanisms are the same as those highlighted in this chapter as the antecedents to denial. There are many other examples of democratic governments using strategies such as altering the language to disguise the reality of torture or even frankly denying their involvement. Some examples are reviewed below.

France and the Use of Torture

The French/Algerian War (1954-62) bore creative interpretations of situations that allowed for the denial of torture by French citizens. French General Bigeard officially denied the French campaign of torture. Later, he admitted to the facts but used the language of denial to gloss over the crime calling torture a “necessary evil” that was used on “savages.” Here, the issue of the purpose of torture was raised. The justification of torture was held by the government to be intelligence

retrieval, though the fact was quite different. The French government denied the torture and censored those who attempted to report on it through news or other media channels, including the censorship of Jean-Luc Goddard's film, *Le Petit Soldat* (Lack, 2003).

Great Britain and the Use of Torture

When terrorist attacks were at their peak from January through July of 1971 in Northern Ireland, London employed extreme interrogation (torture) tactics against the underground Irish Republican Army (McCoy, 2006). "Britain felt compelled to fight the terror with torture" (McCoy, 2008, p. 54). In April of 1971, the English Intelligence Center secretly trained the Belfast police force in five specific torture techniques: (1) hooding, (2) prolonged wall-standing, (3) subjection to loud and hissing noise, (4) deprivation of food and water and (5) sleep deprivation.

In the 1977 case *Ireland v. United Kingdom*, the European Court found the five techniques utilized by the British to be "cruel, inhuman and degrading" and thus breaches of the Geneva convention, but the court did not describe them as torture (Parker, 2005). Moreover, the British government argued that it had been necessary to introduce such techniques to combat a rise in terrorist violence. Yet in reality, there was an immediate upsurge in violence by the IRA after the security forces began to use torture (Parker, 2005).

More recently, allegations have been brought against Britain's Secret Intelligence Service (MI6) for colluding with torturers during the 'War on Terror.' The Joint Committee on Human Rights in the United Kingdom called for an independent inquiry into the matter, and subsequently found a disturbing number of credible allegations of British complicity in torture (Corera, 2009). However, "the committee said it was unable to draw conclusions about the involvement of British officers because ministers and the head of the domestic security service MI5 refused to testify at parliamentary hearings on the claims" (Corera, 2009). Yet Sir John Scarlett, the head of MI6 maintains that there was "no complicity in torture" by the Secret Intelligence Service (Norton-Taylor & Cobain, 2009). In time, further investigations by a proposed independent organization will determine if MI6 agents were complicit in the torture of terrorist suspects.

There are many more examples of torture movements by democracies throughout the 20th century and into the beginning of the 21st century. Each epoch of torture provides a demonstration of its purpose: to terrorize and control a

population. However, the use of torture has rarely been systematically linked to intelligence gathering, partly because of its ineffectiveness in serving this function, as will be discussed below.

THE PURPOSES AND EFFICACY OF TORTURE

On the individual level, the purpose of torture is to destroy a person's sense of well-being. On the societal level, the main function of torture is to terrorize and control. According to Amnesty International (2009) the goal of torture is to change the behavior, the thinking patterns, and the personalities of the victims, to ultimately destroy a person's strength that is needed to resist and recover. The CIA KUBARK Counterintelligence Interrogation manual states the purpose is to "produce the debility-dependence-dread state" (Perry, 2005, p. 35). Subjecting a detainee to violence is a method used to coerce citizens into tacit support for those wielding the power in the torture chamber, whether they represent an elected government, military regime, dictatorship, or a guerilla army (Jempson, 1996). It is an instrument of terror to persuade a community that the masters of torture have the ultimate power (Perry, 2005). Thus, on the broadest level, torture is used to terrorize a population, to control people, and to obtain confessions.

The efficacy of torture depends on the desired purpose. If the purpose is to destroy a person's psyche and/or dominate people or a population, torture has shown to be efficacious. However, torture cannot and does not produce reliable information, and most intelligence experts avow that it does not succeed in obtaining true information. This reality is usually not well known among the public within the torturing society. "Even mild forms of torture can result in a false confession" (Harbury, 2005, p. 162). The prisoner will often say anything to stop the torture, a fact that has been evident since the rule of Napoleon Bonaparte in the 18th century. In the Art of War, Napoleon stated:

The barbarous custom of having men beaten who are suspected of having important secrets to reveal must be abolished. It has always been recognized that this way of interrogating men, by putting them to torture, produces nothing worthwhile. The poor wretches say anything that comes into their mind and what they think the interrogator wishes to know. (As quoted in Luvaas, 2001, p. 11)

Currently, Field Manual 34-55, the rulebook of American military interrogation, prohibits the use of coercive techniques as it yields unreliable results and can induce the source to say whatever he/she thinks the interrogator

wants to hear (Brecher, 2007). A recent indication of the faultiness of information gathered under such duress was the evidence of “weapons of mass destruction” (WMD) in Iraq, which the United States used as justification to go to war. This evidence was obtained via torture, yet subsequent investigations revealed no weapons of mass destruction on the ground (Jehl, 2005).

Despite all the evidence, some still highlight the idea of torture as a means of collecting information. As the purpose of torture is equivocated, the potential for the activation of the denial mechanism is expanded.

Some proponents of torture argue that it is necessary to prevent catastrophe and to save innocent lives from terror attacks. They justify torture employing the so-called “Ticking-Time Bomb” Scenario, which has been propounded by Harvard professor Alan Dershowitz (Brecher, 2007). In this scenario, people are faced with an unavoidable moral dilemma of choosing whether or not to torture a man who supposedly knows the location of a bomb that could kill thousands. “People are likely to choose a course of action which leads to the least suffering possible in the circumstances” (Brecher, 2007, p.14), and thus opt to torture the man.

However, Brecher (2007) points out that even if such a scenario arises, the ticking time bomb argument is flawed in several major ways. First, there is no guarantee that torture will yield the true information. In contrast, it might lead to policy makers engaging in costly and unnecessary political actions, such as going to war against a country falsely thought to be harboring WMDs. Second, alternatives to torture, such as gaining the intelligence in alternative ways or by evacuating those at risk of being harmed, are not even considered. Furthermore, Brecher argues that such a scenario involving certainty that a person has information that could save lives is not the norm in situations involving the use of torture. Instead, people are tortured with the justification given that there is a possibility – not the certainty - that they may have knowledge that could save lives (Brecher, 2007). This raises grave questions about the ethical and societal consequences of condoning torture in a democratic society, as we will discuss. Nonetheless, proponents of torture deny such problems with the “ticking bomb scenario” and resort to justifications with weak anecdotal evidence (Brecher, 2007).

The Importance of Understanding Denial in Relation to Torture

Before demonstrating how denial operates in relation to torture, it is important to understand why it is interesting to apply the psychology of denial to consider-

ations of torture. There are compelling ethical, legal, and societal reasons for preventing and stopping torture.

Conventions against Torture

Human rights are a non-negotiable and fundamental aspect of humanity. Following the atrocities of World War II, 48 nations voted in favor of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights on December 10, 1948, which states under article 5, “No one shall be subjected to torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.” Subsequently in 1949, the Geneva Conventions prohibited wartime violations of human rights, including torture. The Hague Conventions of 1907, which require all prisoners of war to be humanely treated, and the Geneva Conventions became the principal sources of the international humanitarian law (Forrest, 1996). In addition to these conventions, the 1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights prohibits torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment (Harbury, 2005).

In the General Assembly’s Convention Against Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment on 10 December of 1984, The United Nations stated that:

The term torture means any act by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person for such purposes as obtaining from him or a third person information or a confession, punishing him for an act he or a third person has committed or is suspected of having committed, or intimidating or coercing him or a third person, or for any reason based on discrimination of any kind, when such pain or suffering is inflicted by or at the instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of a public official or other person acting in an official capacity. It does not include pain or suffering arising only from, inherent in or incidental to lawful sanctions.

The United Nations further declared in Article Two, that “No exceptional circumstances whatsoever, whether a state of war or a threat of war, internal political instability or any other public emergency, may be invoked as a justification of torture.” Additionally, Article Three maintains that nations must ensure that acts of torture are an offense under its criminal laws.

Beyond the United Nation Conventions against torture, there are bans proclaimed by the European Union, the United States Federal Law, and regional treaties. Article 4 of the Charter on Fundamental Rights of the EU, states “No one

shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.” Torture is prohibited under the anti-torture statute, 18 U.S.C. § 2340 of the United States Code of the federal government. “US Federal law makes it a felony punishable for up to twenty years imprisonment for any U.S. official to torture, or conspire to torture, a person abroad” (Harbury, 2005, p. 121). The African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, a treaty adopted by the Organization of African Unity in 1981, prohibits all forms of exploitation and degradation, including torture (McEntee, 1996). These are just a few examples of countless resolutions proclaimed by nations not to commit torture. Despite these conventions, many nations continue to defy international and national law.

Societal Reasons for Ending Torture

In addition to the need for a nation to avoid the practice or abetting of torture in any form for the ethical and legal reasons that have just been discussed, there are also persuasive arguments about the importance of avoiding torture because of its ill effects on society. These arguments pertain to the institutional forms of damage that happen in response to allowing torture to be practiced, even if while denying its occurrence.

Brecher (2007) argues that societies that allow the practice of torture legitimize the profession of being a “torturer,” which in turn develops an internal dynamic that itself leads to the distortion of facts and events within the society. Furthermore, to legitimize the torturer as a professional blurs the ethical boundaries of medical professionals within the society, conveying, for example, that physicians’ responsibility to the state may override their responsibility to their patients—a very slippery slope. Similarly, Brecher argues that by allowing torture, democratic societies are in danger of experiencing a corruption of the legal process within their own societies, as well as losing ground in providing role models of social forms to which citizens within less democratic societies can aspire.

Jackson (2007) also describes the wide-reaching cultural and institutional effects on societies that practice torture. He argues that in order to maintain the practice of torture, a “torture-sustaining reality” must be socially constructed through “producing a series of powerful narratives and representations that are then endlessly reproduced across every sector of society until they become widely accepted as legitimate forms of knowledge and practice” (p. 359). Jackson identifies two types of narratives that are particularly required to sustain this torture-sustaining reality: 1) a powerful and threatening enemy image is

constructed and conveyed, against which extreme measures such as torture are required in order to protect the nation from evil; and 2) these enemies are dehumanized so that any potential concern about their human rights is attenuated. Not only do such social constructions have consequences for enabling the torture of individuals, Jackson argues, but also they have wide-ranging cultural consequences for the society. He cites recent research showing that:

The central narratives of the war on terrorism have been reproduced culturally across virtually every aspect of US society: churches, religious broadcasting, teaching in schools and universities, popular fiction and non-fiction, children's books, television entertainment, newspapers, movies, documentaries, websites, think-tanks, popular music, computer games, cartoons, comic books, and a great many other discursive processes... (p. 360)

UNDERSTANDING DENIAL IN CONSIDERATIONS OF TORTURE

There are at least three ways in which denial has influence over the political context of torture in democratic societies. First, there is the denial by leaders, citizens, and others that state-sanctioned torture is practiced in one's country or by representatives of one's country in other countries. In this thinking, if "enhanced interrogation techniques" are used, these techniques are considered to not constitute forms of torture, and, if confirmed acts of torture occur, these acts are committed illegitimately--by "bad apples" and are not authorized. Manipulation of facts around torture could also be considered simply lying, but in this chapter we highlight how the equivocal language plays upon the psychological denial mechanisms of torturers and citizens in democracies that torture. A second form of denial is the denial of the political motivations for sanctioning torture. This is manifested in policy endorsements of the supposed necessity to use severe interrogation techniques against individuals in order to save lives, (i.e., the ends justify the means) without any acknowledgement that the sanctioning of such techniques may have self-serving functions such as maintaining political power through intimidation and terror. A third form of the denial of torture is that of the denial of the humanity of the victims of torture. This occurs in many ways, including describing the victims of torture, who often have not even been charged with or found guilty of a crime, as "terrorists."

An analysis of these manifestations of the denial torture suggests a complex model is needed for understanding the psychology of denial of such issues as

torture that occur within a political context. Several components of this model are drawn from psychoanalytic and information-processing perspectives, while other components are drawn from social psychology. Because torture occurs in a political context, an adequate model also necessitates inclusion of political institutions such as the mass media and national leaders.

Because *cultural* norms are maintained, individual denial can also culminate in a society-wide phenomenon. The torture issue that has arisen in the context of the “War on Terror” can be viewed as an example of American citizen’s denial implicitly condoning behavior that is illegal and/or immoral. Jackson (2007) writes, “The practice of torture profoundly challenges deeply-held cultural-political beliefs about US civic identity, the military and the nature of the American polity” (p. 354). Yet, through the well-developed narrative constructed by dominant institutions (e.g., governmental, military, financial, media, and educational) a “torture-sustaining reality” (p. 355) is created, catalyzing individual denial processes to maintain the paradox of immoral behavior and US civic identity.

In a democracy such as the United States, the country’s citizens and institutions ultimately tie US civic identity to a self-concept of integrity. To maintain such an ideal, individuals wrap their perceptions of the country’s actions in a package of uprightness and valor. When such a reputation is tarnished, there may be a tendency for individuals to maintain a strong civic identity by denying responsibility in honor of their country. Denial is well suited in the short-run for maintaining an idealized image of one’s country, (e.g., that the U.S. is the most enlightened and humanitarian of all societies), especially when encountering evidence that threatens the veracity of such idealized images. Kim et al. (2004) and Ferrin et al. (2007) both signify the utility of denial of responsibility (in comparison to *apology* and *reticence*) in response to violations of integrity. A violation of integrity is defined as a breach in one’s trust in the honesty and uprightness of the actor. These investigations support the hypothesis that *denial* is a superior response to integrity violations, whereas *apology* is a stronger response to competency violations (a breach in one’s trust and confidence in the actor’s abilities and knowledge). However, their work diverges from others in focusing on the investigation of a *conscious* response by the denier (or apologizer) and by operationalizing the outcomes of interest as *social* (rather than specifically psychological) constructs. In the experiments, confederate actors are directed to *consciously* respond to breaches of trust with denials or apologies. Such evidence raises questions about the media, government, and military may in some cases consciously attempt to influence attitudes toward torture by framing the issues so

that the denial of torture is consistent with the public's perception of national and personal integrity.

The societal level concern with influencing the public's perception of national integrity is not a new phenomenon, as the US has endeavored to maintain a level of integrity in the eyes of its citizens and the world. In fact, Jackson (2007) suggests that the "torture-sustaining reality" is situated in our nation's history of counter-insurgent activities, starting with the war against the Native American nations and continuing through the cold war, and the wars in Vietnam, Iraq, and Afghanistan. He also describes the domestic prison system and the US treatment of Haitian and Cuban immigrants at Guantanamo Bay as saturated with "dirty" methods in handling inmates. These acts are evidence of a long history of two counter-rhetorics coexisting in public perceptions of America. The primary rhetoric of US civility and morality merges with a secondary rhetoric suggesting that such actions would never be sanctioned, supporting the individual denial of immoral behaviors that have been enacted *with* the sanctioning from US leaders.

Embedded in the "torture-sustaining reality" is the implication that citizens as well as their leaders not only deny the evidence of actual state-sanctioned torture, but also deny any self-serving political motivations accompanying such actions. As previously discussed, even when one "knows" of such motivations, one has psychic denial mechanisms to diffuse their import (Erdelyi, 2006) and present a counter reality (Dorpat, 1983). This can be understood as a form of displacement of responsibility, such as by referring to a few "bad apples" as responsible for individual acts of torture at Abu Ghraib, thereby avoiding perceived violations of the national integrity and morality of the U.S.

Whether utilized as a way to diffuse cognitive dissonance rising from conflicting worldviews, or as an unconscious defense mechanism of the ego, the process of denial is commonplace in the context of torture. Erdelyi's (2006) conception that denial is a repression of value and meaning - but not information - can be embedded in a social-psychological paradigm where techniques of influence create the "torture-sustaining reality." Such approaches allow for scattered reports of torture to be heard but not fully understood. By veiling the meaning and intensity of such a report through techniques like "dehumanization" and "authority," citizens are permitted and encouraged to see one thing, but experience another.

These abjurations of responsibility are secondary to a greater denial perpetuated by the double-sided reality: the individual's disavowal of the humanity of the intended victims. Through complex social-psychological modes of influence, such as *dehumanization* and *deindividuation*, individuals are able to move victims to categories that deny their personhood, thereby maintaining

human moral codes in the face of torture (Kelman, 2005; Zimbardo, 2007). “Detainees” are seen for the group they represent, and not as individual actors. Without the personhood American individuals claim to respect, torture victims become rational and moral targets slipping under the wired fence of acceptable behavior.

SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGICAL MECHANISMS OF DENIAL CONSIDERATIONS OF TORTURE

How is it possible to simultaneously hold the concepts of democracy and torture in one’s mind when they are completely incompatible and contradictory? It is argued here that the answer is—at least in part—denial. However, to more fully understand how this operates, it is critical to identify mechanisms that contribute to denial in this context. As discussed below, social psychological mechanisms play important roles in providing conditions favorable to the denial of torture.

Citizens of a democracy involved in torture, utilize denial as a mechanism to relieve anxiety and to reduce cognitive dissonance. Cohen (2001) demonstrates that denial is a mechanism by which individuals not directly involved in perpetrating torture or not directly victimized by torture actively select what they perceive and acknowledge. If information is considered to be threatening, it will ultimately be denied.

Citizens also interact with the social conditions creating the perception of a new reality that may permit their intrapsychic denial. If reinforced by social institutions, reality can be defined as to alter citizens’ habitual ways of thinking and acting (Zimbardo, 2007). For example, they may deny that torture is happening by denying that certain physical abuse is actually torture. Although physically abusing prisoners is arguably a form of torture, a poll issued by ABC News/Washington Post in 2004 found that two-thirds of Americans believe the government was using physical abuse that stops short of torture (Morris & Langer, 2004).

There are certain social constructs that pave the way for the intrapsychic denial of torture, and these mechanisms enable citizens of a democracy to deny that their government is utilizing torture and that the atrocious acts are indeed torture. Moral disengagement, displacement of responsibility to an authority figure, dehumanization, and deindividuation significantly contribute to the denial of, and thus perpetuation of torture. These factors may be at play regardless of

how close or far from the act a citizen is. In fact, many of these mechanisms are the very intrapsychic processes that allow the torturers to commit their crimes.

Moral Disengagement

In general, by experiencing normal socialization processes during their upbringing, people adopt moral standards, which act as guides for prosocial behavior and deterrents of antisocial behavior (Bandura, 1999). According to Bandura (1999), “the self-regulatory mechanisms governing moral conduct can be selectively disengaged by a number of psychosocial mechanisms. These mechanisms include displacement of responsibility, dehumanizing one’s victims, and deindividuation.”

Displacement of Responsibility

Displacement of responsibility is tantamount to the denial of responsibility “The most facile and comprehensible way to evade personal responsibility is to appeal to authority and obedience” (Cohen, 2001, p. 89). Appealing to authority allows one to deny agency, intent, disposition, and choice. Denying responsibility also reduces dissonance and the negative affect induced by a partaking in a counterattitudinal behavior like torture (Gosling, et al., 2006). Thus, if people deny that the government partakes in torture and if perpetrators deny responsibility for committing torture, they will feel less guilt, shame, or general discomfort.

Cohen (2001) also argues that being lower in the hierarchy of command facilitates the denial of personal responsibility for committing an atrocity because of not feeling responsible for the policies being acted upon. Yet Cohen argues that being higher in the chain of command also enables the denial of responsibility because then one does not directly commit or even witness the atrocity. Authorities in the government who condone torture displace responsibility onto a “few bad apples,” while military servicemen and women deny responsibility by attributing their actions to obeying orders. Citizens also deny that their government tortures by claiming that a few ‘aberrant’ soldiers committed the atrocious acts or that the torture was a matter of a few isolated incidents (Arredondo, 2008). On the contrary, according to Javier Zuniga, Amnesty International’s Americas Program Director, “Most of the torture and ill-treatment

stemmed directly from officially sanctioned procedures and policies -- including interrogation techniques approved by Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld” (Amnesty International, 2006).

People are capable of behaving in ways they would normally repudiate if a legitimate authority accepts responsibility for their actions that enabling perpetrators to deny their roles in the torture. Evidently, the greater the legitimacy and proximity of an authority figure, the higher the level of obedient aggression (Bandura, 1999). Milgram (1963) demonstrated the willingness of ordinary people to obey an authority figure to commit atrocious acts. A large majority of participants obeyed the instructions of the authority figure to administer electric shocks of increasing and even deadly voltage, and 65% administered the maximum shock level of 450 volts. In a partial replication of Milgram’s study, Burger (2006) found obedience rates were only slightly lower than those Milgram found 45 years prior. Interestingly, participants who saw a confederate refuse the experimenter’s instructions obeyed as often as those who saw no model (Burger, 2009).

Although there might have been a potential for enlightenment on the potentially negative consequences of authority and obedience since the Milgram experiments were conducted, this has not been the case. In his review of the literature, Blass (1999) found that rates of obedience have shown no systematic change over time, and he also found no gender differences in obedience.

This mechanism of displacement of responsibility demonstrates how denial around personal responsibility may result in increased likelihood of torture perpetration. Also, it is an important concept for understanding how the democratic citizen--from the outside--might accept the diffusion of responsibility as explaining away the crime of torture.

Dehumanization

Citizens of governments that torture (and even perpetrators of torture) may promote denial by rejecting the humanity of the victim. Dehumanization is the perception of the abused as less than human, and thus not worthy of just treatment. According to Haslam (2006), there are two forms: the first denies the unique human attributes of others, representing them as animal-like; and the second denies the human nature of others, representing them as objects. “Dehumanization excludes the victims from the perpetrators’ moral community, making it unnecessary to relate to them in moral terms” (Kelman, 2005, p. 131). Often, members of the “out-group” and “enemies” are dehumanized. During the

military dictatorship in Greece in 1967-1974, negative attitudes towards the enemies were maintained and reinforced by daily lectures given to the servicemen by the officers (Haritos-Fatouros, 1995). Research has also demonstrated that dehumanization leads to greater contempt and less favorable attitudes towards refugees (Esses et al. 2008).

Dehumanization allows for trained and untrained torturers to commit such acts because they deny the human essence of their victims. Some examples of this seen at Abu Ghraib prison include forced nudity and hooding.

Perceptions of other groups as immoral and unjust are important components of the dehumanization of members of these groups and lead to negative intergroup attitudes and behavior (Alexander, Brewer, & Herrmann, 1999). Morality can be disengaged by the tactic of dehumanizing a potential victim (Zimbardo, 2008).

In their study on aggression, Bandura and colleagues (1975) found that a decreased sense of personal responsibility, dehumanization, and an interaction between these two factors enhanced aggressiveness, and dehumanization fostered self-absolving justifications.

It is easy to imagine the affects that this might have on the citizens' ability to use the denial mechanism to avoid considering what is at stake with torture.

Deindividuation

Festinger, Pepitone, and Newcomb introduced the theory of deindividuation into mainstream social psychology in 1952. Festinger et al, (1952) contended that during a de-individuated state, anti-normative behavior emerges because individuals act as if submerged in a group and are neither seen nor paid attention to as individuals. Zimbardo (1969) extended deindividuation theory by specifying the input variables leading to deindividuation (anonymity, loss of individual responsibility, arousal, sensory overload, novel or unstructured situations, and conscious-altering substances) and the resulting output behavior, described as "behavior(s) in violation of established norms of appropriateness" (Zimbardo, 1969, p.251 as cited in Postmes & Spears, 1998). Deiner (1980) elaborated the theory of deindividuation and argued that it comes about through decreased self-awareness. In sum, classical and contemporary theories propose that, "deindividuation is a psychological state of decreased self-evaluation and decreased evaluation apprehension causing anti-normative and disinhibited behavior" (Postmes & Spears, 1998, p.241).

However, in their meta-analysis on the deindividuation literature, Postmes and Spears (1998) questioned the tenability of these theories, as they found that

the deindividuating conditions of anonymity, larger groups, and reductions in self-awareness, led to an increase in behavior that is normative within the present social context. "Deindividuating manipulations of anonymity, group size, and self-awareness foster adherence to situational norms and have comparatively little impact on behavior that is anti-normative according to general social norms" (Postmes et al., 1998, p. 252). Thus, anonymity and reduced self-awareness within a group enhance sensitivity to local norms.

Mullen et al. (2003) found that deindividuation leads to a reduction in both self-awareness and social identity. There are numerous studies depicting deindividuated persons committing shocking acts. Zimbardo (2007) describes an experiment in which no authority was present and women in a deindividuation condition delivered twice as much "shock" to victims as did the comparison women in the individuated condition. Also, Zimbardo's Stanford Prison Experiment relied upon the deindividuating reflective sunglasses and military uniforms as a means of creating anonymity (Zimbardo, 2007). When examining the lack of identifying information on the guards' uniforms at Guantanamo, it is evident that anonymity is a powerful mechanism by which military servicemen and women deny the truth that they are committing acts of torture. Their lack of self-awareness in a deindividuated state compels the guards to be enticed by the local norm, which denies that the abuse is torture, instead of protesting against the atrocities taking place.

Denial that their actions constitute acts of torture enables perpetrators to commit these crimes against humanity. Through heavy initiation processes and training, intrapsychic denial thrives. In his study on Greek military police during the Junta, Haritos-Fatouros (1995) presented and analyzed the various selection stages, psychological characteristics needed in an official torturer, and the training processes involved in "turning the normal behavior of an army recruit into the deviant behavior of a torturer" (p.129). Her analyses were based on official records of testimonies of twenty-one military-police given at the trial of the Junta criminals in 1975 in Athens and personal interviews with sixteen ex-military police during the military dictatorship in Greece. The training process included harsh treatment and restriction of the satisfaction of basic needs, including eating and relieving oneself. Inflicting torture on the recruits as if it were an everyday, "normal" event led to a desensitization of torture. "Routinization allows the torturers to ignore the overall meaning of the tasks they are performing and eliminates the opportunity to raise moral questions" (Kelman, 2005, p. 131). Moreover, endowing torturers with a sense of the high purpose to protect the threatened state encourages the routinization of torture (Kelman, 2005). As torture

becomes routine, personal responsibility diminishes and denial that the acts are torture becomes more entrenched.

Dr. Allodi of the Canadian Centre for Victims of Torture reveals:

The indoctrination or training in torture... consists of a systemized program of beatings, insults, and threats designed specifically to humiliate and brutalize the recruits. Crushed into submission in an irrational and unpredictable world, where the only escape is to obey orders blindly, they are introduced to a new ideology and values and a system of rewards for those who conform. (Atkinson, 2007, p.109)

The process of torture creates a new reality for the torturers. Torture is redefined as an essential measure to protect the state against the enemies. An observation of their behavior demonstrates that the prison guards of Abu Ghraib were in denial that they were committing crimes against humanity. Documenting the cruelty with photographs, in which they are smiling and showing a “thumbs-up,” illustrates their belief that they would be applauded for their actions. (Wittmann, 2008).

Intra-psychic mechanisms are susceptible to the influences of social institutions and social constructs. In the next section, we will provide an examination of some of these phenomena. The incidence of torture, which is sanctioned explicitly or implicitly by the state policy, may intensify under certain environmental conditions.

THE INSTITUTIONAL CONTEXT FOR THE DENIAL OF TORTURE

Democracies, as other forms of government, occur in a context of social institutions that can influence the ideas of the citizens. These social institutions include the media, the government, corporations, and many others. This complicated network of institutions interacts to form the matrix in which democratic citizens make decisions about how they want their government to function. Without accurate information, democracy will be at a disadvantage because its citizens cannot accurately participate. Further, the network of institutions has biases and flaws that may set the stage for the propagation of poor or partial information. The information that is communicated through these institutions should be complete, accurate, and objective, especially when it comes to topics that are of this level of importance. When it is not, for any reason, it

creates the societal conditions that can promote the denial factor discussed in this chapter.

The torture issue is one topic where these social institutions influence public opinion and lead to the psychological mechanisms discussed here. In fact, sometimes these social institutions become complicit in the denial mechanism around torture by producing information that is incomplete, vague, or inaccurate. Psychological mechanisms are strongly influenced by surrounding factors. A tendency toward denial can be enhanced by particular nuances through which information of the torture issue is communicated. We focus below on the United States' recent involvement in torture as a primary example.

Denial of Torture through Political Language

The US Department of Justice created a language around torture that lessens the severity. This creates fertile ground for denial by citizens. In the now famous US "Torture Memos," (or "Bybee memos," named for Assistant Attorney General, John Bybee), John Yoo and David Addington created new language for the government that distances meaning from act (Kemp, 2008; Mayer, 2006). Simply change the words and change legal definitions and the acts then sound permissible. And the denial is a bit more palatable.

In the "torture memos," the very word torture was redefined. It was detached from its traditional meaning described in treaties, conventions, international law, and in the Webster's Dictionary. Furthermore, it was redefined as an extreme circumstance that allows for a new and narrow way of using the (previously clearly) understood term. Removal of the word "torture" from dialog about torture certainly improved the setting for denial. These memos redefined torture so that the "[physical pain] must be equivalent in intensity to the pain accompanying serious physical injury, such as organ failure, impairment of bodily function, or even death" (Bybee, 2002, p.1). And the "mental pain... must result in significant psychological harm of significant duration, e.g., lasting for months or even years" (Bybee, 2002, p. 1).

"Enhanced interrogation" is a term that has become a euphemism for torture. This language shift removes the word for an illegal act and replaces it with an invented phrase that suggests something moral, but also something important, in fact something necessary (Mayer, 2006; Wolfendale, 2009). Meanwhile the act, *torturing a suspect*, has remained unchanged. But such a change in the language of torture can significantly support the psychological mechanism of denial by citizens of a democracy.

There are also a number of other examples from the United States' "War on Terror" where clear language is manipulated into vague language to serve a political agenda (including the government's choice of the term "War on Terror"). Each example promotes fertile ground for the denial of torture. "Enemy Combatant" can serve as a euphemism for *prisoner of war that we may torture*. "Extraordinary rendition" can operate as a euphemism for *move location to allow for torture and give the torturer impunity*. With these new, *created* terms, policy makers can create new perceptions of acts that previously were considered unacceptable forms of behavior--thus making the denial of the meaning more easily possible (Sontag, 2004).

When caught in a clear case of torture crime at Abu Ghraib, the United States government's response was to claim that this was a rare and unusual example of "a few bad apples" (Hamm, 2007). In the aftermath of the public revelation of these crimes at Abu Ghraib, senior officials denied the severity of these realities that had occurred within the context of the "War on Terror." They continued the language manipulation by omission of the word "torture" and substituting words such as "abuse." Moreover, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld said at a press conference, "...and therefore I'm not going to address the 'torture' word" (as quoted in Sontag, 2004, p. 25). *It didn't really happen?* This trend is continued into the Obama administration with the White House's refusal to allow photographs of detainee "abuse" (torture), again promoting denial in the citizens.

Further, the rhetoric has emphasized that the "abuses" that have occurred have been inflicted on "terrorists" (instead of *suspects*) or "enemy combatants" (instead of *prisoners of war* or *suspects*). In fact, government leaders have spoken of the detainees at Guantanamo Bay as "terrorists" ("the worst of the worst") yet many were released over time because there were no clear ties between them and any criminal activity (Golden, 2006). To be correct in the language, these persons were *suspects* initially, and then they became *suspects released, without charge, due to lack of evidence*. But the official language that was applied to them was "terrorists" and "the worst of the worst" (Golden, 2006).

The language changes are also applied beyond the characterization of the persons involved and on to the torture techniques.

Particular techniques have even been scrutinized and intellectualized beyond reason. "Waterboarding," a new name given to *water torture*, has become the source of frequent debate and discussion. This technique has long been a method of torture wherein the torture victim is subjected to pouring water into their mouth to simulate drowning. It has become the topic of debate whether or not this is torture. Yet it was designed for the purposes of torture many years ago, and used by notorious torture regimes from the Spanish inquisitions to the Khmer Rouge

(Rutten, 2008) as an undisputed method of torture. It was discussed in the International Military Tribunal for the Far East (The “Tokyo Trials”)--the post WWII war crimes tribunal by Allied Forces--as evidence of torture against the Empire of Japan (Wallach, 2007). But recently, water torture has been given a new name and a public debate has arisen around whether or not it is even torture at all. Is it psychologically easier to deny torture if the government tells its citizens that its practices are not “torture?” The fact that this is a debated topic suggests denial of what is being debated, especially given the previous international understanding of “waterboarding” as a form of torture.

The effect of the above language changes on the capacity for denial is significant. Taboo words are replaced by acceptable words. Where “torture” conjures vibrant images of unspeakable acts, government euphemisms for torture carry no such connotations. In some ways the newly crafted terms are meaningless, and in others they almost conjure noble or at least justifiable actions. If one’s nation engages in “enhanced interrogation,” that feels more acceptable than if the word “torture” is used to describe the same acts.

Straight-forward dismissal has also been seen in the example of government approach to torture. The US government repeated the phrase “we do not torture” throughout the President Bush administration (e.g., “Bush says,” 2007) and into the President Obama Administration. During President Obama’s state of the Union Address, he echoed this phrase (Obama, 2009), while the White House refused to release photographs of prisoner torture that had occurred within the context of the war in Afghanistan (Muskal, 2009).

Media

Media may also participate in the risk for citizen denial within a democracy with regard to issues like torture. The combination of media outlets may be influential in the development toward or away from society’s tendency for denial. To the degree that media outlets remain completely informative, accurate, and objective, they may reduce the capacity for citizen denial. But when these conditions are not met, the media can contribute to the public’s capacity for denial.

News Media

The news media's coverage of the torture issue may aid the denial process. The news coverage of the torture problem tends to be neither complete nor objective. It tends to highlight torture in its most ambiguous context rather than its usual context. And it tends to omit essential information about torture that would easily clarify any possibility of debate. These factors highlight the questions around torture rather than the facts, making it seem like what is salient about torture involves debatable issues rather than torture as an unambiguous *crime against humanity*. In fact, torture is literally discussed in the media as "the torture debate," suggesting that this illegal crime against humanity is to be debated despite the conventions and laws banning its practice.

The media includes distracting information that reduces the focus on important realities about the occurrence of torture, such as the context in which it is most likely to occur. The most obvious example of this occurs when torture news is presented along with the *ticking time bomb* thought experiment (mentioned above). This is the make-believe scenario (used as a thought experiment in philosophy classes) which asks whether torture is ethically permissible in a context where it *will* provide essential information that *will* save many innocent people from a ticking time bomb. Suddenly the audience is distracted from the issue of whether a democracy is involved in an international crime and instead is focused on Kantian vs. utilitarian ethics from Philosophy 101. When this scenario is included in the context of the torture news, it is unusual for the media to highlight the fact that this situation does not happen in real life, or that torture is considered to be unlikely to be effective in such a situation. It is merely introduced in its incomplete form and ends up distracting from the matter being reported (Hannah, 2006).

Other examples of the inclusion of distracting, emotionally charged side stories are found throughout media coverage of torture. Usually this is seen with regard to the context of torture ambiguously raising questions around the justification of the action. Audiences are encouraged to react with the limbic system rather than with their cerebrum.

Emotion over Logic

There are multiple examples of omissions in the news around torture that add to the denial factor (aside from simply *not covering* important stories around government torture).

Most torture occurs outside the context of interrogation (as was the case at Abu Ghraib). But this is not highlighted. Thus, from the information provided by

the news media, the impression is created that interrogation is the *only* context for torture. As mentioned in this chapter's section on the history of torture, all of the significant epochs of torture have been about terrorizing populations or extracting confession rather than about intelligence gathering.

Furthermore, the inefficacy of torture for the purpose of intelligence gathering is usually omitted in media. Yet, intelligence agencies have known for some time that information obtained under torture is unreliable (Imre, 2008). This is more important contextual information that is not presented. Although this is well-known to intelligence officers, detectives, and agencies that deal with information gathering, it is poorly understood by citizens because the news omits such coverage of the topic.

In addition, the convention against torture as a *crime against humanity* is not a highlighted feature in media news coverage of torture. An absolute ban against torture has been well established by the treaties and conventions that the United States has signed as well as by our own Federal Laws. Any *debate* about torture has already taken place decades ago, and the United States government has chosen to agree with the rest of the world that torture is always illegal. This is important contextual information for the torture news that is often omitted. The United Nations Convention Against Torture and the Geneva Conventions are unambiguous – their words leave no room for denial. But their omission in news media is important to the denial process. *How many Americans are aware that the United States is signatory to the UN Convention Against Torture? Or what it means to be signatory to such a convention?* This is important information for the purpose of providing complete information around the topic.

The news media's acceptance of government rhetoric is another issue lending to denial of the citizens. The "torture memos" may have coined the euphemistic terms, but the news media turned them into household terms by repeating them without critical analysis of their meaning. Also, the media attention to events at Abu Ghraib was marked by a number of public official events by the Bush administration that consistently muffled the use of "torture" from the language of the discussions. After the release of the damaging photos, Bennett et al. (2007) indicate that "within two weeks, the photos had been defined decisively, following the Bush administration's lead, as 'abuse'" (p. 98). A democratic society assumes that an important role of the media is to provide critical analysis, rather than to operate as an echo chamber, repeating political and cultural leaders' rhetoric without critical scrutiny.

Journalist Bill Moyers is similarly critical of this media failure. He criticizes what are referred to as the "rules of the game" with regard to press interaction with government. "These 'rules of the game' allow Washington officials to set the

agenda for journalism, with journalists essentially left to recount what they are told instead of subjecting official words and deeds to critical scrutiny. Instead of acting as filters for readers and viewers, sifting the truth from the propaganda, the press transcribes both sides of the spin, invariably failing to provide context, background, or any sense of which claims hold up and which are misleading.” (Moyers, 2009)

Talk Media

In addition to presentation of more “standard” formats for presenting “the news,” torture is also discussed on the “talk news” as well. There are many problems with the debate format for handling complicated issues generally. Torture is a particularly complicated issue that will not be served well to present in this format. Yet torture is often discussed and continues to be discussed on “talk news.”

The talk media debate format generally reduces a complicated topic into the form of a simple polarized debate between two individuals with extremely different viewpoints. Not enough time is allotted to the (usually emotion driven) argument that ensues so the exchange is entirely undeveloped. The outcome tends to be a brief, thoughtless, angry exchange that brings no new ideas to an intricate topic. Usually a viewer is not enlightened or challenged, but emotionally charged and excited about whichever side of the debate he/she initially was tending toward anyway.

When the talk media was applied to torture, a similar process occurred. The issue was framed without context as a debate usually around the ticking time bomb fantasy. In time, this thought experiment (that basically has nothing to do with the issue of US torture) claimed center stage. Its emotional flare *became* the message, thus losing any possibility of challenging citizens to confront the topic before them, a democratic government torturing people and violating international law. This sets up another mechanism for denial.

Further, challenging the assumptions of the “debate” becomes a difficult task given the setting. Not enough time or thought is allowed for anything beyond the featured, brief argument whose rules are predetermined by the rhetoric preceding it. This absolutely limits the potential for information delivery or for critical thought on an important topic.

Entertainment Media

The entertainment media is often criticized for glorifying many forms of violence. If the entertainment media were the only influence, the public might believe that war is nothing but a glorious romp and police spend their hours in high-speed chases and glamorous gun duels. Also, the public might believe that torture is a necessary interrogation tool that reluctant heroes may have no choice but to use in order to save the day just in the nick of time. But that is a misrepresentation.

Fox's "24" has become the flagship for entertainment media's misrepresentation of torture. "24" depicts noble heroes who are amazingly successful at torturing the secrets out of hardened terrorists. That is just the scenario that does not happen outside the thought experiment from the philosophy classroom. But in such fictitious scenarios, torture is portrayed as a living "ticking time bomb scenario" dramatized for mass audiences to behold. *It looks credible*. This dramatization may contribute to solidifying the fantasy of the ticking bomb scenario into viewers' perception of reality. Torture denial can be viewed as having as a hero 24's Jack Bauer as its champion (Cooley, 2008; Kamin, 2007).

There are many other examples of torture inaccurately depicted in entertainment media. The dramatic portrayals of these fictions elicit emotions of fear and excitement and entice the imagination. Furthermore, in television shows and films, the concept is sometimes developed that only the weak will talk under torture. While the coward terrorist will divulge accurate information quickly, the noble protagonist would never spill the secrets, no matter what happens. But the facts in the history of torture will suggest that torture will lead to just about anybody saying just about anything in confession in order to stop the pain (Harbury, 2005).

Other Institutions

There are other social institutions that could be examined for their participation in societies' denial of the torture issue in the United States. The United States' judicial system's course post September 11 is problematic. Likewise, the American Psychological Association's (APA) has been criticized as looking the other way around the issue of psychologists participating in torture.

The APA Presidential Task Force on Psychological Ethics and National Security (PENS) concluded in 2005 "that it is consistent with the APA Ethics Code for psychologists to serve in consultative roles to interrogation and

information-gathering processes for national security-related purposes” (APA, 2005c). However, in February 2008, the APA modified their policy on torture to more clearly express the organization’s 2007 anti-torture policy and to remove loopholes found in the 2007 report (Soldz, 2008). This report states, “Psychologists are absolutely prohibited from knowingly planning, designing, participating in or assisting in the use of all condemned techniques at any time and may not enlist others to employ these techniques in order to circumvent this resolution’s prohibition” (APA, 2008). Still, “the APA has remained silent about the roles of psychologists in U.S. interrogation abuses, maintaining the fiction that the role of psychologists in U.S. national security detentions was largely positive” (Soldz, 2008). Thus, the APA, a highly respected professional society, is susceptible to criticism for having contributed to the denial of torture.

All the examples of social institutions aligning with stances that promote denial are too numerous to discuss in this short chapter. From political parties to religious organizations to corporations, denial and taboo may play a role in how institutions handle torture.

IMPLICATIONS OF EXAMINING THE PSYCHOLOGY OF DENIAL IN THE POLITICAL CONTEXT

Denial and Democracy

Torture does not fit into the ideals of any democracy yet it is practiced in democracies. Through this examination of denial, we understand one possible mechanism for the preservation of torture in this paradoxical context. But this may beg a more pressing question, especially with regard to critical issues such as torture: *what is the role of denial in democracy?* Citizens of democracies have an obligation to remain aware of important issues. Denial is entirely inconsistent with the duties of democratic citizens.

Citizens have a right to transparency as well as a duty to understanding. However, when the social institutions that are intrinsic to the matrix of information-sharing succumb to the breakdowns addressed in this chapter, denial can become a factor in reducing transparency. This raises questions about the obligations of democracies regarding this primitive psychological mechanism and the obligations of citizens to remain completely informed. Do the citizens have a responsibility to watchdog their institutions, for example by demanding more informative, accurate, and complete news media and government reporting? Do

institutions have a responsibility to inform the citizens, such as by highlighting socially responsible news despite more profitable alternatives? How can institutions and citizens overcome denial in considerations of virtually unspeakable topics such as torture?

Overcoming Denial in the Political Context

To the extent that the critique in this chapter accurately depicts factors contributing to the social problem of torture under democracy, we may consider the conditions that could be amended in effort to reduce denial among citizens.

Democratic governments have a responsibility to the public to be transparent, totally informative, and inclusive of majority and minority opinions. An antidote to overcome citizen denial in the political context is accurate information about the government, including all relevant agencies of government--from the executive branch, to the military, to the justice department. The public must have factual knowledge in order to have a functional democracy. Media outlets also have the obligation to provide critiques of government actions when such actions are out of line with the virtues of a democracy. When media fails, denial is fostered. In the context of denial, government is able to move unguided by citizens, and, therefore, discrepant with fundamental principles of self government.

The power of the media for helping to undermine denial in the political context is highlighted by public reactions to media portrayals in which the torture issue has been highlighted more bluntly. Many media outlets showed the now-famous photographs from Abu Ghraib including the photograph of a hooded suspect being tortured with electric shocks. In response to the release of the photos, a public outcry arose against the use of torture against military captives, undermining the public's denial that torture had occurred under the U.S. presence during the war in Iraq, although the media struggled with the framing of this story as to whether to divulge from the government portrayal of "a few bad apples" being responsible (Bennett, Lawrence, & Livingston (2006).

CONCLUSION: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF DENIAL IN A POLITICAL CONTEXT

This chapter has focused on “the case of torture” with regard to the psychology of denial in a political context. But it is important to also step back from the torture issue and consider how much impact this primitive psychological defense mechanism may have over the greater political process. The psychology of denial has been linked in this chapter to multiple factors involved with the web of politics. We have only alluded to some of the institutions and constructs in the matrix of societal factors that exert influence over citizens’ denial. This analysis suggests that denial operates as a maladaptive defense mechanism when applied to the political process of democracies, and can be considered to have dangerous potential for adversely influencing action around critical topics. Although it is very important to understand the effects of denial on individuals, denial’s potential for large-scale effects on society also merits further attention.

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Chapter 2

REPRESSION: FINDING OUR WAY IN THE MAZE OF QUESTIONNAIRES

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ABSTRACT

Repression is typically associated in literature with terms such as non-expression, emotional control, rationality, anti-emotionality, defensiveness and restraint. Whether these terms are synonymous with repression, indicate a variation, or are essentially different from repression is uncertain. We have discussed the similarities and differences between these concepts elsewhere (Garssen, 2007). In addition, a multitude of questionnaires has been developed in this field, which presents yet another problem for evaluating studies. In the present review, we critically discuss the various questionnaires used for measuring repression and related constructs, and then present our assessment on which scales are reliable and valid and which are not. The most appropriate repression measure is the Marlow Social Desirability (MC SD) scale, or the combination of the MC SD and an anxiety/distress scale. The question whether the MC SD scale alone, or the combination measure is the best repression measure remains unsettled. Future studies should apply several of the reliable and valid repression measures and study their

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interrelationships, as well as their relationships with several distress, personality and objective measures.

Key words: Repression, emotional control, defensiveness, questionnaires, review

INTRODUCTION

The possible influence of repression on disease development (Beutler, Engle, Oro'-Beutler, Daldrup, & Meredith, 1986; Jensen, 1987; Weihs, Enright, Simmens, & Reiss, 2000), health behaviour and symptom reporting (Linden, Paulhus, & Dobson, 1986; Koller, Heitmann, Kussmann, & Lorenz, 1999) has been investigated in many studies. Summarising the findings proves problematic, however, as authors use different labels for 'repression-like' concepts, such as repression, suppression, non-expression of negative emotions, emotional control, emotional inhibition, rationality, anti-emotionality, type C response style, defensiveness and restraint. It is unclear whether this array of terms actually refers to the same concept or altogether different concepts. For instance, is forgetting details of traumatic events (i.e. sexual abuse or war experiences) comparable to not wanting to show one's emotions because of one's preference to rationalise? And yet, the term repression is used in both examples.

In addition, a multitude of questionnaires has been developed in this field, which presents yet another problem for evaluating studies. For instance, it is not certain whether findings obtained from an Emotional Control questionnaire and a Defensiveness scale can be equated. Below we will critically review the available repression-like questionnaires. Elsewhere, we have presented a conceptual discussion on the various terms used in this field (Garssen, 2007; Garssen & Remie, 2004).

Repression is the general term that is used to describe the tendency to inhibit the experience and the expression of negative emotions or unpleasant cognitions in order to prevent one's positive self-image from being threatened. It should be emphasised that the term is used here to describe a trait or style (also labelled as 'repressive coping style' or 'repressive defensiveness') and not an act. Other authors have presented comparable descriptions, such as "Individuals who avoid focusing on ego-threatening material are termed repressors" (Ashley & Holtgraves, 2003), or "repression can be defined as the avoidance of threatening information" (Baumeister & Cairns, 1992).

The term defensiveness is best explained on the basis of the work by Weinberger, who made a distinction between two types of defensiveness: Repression was defined as scoring high on defensiveness, but low on anxiety, and anxious defensiveness defined as scoring high on both defensiveness and distress (Weinberger, Schwartz, & Davidson, 1979). Two groups formed on the basis of this distinction turned out to be different on a number of personality variables, as apparent from another study by Weinberger (Weinberger & Schwartz, 1990)¹. Compared to the other groups, the anxious defensive group scored low with respect to assertiveness, ability to express themselves in close relationships, sensitivity to one's own needs and feelings, self-esteem and self-control, but scored high on avoidant personality (shyness), dependency (emotional reliance on others and approval dependence), obsessive worrying, and (minor) physical illnesses. The repressive group, on the other hand, was characterised by high scores for intimacy, self-esteem, self-control (tendency to use self-management techniques), defensiveness and alexithymia, but low on avoidant personality (Weinberger et al., 1990). These differences across a broad spectrum of personality traits indicate that the division into the two defensiveness groups is more than the product of an arithmetic procedure; it refers to a constellation of essential individual differences.

Defensiveness, therefore, seems to cover a broader concept than repression. Defensiveness concerns different strategies to protect oneself against being hurt psychologically. The first condition, anxious defensiveness, includes the awareness of negative emotions, whereas these emotions are denied in the second condition, repression. Weinberger's division into two forms of defensiveness is highly useful. If high levels of anxiety or other forms of distress are implied in the definition of a concept, one should place this concept under the heading of anxious defensiveness, rather than under the heading repression. On an empirical level, a low level of distress reporting in repression would be expected (negative relationship between repression and distress), and a relatively high level in anxious defensiveness (no relationship or a positive relationship).

¹ Weinberger et al., 1990) applied the Weinberger Adjustment Scale (WAI) instead of the MC DS, and used the term 'restraint' instead of 'defensiveness'. Six groups were formed in this study, based on a tripartition of restraint scores and a dipartition of distress scores, but the remaining four groups are not relevant to this discussion.

QUESTIONNAIRES

Questionnaires will be discussed under two headings ‘repression’ and ‘other questionnaires’. The latter category includes self-deception and other-deception. The scales are presented alphabetically within each category.

It should be emphasised that we have only provisionally categorised these scales as ‘repression scales’. The developers of the scales are rarely explicit about whether their scales reflect repression. Uncertainty about the character of a scale should be settled by empirical evidence; especially the relationship with other repression questionnaires. If such evidence is available, it is presented in the discussion below and in the tables.

The psychometric characteristics of the repression questionnaires are summarised in Table 1. Information about the number of items per (sub)scale, factor analytic findings, internal consistency and test-retest reliability can be found in Table 1a. The relationship with other repression scales is presented in Table 1b. This table also summarises three other characteristics that specifically apply to repression scales. The first characteristic concerns the relationship with distress. The character of repression dictates a negative association between repression and distress scores, as repression implies the tendency to underreport negative emotions. Secondly, it indicates whether negative emotions are mentioned in the wording of items, which is for instance the case in questions like: “When I feel anxious, I smother my feelings” (Item in the Courtauld Emotional Control Scale; Watson et al., 1983). We present this information, because such formulations could artificially lead to a positive relationship between repression and distress scores. People who are inclined to deny negative emotions (repressors) may focus on the first half of such items (“no, I rarely feel anxious; this does not apply to me”). If so, they will score low both on such ‘repression’ items and on items in a distress questionnaire. The third aspect concerns the directness or indirectness in the wording of items asking about the tendency to deny negative feelings. An example of a direct item is “When I am anxious, I smother my feelings” (Courtauld Emotional Control Scale; Watson et al., 1983). An indirect item is “I am never unkind to people I don’t like” (Defensive subscale of the Weinberger Attitude Inventory; Weinberger, 1991).

Table 1a. Overview of repression questionnaires

Questionnaire	Subscales	No. of items	Psychometric characteristics		
			Confirmed by factor analysis? ¹	Internal consistency sufficient?	Test-retest reliab. sufficient?
Balanced Inventory of Desirable Responding (BIDR) (Paulhus, 1984)	Self-deception (SD) Other-deception (OD)	20 20	yes (Kroner et al., 1996; Paulhus, 1984)	yes (Paulhus, 1984; Linden et al., 1986; Turvey et al., 1993; Kroner et al., 1996; Furnham et al., 2002; Stober et al., 2002) ⁴	
Courtauld Emotional Control Scale (CECS) (Watson et al., 1983)	Anger control Anxiety control Depression control	7 7 7	no	yes (Watson et al., 1983; Giese-Davis et al., 2001)	yes (Watson et al., 1983)
Emotional Control Questionnaire (ECQ) A. (Roger et al., 1987); B. (Roger et al., 1989)	Rehearsal	11 ^A 14 ^B	yes (Roger et al., 1987; Roger et al., 1989) ^a	yes (Roger et al., 1987) ^A (King et al., 1992; Roger et al., 1989) ^B	yes (Roger et al., 1987) ^A (Roger et al., 1989) ^B
	Emotional Inhibition	9 ^A 14 ^B		yes (Roger et al., 1987) ^A (Roger et al., 1989) ^B no (King et al., 1992) ^A	yes (Roger et al., 1987) ^A (Roger et al., 1989) ^B
	Aggression Control	11 ^A 14 ^B		yes (Roger et al., 1987; King et al., 1992) ^A (Roger et al., 1989) ^B	yes (Roger et al., 1987) ^A (Roger et al., 1989) ^B
	Benign Control	9 ^A 14 ^B		yes (Roger et al., 1987) ^A (Roger et al., 1989) ^B no (King et al., 1992) ^A	yes (Roger et al., 1987) ^A (Roger et al., 1989) ^B
Emotional Expression and Control (EEC) scale (Bleiker et al., 1993)	Emotional control (EC) Emotional expression - Out (EEO) Emotional expression - In (EEL)	6 6 6	yes (Bleiker et al., 1993)	yes (Bleiker et al., 1993; Verissimo, Mota-Cardoso, & Taylor, 1998; Garssen et al., 2007)	yes (Bleiker et al., 1993)

Table 1a.(Continued)

Questionnaire	Subscales	No. of items	Psychometric characteristics		
			Confirmed by factor analysis? ¹	Internal consistency sufficient?	Test-retest reliab. sufficient?
Marlowe-Crowne Social Desirability (MC SD) Scale (Crowne et al., 1960)		33		yes (Sincoff, 1992; Turvey et al., 1993; Fischer et al., 1993; Loo et al., 2000; Jorgensen & Zachariae, 2006; Garssen et al., 2007)	yes (Jorgensen et al., 2006)
Rationality/Anti-emotionality (RAE) scale (Bleiker et al., 1993)	Rationality Emotionality Understanding	6 4 3	no	yes (Bleiker et al., 1993; Garssen et al., 2007)	yes (Bleiker et al., 1993)
Rationality/Emotional Defensiveness (R/ED) scale (Spielberger, 1988b)	Rationality Anti-emotionality	5 7	yes (Spielberger, 1988b; Fernandez-Ballesteros et al., 1997)	yes (Fernandez-Ballesteros et al., 1997)	yes (Fernandez-Ballesteros et al., 1997)
Repression-sensitization (R-S) scale (Byrne, 1961; Byrne et al., 1963)		55	no, factor analysis has failed to support the assumption of unidimensionality (Carlson, 1979)	yes (Linden et al., 1986) (Turvey et al., 1993)	
Self-deception and Other deception Questionnaire (SDQ, ODQ) (Sackeim et al., 1979)	Self-deception (SD) Other-deception (OD)	20 20	yes (Paulhus, 1984)	yes (Turvey et al., 1993)	
State Trait Anger Expression Inventory (STAXI) (Spielberger, 1988a)	Anger-In Anger-Out Anger Control	8 8 8	yes (Fuqua et al., 1991; Forgays, Forgays, & Spielberger, 1997)	yes (Spielberger, 1988a; Kassino, Sukhodolsky, Eckhardt, & Tsytarev, 1997)	

Table 1a. (Continued)

Questionnaire	Subscales	No. of items	Psychometric characteristics		
			Confirmed by factor analysis? ¹	Internal consistency sufficient?	Test-retest reliab. sufficient?
Weinberger Attitude Inventory (WAI) A. Complete WAI (87 items) B. Short-form (37 items; including 12 distress items and 2 validity items) (Weinberger, 1991)	Restraint subscales: - Suppression of Aggression - Impulse Control - Consideration of Others - Responsibility Repressive Defensiveness Denial of distress	7 ^A ; 3 ^B ; 8 ^A ; 3 ^B ; 7 ^A ; 3 ^B ; 8 ^A ; 3 ^B ; 11 ^{A,B} 11 ^A	yes (Weinberger, 1991; Farrell et al., 2000; Weinberger, 1997) ^c	yes (Weinberger, 1991; Turvey et al., 1993; Weinberger, 1997) ^A ; (Giese-Davis et al., 2001) ^B yes but somewhat low.(= .50 a .60) for Impulse Control and Responsibility (Garssen et al., 2007) ^B	yes (Weinberger, 1991) ^A

1. This means that an a priori division into subscales has been confirmed by factor analysis, or that original factor analytic findings has been confirmed in other studies.
 2. Internal consistency of the self-deception scale was sufficient if three items were dropped (Furnham et al., 2002)
- A,B. Two versions of this list exists (see first column)

Table 1b. Overview of repression questionnaires.

Questionnaire	subscales	Relationship with other repression measures in the expected direction ? ¹	Relationship with distress measures in the expected direction? ²	Negative emotions mentioned in the items?	Direct or indirect repression questions?
Balanced Inventory of Desirable Responding (BIDR) (Paulhus, 1984)		yes (for both SDQ and ODQ) MC SD (Paulhus, 1984; Pauls et al., 2004; Furnham et al., 2002) R-S (Linden et al., 1986) SDS (based on MC SD) (Stober et al., 2002)	yes for both SDQ and ODQ (Linden et al., 1986) yes for SDQ (Turvey et al., 1993)	no	indirect
Courtauld Emotional Control Scale (CECS) (Watson et al., 1983)		yes Lie scale of EPQ; not significant for MC SD (Watson et al., 1983) yes R/ED, though not for all subgroups; (Swan et al., 1992) no WAI (Giese-Davis et al., 2001)	yes but only significant for Anger control (Watson et al., 1983) no positive relationships (Classen, Koopman, Angell, & Spiegel, 1996) no positive relationships (Giese-Davis et al., 2001)	yes	direct
Emotional Control Questionnaire A. ECQ1 (Roger et al., 1987) B. ECQ2 (Roger et al., 1989)	Rehearsal	yes negative rel. with SDQ, WAI restraint, MC SD (what is to be expected from a rehearsal scale) (King et al., 1992) ^A no positive rel. Anger-In of STAXI; no rel. with avoidance coping, R/ED, Anger Control of STAXI (Kaiser, Hinton, Krohne, Stewart, & Burton, 1995) ^B	yes positive rel. (what is to be expected from a rehearsal scale) (Roger et al., 1989; Kaiser et al., 1995) ^B	no	direct
	Emotional Inhibition	no SDQ, WAI-restraint, MC SD (King et al., 1992) ^A no Avoidance coping, Anger-In, Anger-Control, R/ED (Kaiser et al., 1995) ^B	no relationships found (Roger et al., 1989; Kaiser et al., 1995) ^B	no	direct

Table 1b. (Continued)

Questionnaire	subscales	Relationship with other repression measures in the expected direction ? ¹	Relationship with distress measures in the expected direction? ²	Negative emotions mentioned in the items?	Direct or indirect repression questions?
	Aggression Control	no SDQ, MC SD, though a positive rel. was found for WAI-restraint (King et al., 1992) ^A	no relationships found (Roger et al., 1989) ^B	no	direct
	Benign Control	no SDQ, MC SD, though a positive rel. was found for WAI-restraint (King et al., 1992) ^A	no relationships found (Roger et al., 1989) ^B	no	direct
Emotional Expression and Control (EEC) scale (Bleiker et al., 1993)	EC	yes RAE (Bleiker et al., 1993) yes MC SD, RAE Understanding and Rationality, WAI restraint and defensiveness (Garssen et al., 2007)	yes (Bleiker et al., 1993; Verissimo et al., 1998; Garssen et al., 2007)	yes	direct
	EEO	mixed negative for Rationality, positive for Emotionality and absent for Understanding of RAE (Bleiker et al., 1993) mixed absent for WAI restraint and defensiveness, MC SD and Understanding of RAE, positive for Anti-Emotionality and Rationality of RAE	mixed positive for anger, negative for depression, and absent for anxiety (Bleiker et al., 1993) no no relationships found (Verissimo et al., 1998) no positive for some distress scales; absent for others (Garssen et al., 2007)	yes	direct
	E EI	yes RAE, but correlation coefficients were very low (Bleiker et al., 1993) no negative for MC SD and some WAI restraint and defensiveness scales; only positive for RAE Rationality (Garssen et al., 2007)	no pos. relationships (Bleiker et al., 1993); or no association (Verissimo et al., 1998; Garssen et al., 2007)	yes	direct

Table 1b. (Continued)

Questionnaire	subscales	Relationship with other repression measures in the expected direction ? ¹	Relationship with distress measures in the expected direction? ²	Negative emotions mentioned in the items?	Direct or indirect repression questions?
Marlowe-Crowne Social Desirability (MC SD) Scale (Crowne et al., 1960)		yes SDQ (Paulhus, 1984) yes WAI restraint, SDQ (King et al., 1992) yes R/ED (Swan et al., 1992) yes SDQ (Tomaka et al., 1992) yes WAI restraint and defensiveness, SDQ (Turvey et al., 1993) yes R/ED (Ritz et al., 1996) no R/ED (Fernandez-Ballesteros et al., 1997) yes cognitive avoidance (Egloff et al., 1997) yes WAI restraint and defensiveness (Derakshan et al., 1997) yes WAI defensiveness (Nyklicek et al., 1998) yes BIDR SD & IM (Furnham et al., 2002) yes WAI restraint and defensiveness, Emotional Control of EEC, Understanding of RAE (Garssen et al., 2007)	yes (Ritz et al., 1996; Egloff et al., 1997; Phipps & Srivastava, 1997; Mann & James, 1998; Watson et al., 1983; Turvey et al., 1993; Gick, Mcleod, & Hulihan, 1997; Nyklicek et al., 1998; Garssen et al., 2007; Kreitler et al., 1990) no no relationships found (Sincoff, 1992) mixed negative rel. with three distress questionnaires, but sign. for only one (Derakshan et al., 1997)	no	indirect
Rationality/ Anti-emotionality (RAE) scale (Bleiker et al., 1993)	Rationality	mixed absent for MC SD, mixed for WAI restraint and defensiveness, positive for Emotional Control of EEC (Garssen et al., 2007) yes Emotional Control of EEC (Bleiker et al., 1993)	no positive for some distress scales (Garssen et al., 2007) yes, but correlation coefficients were low (Bleiker et al., 1993)	no	indirect, though Rationality is the most direct repression subscale

Table 1b. (Continued)

Questionnaire	subscales	Relationship with other repression measures in the expected direction ? ¹		Relationship with distress measures in the expected direction? ²		Negative emotions mentioned in the items?	Direct or indirect repression questions?
	Emotionality	no	absent for MC SD, WAI restraint and defensiveness, EEC (Garssen et al., 2007) no EEC (Bleiker et al., 1993)	no	relationships found (Garssen et al., 2007; Bleiker et al., 1993)	no	indirect
	Understanding	yes yes	MC SD, some scales of WAI restraint and defensiveness, Emotional Control of EEC (Garssen et al., 2007) Emotional Control of EEC (Bleiker et al., 1993)	yes yes	for several, though not all distress scales (Garssen et al., 2007) (Bleiker et al., 1993)	no	indirect
Rationality/Emotional Defensiveness (R/ED) scale (Spielberger, 1988b)		yes yes yes no no	CECS-subscales, Anger Control and Anger Out subscales of the STAXI, and MC SD. The relationship with Anger-In subscale of the STAXI was low, not always significant and negative (Swan et al., 1992) STAXI-control and avoidance coping (Kaiser et al., 1995) MCSD (Ritz et al., 1996) MCSD-Anxiety combination {Ritz & Dahme 1996 1470 /id} MCSD (Fernandez-Ballesteros et al., 1997)	yes yes yes	anxiety, anger and depression, though only significant in one of the two study groups; no significant relationships for the sumscore to the SCL-90 (Swan et al., 1992) anger expression (Kaiser et al., 1995) anger expression, state anxiety (Davidson, 1996)	no	indirect
Repression-sensitization (R-S) scale (Byrne, 1961; Byrne et al., 1963)		yes yes	BIDR, (Linden et al., 1986) WAI restraint and defensiveness, MC SD, MC DS - MAS combination and SDQ; (Turvey et al., 1993)	yes	(Linden et al., 1986; Turvey et al., 1993)		

Table 1b. (Continued)

Questionnaire	subscales	Relationship with other repression measures in the expected direction ? ¹		Relationship with distress measures in the expected direction? ²		Negative emotions mentioned in the items?	Direct or indirect repression questions?
Self-deception and Other deception Questionnaire (SDQ, ODQ; Sackeim et al., 1979)		yes yes	for both SDQ and ODQ: MC SD, (Paulhus, 1984) for SDQ: MC SD (Tomaka et al., 1992) MC SD (King et al., 1992)	yes yes	for SDQ, but low and not always sign. correlations for ODQ (Sackeim et al., 1979) for SDQ (Tomaka et al., 1992; Turvey et al., 1993)	no	indirect
State Trait Anger Expression Inventory (STAXI) (Spielberger, 1988a)	Anger-In	No Mixed	R/ED (Swan et al., 1992) no rel. with R/ED & avoidance coping , though positive relationships were found for Rehearsal and Emotional Inhibition of ECQ (Kaiser et al., 1995)	no	positive rel. (Kassinove et al., 1997; Kaiser et al., 1995; Spielberger, 1988a)	yes	direct
	Anger-Out	Yes	R/ED (Swan et al., 1992)	yes	(Kassinove et al., 1997; Spielberger, 1988a)	yes	direct
	Anger Control	Yes Yes	R/ED (Swan et al., 1992) R/ED & avoidance coping (Kaiser et al., 1995)	yes	(Kassinove et al., 1997), though not significant (Kaiser et al., 1995)	yes	direct

Table 1b. (Continued)

Weinberger Attitude Inventory (WAI) A. Complete WAI (87 items; including 30 restraint, 22 defensiveness, 29 distress and 3 validity items) B. Short-form (37 items; including 12 restraint, 11 defensiveness, 12 distress and 2 validity items) (Weinberger, 1991)	yes	for teacher and peer ratings, (Weinberger, 1991) ^A	mixed	relationship for Repressive Defensiveness, but not for Restraint (Turvey et al., 1993) ^A	no, except for suppression of aggression	indirect
	yes	MC SD and SDQ (King et al., 1992) (relationship is only for the total of the restraint scales) ^A	no	Repressive Defensiveness, which was the only tested repression measure, showed only a sign. relationship for 1 out of 7 (un) well-being measures (Emmons & Colby, 1995) ^{A,B}		
	yes	MC SD, MC SD anxiety combination, SDQ (Turvey et al., 1993) ^A	yes	though not for the subscale Consideration of Others in all samples, (Weinberger, 1991; Weinberger, 1997) ^A		
	yes	MC SD (Derakshan et al., 1997)	mixed	negative rel. with STAI, but no significant rel. with two other distress questionnaires (Derakshan et al., 1997)		
	yes	MC SD (Nyklicek et al., 1998) (only the Repressive Defensiveness scale was tested)	yes	(Nyklicek et al., 1998) (only the Repressive Defensiveness scale was tested)		
	yes	MC SD, Emotional Control of EEC, Understanding of RAE (However, few associations for Responsibility of WAI) (Garssen et al., 2007) ^B	yes	though not for Consideration of Others and Anger Suppression (Giese-Davis et al., 2001) ^B		
			mixed	only a few (negative) relationships with distress scales (Garssen et al., 2007) ^B		

1. Expected are positive relationship with other repression scales.

2. Expected relationship with repression are: negative for distress and positive for well-being.

A,B. Two versions of this list exists (see first column)

Repression Questionnaires

1. The *Courtauld Emotional Control Scale (CECS)* evaluates “the extent to which individuals report controlling anger, anxiety and depressed mood” (Watson et al., 1983). The scale includes three subscales: Anger control, Anxiety control and Depression control. Items have been selected from patients’ responses to interview questions. The wording of the items is as follows: “What happens when you get angry/anxious/depressed?” This questionnaire was developed to apply in studies on cancer, as is the case with the EEC and RAE described below, but these scales are in their wording not cancer-specific and can be used generically.

On the basis of factor loadings, the number of items was reduced to 21; seven for each of the three subscales. Internal consistency and test-retest reliability were adequate. However, the expected positive associations with other repression scales and the expected negative associations with distress measures were not always demonstrated (see Table 1b). Some studies even found positive associations between the three CECS scales and distress questionnaires (see Table 1b).

In summary, the classical psychometric characteristics of this scale appeared adequate, though the factor structure that was originally found has to date not been confirmed in a new study. The relationship with other repression measures has also not yet been convincingly demonstrated. Additionally, a positive relationship with distress was found in two studies, which undermines the validity of this questionnaire as a measure of repression.

2. Roger developed the *Emotional Control Questionnaire (ECQ)* to measure the tendency to inhibit the expression of emotional responses (Roger & Nesshoever, 1987; Roger & Najarian, 1989). The questionnaire contains 40 items and includes four subscales: Rehearsal, Emotional Inhibition, Aggression Control and Benign Control. The first scale, Rehearsal, is no repression scale, because it refers to prolonged rumination about upsetting events in the past. Emotional Inhibition relates to withholding emotional expression. Aggression Control concerns the expression of aggressive acts, while Benign Control taps the control of impulses that are not aggressive. A new and elaborate version, called ECQ2, was developed by Roger et al. (1989), which comprises 56 items that were divided into the same four scales (14 items in each scale). This new scale included 37 items from the original scale.

The factor structure of the original version (ECQ1) was determined in the first study by Roger (Roger et al., 1987) and replicated in the second study (Roger et

al., 1989). The last study also factor analysed the more recent version (ECQ2), which yielded a four-factor solution that was comparable to the four-factors solution of the ECQ1. Internal consistency appeared insufficient for Emotional Inhibition and Benign Control in one study (King, Emmons, & Woodley, 1992), although internal consistency and test-retest reliability were satisfactory in other studies (Roger et al., 1987; Roger et al., 1989). Relationships with other repression questionnaires were rarely significant. Three of the ECQ scales showed no relationship with distress questionnaires, whereas a positive relationship was found for the Rehearsal scale, which is to be expected, given the character of this scale.

In conclusion, the reliability of this scale is sufficient, but one has to doubt the validity of the scale.

3. The *Emotional Expression and Control (EEC) scale* (Bleiker, Ploeg, Hendriks, Leer, & Kleijn, 1993), is constructed in line with the STAXI by Spielberger (see below). The EEC assesses the extent to which negative feelings are held in, expressed toward other people, or controlled, respectively. The EEC contains similar subscales as the STAXI that each include six items: Emotional Control (EC), Emotional Expression-In (EEI), and Emotional Expression-Out (EEO). Each six-item subscale is composed of two items measuring anxiety, two items measuring anger, and two items measuring depression. Reliability in terms of internal consistency and test-retest reliability of the three EEC subscales have been demonstrated.

The a priori division into subscales was confirmed by factor analysis. The relationships with other repression scales were unsatisfactory. They were in the expected direction for the Emotional Control subscale, but were mixed (sometimes positive, sometimes absent and sometimes negative) for the other two scales.

EC appeared to be negatively related to feelings of distress (anxiety, anger, depression), and positively related to quality of life measures, as is to be expected from a repression measure. However, relationships were mixed for EEO and even positive for EEI.

In conclusion, only one of the subscales in the Emotional Expression and Control scale, the Emotional Control subscale, seems a reliable and valid measure for repression. The validity of the other two subscales is, however, insufficient.

4. The *Marlowe-Crowne Social Desirability (MC SD) scale* (Crowne & Marlowe, 1960) should, according to Weinberger et al. (1979), be better conceived as a measure of defensiveness, rather than a measure of social

desirability. They stated that “It is essential to note that numerous studies have concluded that the MC SD scale is unrelated to the construct that it is usually thought to measure, namely conformity behaviour or tendencies to respond to questionnaires in a socially desirable direction”.

In eleven of the twelve studies shown in Table 1b, a relationship between the MC SD and other repression scales was found. A negative association between MC SD scores and distress scores was also demonstrated in ten studies, though not found in one study (Sincoff, 1992), and in another study only for one of three distress questionnaires (Derakshan & Eysenck, 1997).

Several short forms of the MC SD have been developed. They appear to be closely related to the full MC SD scale, but have somewhat lower internal consistency (most alphas in the .50 - .70 range). Confirmatory factor analyses have shown that some of these shorter forms showed a better fit with a unidimensional model than the full form (Loo & Thorpe, 2000; Fischer & Fick, 1993; Loo & Loewen, 2004).

In conclusion, reliability and validity of the MC SD scale have been confirmed in many studies.

5. The *MC SD - distress combination*. This combination measure was developed by Weinberger et al. (1979) in an attempt to resolve the ambiguities in the then widely-used Repression-Sensitization (RS) Scale (Byrne, 1961), which is discussed below. Schwartz et al proposed to dichotomise the MC SD scores and the scores to the Manifest Anxiety Scale to form the following four groups: repressive (high MC SD - low MAS), truly low anxious (low MC SD - low MAS), defensive high anxious (high MC SD - high MAS) and truly high anxious (low MC SD - high MAS). According to this scheme, repressors are characterised by high defensiveness and low report of anxiety.

The division into the four subgroups has yielded many interesting findings, which confirm its validity as a method for separating repressors from non-repressors. Furnham and Trayner discussed in their excellent review 29 studies on cognitive, behavioural and personality factors associated with repressive coping (Furnham & Trayner, 1999). Repressors, defined as scoring high on defensiveness and low on distress recall fewer negative emotional memories, both with respect to experimentally presented stimuli and with respect to daily unpleasant affect and negative emotional memories from childhood. Repressors avoid disturbing material and, when forced to face unflattering information about themselves, rationalise and engage in refutational thinking. A newer study by Furnham, Petrides and Spencer-Bowdage (2002) also found higher scores for self-esteem, satisfaction with life, emotional intelligence and adaptive coping styles

(rationality and detachment) and lower scores for nonadaptive coping styles (emotionality and avoidance) among repressors. Repressors rate the likelihood of negative future events happening to them lower than non-repressors, including the chance for developing cancer. There was some evidence, though less convincing, that repressors are also unrealistically optimistic with respect to expected positive events (Myers & Brewin, 1996).

The behaviour of repressors also indicates that they are highly motivated to maintain a positive self-image and the belief that they are truly not anxious (Weinberger, 1990). For example, they have little tolerance for emotional ambivalence (Sincoff, 1992) and are particularly good at shifting their attention away from material they wish to ignore (Fox, 1993). Repressors were evaluated by raters as more anxious during an experimental situation than repressors did themselves; this discrepancy was significantly higher in the repressor group than in the non-repressor groups (Derakshan et al., 1997). Repressors rated themselves as less anxious than did the judges, whereas the reversed pattern was observed in the non-repressor groups. Repressors were also less likely to agree with the suggestion that their heart rate had dramatically increased during the experiment and they attributed their heart rate increase much more to it being exciting and challenging than to it being stressful and threatening (Derakshan et al., 1997).

There is some variation in the way the four groups are chosen. Some studies identified their participants by screening a large number of potential participants and choosing extreme scores on defensiveness and trait anxiety to identify the four groups (Derakshan et al., 1997). Other studies used the entire available pool of participants, usually using median splits on defensiveness and trait anxiety (Jensen, 1987). Some studies compared both methods for separating repressors from non-repressors. They found similar (Furnham et al., 1999; Furnham, Petrides, Sisterson, & Baluch, 2003) or even stronger associations (Myers & Vetere, 1997) between repression and other variables when the analysis was based on the total sample compared to an analysis based on extreme scoring participants.

Other approaches have been applied to classify repressors. One study defined repressors as scoring high on the WAI restraint/defensiveness scales (see below) and low on distress scales. Approximately 85% of the participants classified as repressors in accordance with this combination, were identical to the repressors identified by the MC SD - Anxiety combination (Derakshan et al., 1997). Furnham et al. (2002), who found that repressors tend to present themselves in a positive way on a number of self report scales, also demonstrated that these findings were largely independent of the method of defining repressors, i.e. whether low anxiety scores were combined with high SD, high self-deception or

high impression-management scores. Another study applied a less obvious combination by defining repressors as scoring high on cognitive avoidance and low on vigilance (Egloff & Hock, 1997). This combination measure showed poor agreement with Weinberger's classification (Mendolia, 1999).

Repressors defined in accordance with Weinberger's scheme show both self-deception and other-deception (Jensen, 1987; Furnham et al., 2002) and they score higher on other repression measures (Turvey & Salovey, 1993; Ritz & Dahme, 1996). It is self-evident that the repressive coping style defined as per Weinberger's scheme, is associated with low distress.

The four-group division is based on a combination of two scales: The MC SD scale and an anxiety scale. The advantage of using this combination, instead of using only the defensiveness measure, however, has been questioned. Some studies have shown that associations with other variables (other repression measures and physiological activity) are no more convincing for the combination of MC SD and anxiety than for the MC SD alone (Tomaka, Blascovich, & Kelsey, 1992; Ritz et al., 1996). The analysis method to determine the characteristics of repressors is critical. Many studies applied a one-way ANOVA comparing the four groups, followed by post-hoc analyses. However, a significant ANOVA may be the consequence of a difference between (some of) the four groups in anxiety or defensiveness alone, whereas the combination of defensiveness and anxiety is critical to defining repression. The effect of the combination may be determined by testing the interaction in a two-way ANOVA or a regression analysis. Applying a two-way ANOVA, Tomaka et al. concluded: "Assessment of repressive coping (i.e. self-report of stress/anxiety in combination with the MC SD scale) accounted for no additional variance [in physiological reactivity] above that accounted for by social desirability" (Tomaka et al., 1992, pg. 621). Furnham et al. performed both multiple regression analyses and two-way ANOVAs. Main effects of social desirability and anxiety were demonstrated in the regression analyses, but no significant interaction terms. The two-way ANOVAs yielded similar results: several main effects were found, but fewer significant interactions than would be expected by chance (Furnham et al., 2003). Other studies have reported similar results (Nyklicek, Vingerhoets, Heck, & VanLimpt, 1998; Furnham et al., 1999; Furnham et al., 2002).

These findings seem to have far-reaching practical and theoretical consequences. The practical consequence is that it no longer seems necessary to use the combination measure, if defensiveness alone has sufficient predictive power. The theoretical consequence is that the findings seem to undermine the validity of the scheme. Furnham reached a milder conclusion, when stating that "it could be argued that the Weinberger et al. (1979) classificatory scheme is driven

chiefly by its anxiety component” (Furnham et al., 2003, p. 234). This conclusion is in our view too weak and too ambiguous. If one finds associations with anxiety, anxiety is the predictor, not an anxiety-driven repressive coping style.

Weinberger et al. (1990) has argued that testing the predictive effect of the interaction term defensiveness x distress using a two-way ANOVA or regression analysis is not appropriate for distinguishing qualitatively different groups. They employed a statistical technique that, as far as we know, has not been applied ever since. Six groups were formed, based on the defensiveness and distress scales of the WAI (see below and see note 1) and these six groups were compared with respect to their scores to several adjustment measures. The analysis method included one-way ANOVA's². This is the generally-employed method, which has been criticised above. What makes their method exceptional is that any significant effect that could be explained as a main effect of defensiveness or distress was disregarded. This procedure allowed for the characteristics that were unique for each group to be determined. However, it is not understandable how a characteristic that is unique for one group would not show when testing the interaction term in the four-group design.

In conclusion, the combination of high defensiveness and low distress scores most often determined with the MC SD scale and the MAS is the measure of repression that is most widely applied. Many predictions based on repression theory have been confirmed by using this method for classifying repressors, which demonstrates its validity. However, the value and validity of the combination method has been questioned. There are serious indications that when testing these predictions the outcome may also be explained by a main effect of anxiety/distress and defensiveness alone, instead of the combination.

6. The *Rationality/Anti-emotionality (RAE) scale* is a 16-item Dutch questionnaire, developed by Ploeg et al. (1989) and Bleiker et al. (1993) on the basis of an interview questionnaire by Grossarth-Maticek, Bastiaans and Kanazir (1985). The RAE is described as assessing the tendency to use reason and logic to avoid negative emotions and interpersonal conflicts. The development of the RAE passed through several phases, but we will discuss the latest version, described by Bleiker et al., (1993). Nine items in the RAE are similar to items in the original Grossarth-Maticek study, and seven new items were added. A factor analysis yielded that three dimensions, labelled Rationality (trying to act rationally),

² The tests concern 28 adjustment measures, divided into seven domains. To limit Type 1 errors, the analyses started with one-way MANOVA for each domain, followed by one-way ANOVA's for each dependent variables, and Newman-Keuls post-hoc tests.

Emotionality (responding emotionally) and Understanding. The internal consistency and test-retest reliability of the three RAE subscales appeared to be sufficient.

The three RAE scales show different relationships to other repression scales and to distress scales. The Emotionality scale did not show any associations, whereas the associations were in the expected direction for the Understanding scale. The Rationality scale had mixed associations with other repression scales and no or very low negative associations with distress scales.

In conclusion, the reliability of the RAE seems sufficient. The validity is sufficient for the Understanding scale, insufficient for the Emotionality scale, and not convincing for the Rationality scale.

7. The *Rationality/Emotional Defensiveness (R/ED)* scale by Spielberger (1988b) was developed on the basis of the 11-item Rationality/Anti-emotionality (R/A) interview questionnaire by Grossarth-Maticek et al. (1985). The R/ED contains 12 items. The scale assesses the tendency to use reason and logic to avoid negative emotions (Rationality) and to avoid interpersonal conflicts (Anti-emotionality)³.

The R/ED has some resemblance to the RAE, described above, but is certainly not identical to the R/ED. One should also bear in mind that the R/ED Anti-emotionality scale is comparable to RAE Understanding scale, but not to the RAE Emotionality scale.

Factor analysis of the R/ED has confirmed the existence of the two dimensions. Internal consistency and test-retest reliability are sufficient.

The two R/ED subscales are positively related to several other repression measures. The relationship with the Anger-In subscale of the STAXI is low, and even negative (Swan, Carmelli, Dame, Rosenman, & Spielberger, 1992). However, this finding seems more so to underline the doubtful character of the Anger-In subscale as a measure of repression, rather than devalue the R/ED. A positive association between the R/ED scale and the MC SD scale was found in two studies (Swan et al., 1992; Ritz et al., 1996), but was not confirmed in another study (Fernandez-Ballesteros, Zamarron, Ruiz, Sebastian, & Spielberger, 1997).

In conclusion, most findings indicate that the two R/ED scales are reliable and valid measures of repression.

8. The *Repression-sensitization (R-S)* scale. Byrne developed this scale and described repressors as those exhibiting an elevated threshold for emotionally toned stimuli, and sensitisers as those who have a non-avoidant or vigilant attitude towards such material. His original R-S Scale consisted of 182 items taken from

six subscales of the Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory (MMPI) (Byrne, 1961). Byrne subsequently revised his scale and eliminated 55 items (Byrne, Barry, & Nelson, 1963).

The R-S scale is supposed to be unidimensional, but factor analysis has failed to support this assumption or find a set of clearly defined factors (Carlson, 1979). Internal consistency appeared sufficient.

An association has been demonstrated between the R-S scale and other repression questionnaires, and the R-S scale is closely related to distress. We have argued that a negative relationship between a repression questionnaire and a distress questionnaire supports the validity of the repression questionnaire. However, the high correlation coefficients for the R-S scale (-.94, Weinberger et al., 1979); -.61/-.77, Linden et al., 1986); -.60/-.66, Turvey et al., 1993) has led investigators to conclude that the R-S scale merely measures (the absence of) anxiety.

In conclusion, the R-S scale is not unidimensional, as originally intended, and its relationship to distress questionnaires is so close that its discriminant validity has been doubted.

9. The *State-Trait Anger Expression Inventory (STAXI)* by Spielberger (1988a) includes three emotional expression scales, each containing eight items: Anger-In, Anger-Out and Anger-Control. These scales assess the extent to which angry feelings are held in, expressed toward other people, or controlled, respectively.

The factor structure has been confirmed, and internal consistency appeared sufficient. Two of the STAXI subscales, Anger-Control and Anger-Out, showed the expected associations with other repression questionnaires and with distress scales. However, the Anger-In subscale showed mixed relationships with other repression questionnaires: these were sometimes positive, sometimes negative and often non-significant. There was also an unexpected positive association between Anger-In and the report of anger experiences.

In conclusion, the STAXI is a reliable instrument for measuring repression of anger, but the validity of the Anger-In scale is doubtful, because the expected relationships with other repression questionnaires and with distress questionnaires could not be demonstrated.

10. The *Weinberger Attitude Inventory (WAI)* was developed by Weinberger (1991). Six subscales in the WAI refer to repression and related concepts, namely the four Restraint subscales, the Repressive Defensiveness subscale and the Denial of Distress scale. The WAI also includes four distress subscales. The four

restraint subscales assess “the tendency to inhibit immediate, self-focused impulses in social relations”, and concern avoiding harm to others when angry (called Suppression of Aggression), “to think before one acts” (Impulse Control), promotion of welfare of others under conditions where there is some personal cost (Consideration of Others), and adoption of social values, such as not cheating and lying (Responsibility). The complete WAI includes 84 items, while a short-form is also used, which comprises 37 items. For each finding presented in table 1A and 1B reference to the complete WAI or the short-form has been indicated.

The psychometric properties of the WAI are adequate in terms of internal consistency and test-retest reliability. The division of the WAI into distress, restraint and defensiveness subscales was corroborated in a confirmatory factor analysis (Weinberger, 1991). Another study applied a confirmatory factor analysis to the four restraint scales (Farrell & Sullivan, 2000). Several models were tested. A model that considered the four scales as representing distinct, though correlated constructs had a good fit. Another model represented a hierarchical model, as originally proposed by Weinberger, in which the four scales are subsumed by the higher factor ‘restraint’. The fit of this model was somewhat less than the fit of the first model. However, the best fit yielded a hierarchical model that excluded one of the scales, namely Consideration of Others. This scale is apparently somewhat distinct from the restraint scales.

As a validity check, WAI restraint scores taken from students were compared to those of knowledgeable informants, namely peers and teachers. Sufficient relationships were found: The restraint scores correlated .44 with peer ratings and .46 with teacher ratings (Weinberger, 1991). The WAI restraint scales are also related to other repression questionnaires.

A significant relationship between the WAI restraint and defensiveness scales, and distress scales was not always found, and was in particular absent for the subscale Consideration of Others. If present the relationship was negative, as is to be expected.

In conclusion, the WAI is a reliable and valid repression questionnaire, though validity is doubtful for the subscale Consideration of Others.

Other Questionnaires

Two scales for measuring self-deception and other-deception, which represent concepts closely linked to repression, are described below. Several other scales for measuring concepts that are related to repression but essentially different

(Garssen, 2007) are not discussed: habitual suppression (measured with the Emotion Regulation Questionnaire, Gross & John, 2003); self-concealment (measured with the Self-Concealment Scale, Larson & Chastain, 1990); type D personality (measured with the Type D Scale-14, Denollet, 2005); denial (various scales; see review of Vos & Haes, 2007); alexithymia, (measured with the Toronto Alexithymia Scale, Taylor, Bagby, & Parker, 2003); monitoring and blunting (measured with the Miller Behavioral Style Scale, Miller, 1987); and emotional expressiveness (measured with the Emotional Expressiveness Questionnaire, King & Emmons, 1990).

1. The *Balanced Inventory of Desirable Responding (BIDR)* by Paulhus (1984) is a 40-item inventory that comprises revised items from the self-deception (SD) and other-deception questionnaires (OD) by Sackeim and Gur (see below), but also items from other scales, such as the MC SD scale. The SD scale consists of items that are universally true but difficult to endorse, such as “Have you ever doubted your sexual adequacies?”. The OD items concern questions about socially desirable behaviours, such as “I always apologise to others for my mistakes”. It is, in our view, not immediately clear why these items reflect self-deception and other-deception, respectively. The reasoning seems to be that the first type of cognitions is more threatening to one’s self-image, while the second type does not so significantly reflect denial of an opinion toward oneself, but a desire to create a favourable impression on others.

The two-factor model was confirmed by factor analysis (Paulhus, 1984). Kroner and Weekes (1996) found, however, a three factor solution with an exploratory factor analysis. The first factor was similar to the OD scale. The second and third factors comprised mostly the negatively and positively formulated items of the SD scale, respectively, and are called denial and overconfidence. A confirmatory procedure indicated that both the original two-factor solution and the new three factor solution were statistically acceptable.

Over the years, Paulhus has revised and improved his BIDR, resulting in the BIDR 6 which is currently the most widely applied version (Stober, Dette, & Musch, 2002). This version shows satisfactory internal consistency and test-retest reliability. The SD and OD scales in the BIDR are both related to other repression measures and negatively related to distress measures. In contrast to the questionnaires by Sackeim and Gur discussed below, the association with the MC SD scale was roughly similar to the SD and OD scales in the BIDR (Paulhus, 1984; Furnham et al., 2002; Pauls & Crost, 2004).

The validity of the BIDR has also been tested by administering this questionnaire to students under anonymous and public conditions. An SD scale is

not expected to be sensitive to these differences, while the tendency to OD is expected to be higher in the public condition. These expectations were confirmed (Paulhus, 1984).

Nevertheless, newer studies have raised doubts about the validity of self-deception (SD) and other-deception (OD) scales in the BIDR. Studies have shown that the scores for SD and OD scales can be influenced by instructions (Stober et al., 2002; Pauls et al., 2004), such as a fake good instruction (e.g. "Present yourself as much as possible in a favourable light"), a fake being competent instruction (e.g. "Present yourself as much as possible as being competent and self-confident"), or a fake social harmony instruction (e.g. "Present yourself as much as possible in an agreeable and conscientious light"). The SD and OD scores changed differently, depending on the type of instruction. For instance, SD scores were most sensitive to the competence instruction and OD scores were most sensitive to the social harmony instruction (Pauls et al., 2004). The authors of this study argue that this questionnaire does not so much measure SD and OD, as is generally believed, but more so overconfidence (with respect to one's competence) versus need for social harmony (deceiving oneself as being a 'super hero' or as being 'a saint').

In conclusion, the two scales in the BIDR are preferred above the two corresponding scales by Sackeim and Gur from which they originate. However, it has been questioned whether the BIDR subscales specifically measure self-deception and other-deception.

2. The *Self-deception and Other-deception questionnaire (SDQ and ODQ)* developed Sackeim and Gur (1979) each comprised twenty items. Denial of the SDQ items, such as "Have you ever doubted your sexual adequacy?", denotes defensiveness, whereas confirmation of the ODQ items, such as "I always apologise to others for my mistakes" also indicates defensiveness. This implies a problematic overlap between denial and confirmation, and self-deception and other-deception. The BIDR, discussed above, is an improved version from which this overlap has been removed.

Internal consistency of the SDQ is adequate. An association has been demonstrated between the SDQ and repression measures. The association with the MC SD was closer for the ODQ than for the SDQ (Paulhus, 1984). Self-deception is negatively related to distress, whereas a lower and not always significant, negative correlation has been found for other-deception.

In conclusion, some but not all psychometric tests have proven the reliability and validity of the SDQ and ODQ. However, we are not convinced that the items are adequate 'translations' of the two concepts they are said to represent. Both

scales seem to measure constructs related to repression, but it has never been proven that they specifically measure self-deception and other-deception. The BIDR is an improvement compared to SDQ/ODQ.

DISCUSSION

A multitude of questionnaires for measuring repression and related concepts have been developed. Choosing an appropriate scale is difficult for two main reasons. Firstly, a review that critically describes the psychometric qualities of repression scales was not yet available. Secondly, it is often unclear how a certain scale relates to other repression scales. For instance, it is unclear what the conceptual overlap is between emotional control and repression, and what the correlation is between an emotional control scale and (other) repression scales. A conceptual analysis is presented elsewhere (Garssen, 2007). The present review tries to provide for a critical analysis of repression scales.

The quality of the scales has been evaluated with respect to the classical psychometric characteristics: Factor analytic findings, internal consistency, test-retest validity, and relationships with other repression questionnaires. We have also used an additional criterion, namely the relationship with distress questionnaires. Repression is by definition associated with suppressed report of negative emotions. Therefore, a positive association between a (supposed) repression questionnaire and a distress questionnaire was considered a reason to doubt its validity.

On the basis of these criteria the reliability and validity of the following scales seem questionable: CECS, Emotional Expression In and Out scales in the EEC scale, ECQ, R-S scale, and Anger-In scale in the STAXI. The psychometric characteristics of the RAE were also not convincing, and have been determined in only one study. For assessing self-deception and other-deception, the BIDR is preferred above the SDQ/ODQ, though recent studies have cast doubts whether these scales really measure self-deception and other-deception.

A possible reason for the positive association between (supposed) repression scales and measures of distress is the inclusion of negative emotions in the wording of the items. Such formulations could suggest that the primary question is whether such emotions are often experienced and only secondary to this, whether these emotions are inhibited. An example of such an item is "When I am anxious, I smother my feelings" (CECS). There are five questionnaires in which negative emotions are mentioned in the items: The CECS, ECQ, EEC, and

STAXI. Positive associations with distress/anxiety were found for several of these scales, namely the CECS, EEC and STAXI. These associations were, however, not systematically found for all subscales of these questionnaires nor for the ECQ. So, the wording of the items was probably not the only reason for the unexpected positive associations.

It is noteworthy to point out another remarkable difference in the wording of repression questionnaires: some ask directly and other scales ask indirectly after repressive tendencies. Direct questions include phrases like: "Smothering one's feelings, keeping quiet, bottling it up, or not letting others see how one feels". Examples of indirect questions are: "I try to understand other people in spite of negative feelings about them" (RAE scale), "I always speak the truth" (MC SD scale), or "I never act like I know more about something than I really do" (Repressive Defensiveness scale of the WAI). If unfamiliar with the scientific literature, one might be somewhat amazed that these indirect items would measure repression. However, it has been convincingly proven that being unduly kind or being otherwise socially desirable implies repressive tendencies. In fact, most predictions about consequences of repression have been confirmed with indirect questionnaires, especially the Marlowe-Crowne Social Desirability (MC SD) scale or the MC SD - MAS combination.

A serious problem was mentioned at the end of the discussion on the MC SD - MAS combination: In several studies this combination measure rarely predicted any variance in the dependent variables above what defensiveness (measured with the MC SD) or anxiety (measured with the MAS) alone predicted (Tomaka et al., 1992; Ritz et al., 1996; Furnham et al., 2003; Nyklicek et al., 1998; Kreitler & Kreitler, 1990; Furnham et al., 1999; Furnham et al., 2002). However, it appeared uncertain whether these problems concern the validity of the classification scheme by Weinberger et al. (1979), or are a consequence of applying the wrong analysis method.

Nevertheless, the question remains whether to choose the MC SD alone or the combination of the MC SD and an anxiety scale. The same question hold for the WAI (restraint and repressive defensiveness scales) versus the WAI combined with a distress scale. Theoretically, the question is simple to answer: defensiveness, as measured with the MC SD or WAI, is not identical to repression, as measured with the combination measures. Empirical evidence, however, has often not been in agreement with the theory. This was demonstrated in the studies cited above and also in the study by Turvey et al. (1993), which showed roughly a similar relationship between the WAI (restraint and repressive defensiveness scales) and the MC SD scale, compared to the relationship between

the WAI and the MC SD - anxiety combination. At present, there is in our view not enough evidence to make a definite choice.

Four studies have determined the interrelationship between various repression questionnaires using secondary factor analysis (King et al., 1992; Turvey et al., 1993; Giese-Davis & Spiegel, 2001; Garssen, Remie, & Lee, 2009). The findings of these studies add to the evidence based on correlation coefficients, as presented earlier, and clarify which scales come together in a repression cluster.

The first study compared sixteen scales. Several of these scales measured concepts that are different from repression, such as emotional expression, self-concealment, alexithymia and ambivalence about emotional expressiveness. The best solution appeared to be a two-factor model. One factor included these non-repression scales. The second factor included 'typical' repression scales, especially the MC SD scale and the WAI. This factor also included self-deception (SDQ) and several other scales not discussed in this review. ECQ scales were also included in this analysis, but the validity of these scales has been questioned (see the discussion on this scale). The factor solution was far from perfect, given that the MC SD and the self-deception scale loaded on both factors. The only conclusion that can be drawn from this study is that some indications were found that scales of concepts unrelated to repression cluster in one group, and that repression scales clustered in another group.

The best solution in the second study (Turvey et al., 1993) was a one factor model. This factor included the MC SD - MAS combination, WAI restraint, defensiveness and distress scales, R-S scale, SDQ and the monitoring scale of the MBSS. The somewhat meagre conclusion from this study is that repression scales measuring related concepts, especially self-deception (SDQ) and the monitoring scale in the MBSS, come together in one factor.

The third study compared the three subscales in the CECS used to measure emotional control, the four restraint and the defensiveness in the WAI, and three distress questionnaires (POMS, CES-D and IES; four subscales in total). There is no reference to social situations in the items included in the CECS (Watson et al., 1983). An example item is "When I feel afraid or worried, I smother my feelings". Most of the items in the WAI subscales (Weinberger, 1991), 1991) refer to social situations, such as the item "I think about other people's feelings before I do something they might not like". One would expect personally-related repression scales (CECS) to load on one dimension and scales assessing socially-related repression (WAI) to load on a second dimension (and the distress scales on a third dimension). The factor analysis yielded a four-factor solution, including respectively: (1) subscales in the CECS, (2) WAI restraint scales, (3) WAI defensiveness scales and (4) the distress scales (Giese-Davis et al., 2001). We

cannot explain why the WAI repression scales loaded on two different factors. However, the finding that the CECS scales clustered in one factor and the WAI repression scales in two other factors could be seen as support for our division into personally-related and socially-related repression.

We compared several scales that have been discussed in this review: EEC, MC SD, RAE and the WAI self-restraint and defensiveness scales (Garssen et al., 2007). In addition, we included two measures to assess Type C response style. A secondary factor analysis yielded a two-factor solution. The first factor is a typical repression factor, which included the MC SD scale, the WAI scales, the RAE understanding scale and the Emotional Control scale in the EEC. The second factor included the EEC Expression In and Out scales, the RAE-Rationality scale, and the two Type C response style measures. We found positive associations between the EEC Expression In and Out scales and RAE-Rationality with distress scales (Garssen et al., 2009), which is inappropriate for repression. Findings from other studies, as discussed above, also indicated that these scales are not valid indicators of repression. We have elsewhere argued that the Type C response style is conceptually close to anxious defensiveness (Garssen, 2007). Therefore, this study confirmed the division into repression and anxious defensiveness (or low and high anxious defensiveness).

The most important question to answer in this review is which scales can be used as reliable and valid measures for repression? On the basis of psychometric findings, the following scales are acceptable measures: the MC-SD scale, the combination of the MC SD and an anxiety scale, the R/ED scale, the restraint and repressive defensiveness scales in the WAI, the Emotional Control subscale in the EEC scale and the Understanding subscale in the RAE. However, the number of psychometric studies for most scales is limited. The reliability and validity of the MC SD, and the combination of MC SD and anxiety/distress have been most convincingly proven in a sufficient number of studies. Appropriate measures for investigating anger repression are the Anger-Out and Control scales in STAXI, although the number of psychometric studies for these measures is also limited.

Hopefully, this treatise on repression questionnaires will lead to more clarity in this field. Several questions remain unanswered, however, especially whether the combination measure proposed by Weinberger (Weinberger et al., 1979; Weinberger et al., 1990) is better than using the MC SD or WAI (restraint and repression scales) alone. We recommend that future studies apply several of the above proposed repression measures to study their interrelationships, as well as their relationships with several distress, personality and objective measures.

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Chapter 3

**HIDDEN CURRICULUM IN EDUCATION
AND THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF DENIAL:
GLOBAL MULTICULTURAL EDUCATION
FOR SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION**

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ABSTRACT

Numerous educational studies have lauded the importance of social bonds in schools and institutional ties as being crucial to students' sense of self and to school achievement. The hidden curriculum [curriculum of exclusion] in schools however can undermine students' identity development and result in academic disengagement. It follows that self-affirmation in school plays a positive role in student engagement and in their academic success. Using postmodernism as a theoretical framework, this chapter examines the processes and implications of the contemporary hidden curriculum. The authors propose a global multicultural education as a positive school effect that helps validate students' sense of self while serving to improve school achievement. We argue that a transformative global multicultural education helps to nurture inclusion, thus reducing subsequent effects of social and cultural denial, and marginalization in schools. The implications of this chapter are important for teachers, administrators and all those interested in student success.

INTRODUCTION

Education is a right guaranteed under Article 26 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (United Nations, 2008). It is to “be directed to the full development of the human personality and to the strengthening of respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms. It shall promote understanding, tolerance and friendship among all nations, racial or religious groups” (United Nations, 2008, Article 26, section 2). However, proclamation is rarely enough to solidify just action. A glance at who is being educated in American schools points to a discrepancy steeped in segregation, hegemony, and ultimately, denial. For 2007, the National Center for Educational Statistics (NCES) reported a national high school dropout rate of 9.3% (NCES 2009-081). This data reflects dropout rates as reported for students whose race and/or ethnicity accompanied state data reports. Using this marker, closer analysis finds that while Whites dropped out at a 1.1%, Blacks’ dropout rate was 11.5%, and Hispanics dropped out at a rate of 19.9% (NCES 2009-081). Further noted is the trend towards a significant lack of degrees conferred to minority males in comparison to minority females, who earn over 60% of the degrees (NCES 2009-081). Such findings suggest the presence of exclusionary practices, for it has been well documented that access to culturally responsive learning, which according to Ladson-Billings (1994), validates and utilizes a student’s culture for the purpose of its sustainability and strength in resisting exclusion from the dominant culture. Such practices play an important role in students’ identity development (Freire, 2005, Gollnick and Chinn, 2009; Nieto, 2004).

It leads that the denial of home cultures and identities, by extolling knowledge official and designated by high-stakes testing, disconnections between students and content widen, pedagogies become less responsive to students needs, and overall academic achievement becomes less imperative to a student’s self-concept (Au, 2009; Wiggan 2008). Academic achievement therefore must be considered a composite of more than just test scores or grades, which could be identified as the prevailing narrative in achievement data, and include social, as well as critical awareness that education practices can construct. Nasir, McLaughlin, and Jones (2008) synthesized the complexity of identity formation and its subsequent impact on academic achievement. They report that the environment or space that schools provide for students significantly impacts perceived racial stereotypes in the identities of youth (Nasir, et al., 2008). Additionally, other markers of identity are also subjected to environment. Jean Anyon (1980) explains how schooling practices maintains the social class

structure, providing some students access through curriculum, pedagogy, and space to the opportunity of wealth while others, mainly those born into a lower socioeconomic status, were prepared to inherit the social class of their parents. A prolifically termed 'hidden curriculum' refers to that which tacitly controls negotiations of identity formation and access to learning, and often based upon dominant ideology, is potentially discernable through critical analysis and accounting for exclusivity in access (Anyon, 1980; Delpit, 1995; Monahan, 2005). It also addresses social and cultural exclusion through an expansion of the definition of a hidden curriculum by examining the social psychology of denial in public schools via spatial structures, technology, in addition to textual curriculum and pedagogical traditions. Furthermore, it speaks to mis-education, which as Carter G. Woodson (1933/2000) observes, sabotages the efforts of marginalized students and perpetuates the internal domination set forth by the ruling class. Woodson (1933/2000) warns against the ruin of a transmissive, culturally ill-relevant education that seeks to maintain the status quo. He argues for the removal of external forces of oppression which formulate the path, the definition, the potential, and the viewpoint of those subjected to the curriculum.

According to Michael Apple (2004), "multiculturalism was not a gift. It took decades of struggle within a white-dominated power structure, in part due to the work of Woodson and the Study of Afro-American Life and History (ASALH). And yet, it is arguable that as it has been instituted in schools, multicultural education is of the 'safest' kind – one that does not interrupt the power of whiteness as the 'the human ordinary'" (p. 179). The normalization of multicultural education as an operation of additives and othering is comparable to the layers of privilege discussed in Peggy McIntosh's work on White and male privilege (1997). She states that, "one factor seems clear about all of the interlocking oppressions. They take both active forms which we can see and embedded form which as a member of the dominant group one is taught not to see" (p. 298). Similarly, Freire's (2005) work suggests that all actors are oppressed through a denial of tools of consciousness, restricted through layers of structure, technology, and textual curriculum designed to maintain the status quo. While public education's dominant discourse suggests the notion of inclusion, meaning that all children can attend public schools, practices suggest otherwise, that the discourse it is built upon normative assumptions which perpetuate the status quo under a guise of equality (McIntosh, 1997). This observation breeds insight into the context of racialized and engendered discrepancies noted in the aforementioned dropout rates and degree confirmations. Stratification in schools is evident through nationwide inequalities in curriculum, facilities, and a lack of highly qualified teachers (Kozol, 2005). Furthermore it is reasonable to consider

exclusivities, the subsequent denial of opportunity and validation within a hidden curriculum of schooling at work here, resulting in additional discrepancies in student outcomes (Wiggan, 2007).

This chapter aims to provide a viable response to the question: how can a global multicultural education excavate the potential learner from under the dominance of a hidden curriculum? Specifically, the social and cultural denial of a student's identity is addressed in relationship to curricular decisions, pedagogy, and school processes. It is necessary at this point to qualify the term identity as utilized within the context of this argument. Identity is a complex assembly inclusive of the social and cultural status of a student, but also his or her attitudes towards schooling, as well as a sense of group membership (Lareau, 2003; Mickelson, 2001; Neito, 1994). This definition requires a layered analysis of the hidden curriculum. The goal is to emancipate, through validation and access, the promise of academic achievement in every student. We argue that through a proliferation of a hidden curriculum bound and delivered through static structures, latent technology, and regulated texts, students are denied the ability to construct their own identity and be validated in that construction within formal education.

The chapter is organized in the following manner: the postmodern theoretical framework that guides this work is contextualized within the field of education and specifically to the act of identity construction and the impact of denial. This is followed by a review of relevant literature focusing on the issues of curricular exclusivity, pedagogical denial, and tacit processes, latent with underlying agenda, as they relate to academic achievement. Lastly, we propose a global multicultural education that addresses concerns raised in light of relevant research, and we provide recommendations for its implementation.

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

In framing the discussion on the hidden curriculum in education, this chapter uses postmodernism to analyze the impacts of exclusion on the formation of identities in school and how such processes undermine academic achievement. Postmodernism is a theoretical framework that implies the disintegration of modernism, as well as universal claims as they relate to society and to the realm of culture. It further pluralizes the world and discourse by rejecting the notion of grand narratives and meta-narratives, and instead encourages a continual assessment of sources of power and the agency it fosters.

Social and cultural denial in school is viewed herein as a reproductive tool that distributes power of access into the discourse of learning unjustly, favoring a perpetuation of the status quo (Bennett deMarrais & LeCompte, 1999). Power is regarded phenomenologically, as it is a construction between object and subject, heavily influenced by a subject's ability to negotiate tension within the relevant discourse (Bennett deMarrais & LeCompte, 1999; Culler, 1997; Lemert, 2004). For Foucault, power is everywhere, "not because it embraces everything, but because it comes from everywhere" (Lemert, 2004, p. 466). This critical stance does not abdicate social and cultural aspects of schooling; conversely it seeks to challenge the grand narratives of schooling, including identity formation and academic achievement, as discourses which not only work to validate but perpetuate their evolution as well, turning students into products of a hidden curriculum (Bennett deMarrais & LeCompte, 1999; Culler, 1997). In addition to manifestations of psychological denial, it is found that academic achievement is negatively impacted. Lareau's (2003) indicates that the stronger ethnic identity a student maintains, the greater his or her school achievement. For minority students the construction of personal identity and of collective identity is of great importance (Lareau, 2003) and suggests a privileging of non-minority students whose collective identity is validated daily through the official curriculum (McIntosh, 1997).

Post-structuralism, as contributed to by Michel Foucault, contends that knowledge is either maintained or reappropriated as doctrine through education (Lemert, 2004). In other words, education can be said to be exclusionary for the purpose of legitimizing a dominant discourse. This process entails the indoctrination of a cultural norm through structure, media, and access (Swidler and Ardit, 2008). According to Swidler and Ardit (2008), this epistemological process is comparable to Bourdieu's habitus, in that the dominant discourse "treats formal, academic knowledge as similar to other kinds of social knowledge with less focus on knowledge of the world and more emphasis on the knowledge of how to operate within it" (p. 187). Thus a discourse of denial, for the purpose of acculturation is promulgated. According to Foucault, discourse is an activity which requires entry into its fellowship, usually demarcated along lines of status. Discourse then becomes a privileged sphere where power is generated through processes of resistance and legitimization (Bennett deMarrais & LeCompte, 1999; Culler, 1997; Lemert, 2004). At this point it is necessary to remind that post-structuralism helped pave the road and transition from structuralism to post-modernism by dislocating grand narratives which validated inequalities for the maintenance of order and stability through preservation of the status quo (Lemert, 2004). Post-modernism takes the post-structural tenant that an immobile, fixed

center does not exist, and utilizes it to illuminate the domination of a single story or a normative way of being. In the context of education, a postmodern analysis of public education discourse suggests that the design, execution, and processes of schooling exist to negate power to those who reside outside the socially and culturally acceptable discourse of knowledge (Bennett deMarrais & LeCompte, 1999). For Foucault, in the context of education, structures of knowledge or epistemology, can both constitute and exert power over students as well as act as social control, producing grand truth claims, perhaps a standard course of study, and surveillance of student behaviors (Lemert, 2004; Sadovnik, 2008).

A process of materializing a post-modern theory in terms of identity discourse is important if factors of agency and denial are to be conscientized. Foucault regards identity construction as non-assessable through static structures because of its innate lack of center, he argues for acceptance of a fluid entity viable to deconstruct and reconstruct itself so long as such tensions are not oppressed upon the individual, but instead reflect an ability to engage in dialogue (Freire, 2005; Lemert, 2004). Said (2000c) suggests the potential of a contrapuntal construction of identity that “gives rise to an awareness of simultaneous dimensions” (p. 186) and is located through “planes of activity and praxis” (2000b, p. 214). Advancing this contextualization through modes of dissonance and creativity, El Saadawi (1997) argues that in order to be dissident, creativity is essential and that the amount of creativity required is in direct proportion to the degree of the struggle. Habermas’ work on intersubjectivity illuminates the role of language as a viable means of dislocating moments of denial for making identity a fluid entity (Lemert, 2004). Language can create space for consciousness by means of explicating hegemony, meaning the domination of one worldview that reigns both tacitly and through direct control, and aims to suppress the critical consciousness required to activate one’s agency (Lemert, 2004).

For our purposes it is understood that education is a construct of dominant norms and seeks perpetuation through a hidden curriculum which, validates an identity of compliance and denies identity constructions that lay beyond these rigid boundaries. In the tradition of Foucault, a student’s identity is at once a source of power as well as a consequence of power. Therefore in order to access a student’s personal power, and subsequently his or her academic potential, it is essential to conscientized the forces of power that seek to disarm, which are often hidden within physical structures, technology, and official texts. It is through this lens that themes from a review of the literature are identified so that the proposed global multicultural education is critically constructed and remains steadfast to the aim of social transformation. For the purposes of this work, the phrase curriculum of exclusion includes physical space and written text; while the pedagogy of

denial denotes instructional practices, dispositions and relationships within the schooling experience, and tactic processes include educational vision and purpose, as well as related political forces, policy, and surveillance techniques.

LITERATURE REVIEW

Access to education is a partnership, a dialogue, a dance within a space created by students and educational institutions. Complicating this dance are the forces of politics, economics, and culture which at the present time reflects a neoliberal, or corporate-capitalist force which validates efficiency, financial profit, and conditionality (Peet, 2003; Stiglitz, 2002). These forces manipulate the institution of education or to employ Foucauldian terms, the discourse of education, which impacts the identity construction of students and their subsequent academic achievement (Carnoy, 2007; Cho and Lewis, 2005; Lemert, 2004; Monahan, 2005).

Curriculum of Exclusion

It can be said that multicultural education has emerged in theory and in practice in the 1950s as a means of fostering such scholarship and pedagogy, emphasizing cultural differences among groups for the purpose of empowering all students with skills needed for success within their own culture and across different cultural groups (Banks, 2002). A review of this literature finds that the inclusion of race, ethnicity, gender, and class has been the predominant focal point of most multicultural education frameworks (Delpit, 1995; Gollnick and Chinn, 2009; Ladson-Billings, 1994; Sinagatullin, 2003; Sleeter & Bernal, 2004). Religion and language, including English language learners (ELLs), have more recently been addressed, but despite these prominent five typologies, greater inclusion is needed (Ladson-Billings, 2004; Nieto, 2004; UNESCO, 2005).

The implementation of multicultural education has primarily centered itself around pedagogy, with specific focus on curriculum reform (Banks, 2004). Gay (2004) cites Beauchamp (1968) in stating that curriculum reform is “driven more by external socio political pressures and political expediencies than by systematic and thoughtful analysis” (p. 30). Gollnick and Chinn (2009) remind that the curriculum is political and that currently, as well as historically, the curriculum of the United States has been a construct of the dominant class, for the dominant

class. Identifiable areas within current multicultural education that require greater inclusion include: multi-membership identities, transnational identities, sexuality, the global studies of women, and the identity of Muslim Americans, post-9/11 (Giroux, 1992; Gollnick and Chinn, 2009; Janesick, 2003; Ladson-Billings, 2004; Sirin & Fine, 2008). Issues of exile, exclusion, dynamic identity shifts and construction demand space, both in the discourse as well as in the proverbial textbook, in any future work regarding the critical, viable nature of multicultural curriculum.

Parker, et al., (1999) start from the premise that the current curriculum, even that which is described as multicultural, is dated, analogizing it to J. Abner Peddiwell/Harold Benjamin's text, *The Saber-Tooth Curriculum* (1959). Part of the rationale behind this curricular reality is that its formation was not inclusive enough (Parker, et al., 1999). Through an examination of what is included and excluded in the curriculum, we use a critical analysis to assess the prevailing attitudes towards diversity in a textual sense, but also in the structure of policy, physical space, and technology. Again, an elaborated definition of curriculum is applied here to denote the transmissive tenants of space and resources, comparable to the more traditional definition of curriculum meaning text. Multicultural curriculum requires this broad definition or risks becoming static and exclusive of non-dominant epistemologies. Monahan's (2005) thesis of space as a text and the employment of textual analysis to deconstruct hegemonic structures give weight to the use of critical methods as an effective means to discern the values of the culture of power that lay embedded in the structural design.

Specifically, Monahan's (2005) discussion regarding the latent technological opportunities as political provides a glimpse into the backdoor manipulations of neoliberal policy in utilizing technology strategically to deny the context of the environment. Thus technology can be viewed as a means of denying a critical consciousness of what is being transmitted through a narrow definition of curriculum, i.e.: accepted texts of knowledge and as a vehicle for knowledge as well. Using Monahan's terminology, fragmented centralization denotes increased centralized control and increased decentralization of responsibility. The centralized agent then defines what is valued and needed in order to compete in the market and in doing so can effectively deny participation in the identification of issues and the proposing of resolutions that do not fulfill the motives of the centralized agent. This model is problematic in education, according to Monahan, because it derives from a corporate focus on economic profit, while education's mission is inclusive of social values as well. A multicultural education

constructed within a framework where technology is revered as apolitical and non-curricular is subjugated to harboring the oppressor.

The phrase 'built pedagogy' used by Monahan denotes meaning transmitted through text and is also discussed in the field under the terms tacit knowledge and hidden curriculum (Anyon, 1980; Burbules, 2008; Delpit, 1995). Within the hidden curriculum, dominant capital is not made explicit and the importance of this explicitness for marginalized students is not valued. Additionally, technology is defined as a tool and is found to be influential in the maintenance of tacit knowledge. Monahan argues that instead, technology is a text, capable of transmitting meaning much in the way that Gramsci fears dominant structures continue to undermine attempts at a conscientizing, multicultural education (Lemert, 2004). If technology is not used to promote inclusivity, then exclusion is validated.

Similarly, physical space serves as a new mode of surveillance where rule is maintained through fear, force, and internalized domination (Monahan, 2005). While a reference to Foucault's treatise on disciplinary force (Cho and Lewis, 2005) is not directly made by Monahan, it is helpful to supplement his text with such terminology to provide a theoretical direction for readers wishing to utilize Monahan's work in the creation of future educational reform. Monahan does however name the destructing role of the informational technology (IT) specialist whose presence creates a new dynamic within the existing power structure. Prior to the integration of technology into education, the prevailing flow of command went from administrator to teacher (Monahan, 2005). Furthering a post-modern analysis, the amount of knowledge and material power that IT specialists yield, results, at some level, from a structure where the administrator and the teacher are indebted to this new stakeholder who commands the power of technology (Monahan, 2005). Monahan (2005) provides an illustration of how postmodern identity construction occurs at the level of schooling in terms of the role space plays in education as well as the on-going construction of that space. In this analysis, limiting the definition of multicultural curriculum to written text sabotages any benevolent aim of the project in that function cannot be separated from its form, but rather the two exist of and for the other. The separation of form and function in multicultural education is not new.

Cho and Lewis (2005) synthesize the concept of dislocation as being built upon the work of Paulo Freire, validating its historical importance while suggesting a need for macro- and meso- level structural change. Even in places where liberatory or progressive education is lauded, a dominant structure still dominates, negating historical, economic, and social context in physical space which restricts access and makes it difficult to explore social institutions (Cho and

Lewis, 2005). The denial of space in which to be critical occurs for the purpose of maintaining the belief that current multicultural education reform is attainable within the dominant structure.

Kozol (2005) illustrates the discrepancies between the physical space in which a student attends school and the content, and quality of the instruction of that content. Students who attend schools in privileged areas are given access to more demanding curriculum, more highly qualified teachers, engage in student-centered learning, and do so in clean, well-equipped classrooms (Kozol, 2005). Conversely students who have been traditionally excluded from curricular text and pedagogical practices often sit in dilapidated classrooms, lack resources, and are often without a consistent and highly qualified teacher (Kozol, 2005; Wiggan, 2008).

Zhao (2007) points to a Cold War psychology that shapes the definition of success and the value or purpose of public education in the United States. This is distinguishable through a dependence on high stakes testing that keep education rigid, as opposed to being dynamic and fluid which could better serve the demands of a global world (Zhao, 2007). An analysis of this neoliberal structure by Abu El-Haj (2006) points to a worldview that values culture as an absolute, displaying itself rigid, prescribed, and in a totalitarian curriculum. The purpose of this rigid structure and its tacit pedagogy is to create passivity on the part of its inhabitants (Abu El-Haj, 2006). In seeking compliance, space is controlled so that tension and conflict are subdued and new knowledge is left latent. Furthermore, to complement Stromquist's work, the subjects offered to students are also part of this covert mission to dominate the flow of knowledge and ideas (Abu El-Haj, 2006). Critical inquiries in subjects such as history, economics, and politics, which could permit students and teachers the space through curriculum and pedagogical practices [i.e.: that which is culturally responsive to the students in the classroom], to question the status quo, are devalued in lieu of topics deemed as safe (Abu El-Haj, 2006). According to Au (2009), multicultural content is routinely not tested and that the validation of official knowledge as designated by high-stakes testing strengthens the curriculum of exclusion (DeFattore, 2008; Foster and Nicholls, 2008). In schools, textbooks are dominated by white males, as is a prevalence of stereotyping, a monocultural viewpoint, and claiming multicultural diversity through the employment of contributive and additive approaches (Banks, 2005), representing a prescriptive, assimilationist approach to curriculum design (Gay, 2004).

Pedagogy of Denial

In order to free oneself from oppressive attachments of identity, Foucault's notion that transformation is possible at the margins becomes importance (Cho and Lewis, 2005; Lemert 2004). The stronghold of the hegemony, as viewed by Gramsci (Lemert, 2004) exists in the context of education, and is evident in a curriculum that reflects the interest of the dominant group. This leaves, by Foucauldian thought, the margins of existence – in relationship to the central agent – to be spaces of greater potential for consciousness or separateness from hegemonic ideology. It is here where the horizon is most discernable, less fettered with hegemonic ideological control through physical, mental, and societal structures. Gramsci states that within this space are two consciousnesses: one critical and one internalized, the latter reflecting the definition of Freire's reading the world and the former reminiscent of Max Weber's internalized oppression (Lemert, 2004). With less imbedded ideological normalization, a disruption to this fundamental fantasy, to borrow a Lacanian construct, is required (Cho and Lewis, 2005; Lemert, 2004). Important however, is the realization that this is not an effortless task because of the subject's role in objectification, which requires destruction of a part of one's identity (Cho and Lewis, 2005; Lemert, 2004). Since identity construction is simultaneously informed by and also informs the schooling experience of a student, any loss of identity can illicit strong repercussions not only in the schooling experience, but in achievement levels as well. Therefore, a radical fear of loss can usurp any attempt at reconstructing an identity. Structural analysis here produces the ultimate derivative of personal power to subvert one's identity verses the institutionalized status quo which is necessary in order to open up the space required for critical discussion (Cho and Lewis, 2005; Freire, 2005; Lemert, 2004; Said, 2000a).

Agbenyega (2008) finds identity is central in all relationships between schools and students, a conclusion supported by the abundance of photographs taken by students revealing "dominant school structures, reproduction of power, marginalization which constructs for them subordinates from of identity" (59). Such negative dispositions towards school were not found to be related to cultural dress or speech patterns, but instead related to agency and access, meaning the levels to which a student's own narrative was validated in the official curriculum and the pedagogical processes in which a student was included (Nasir, McLaughlin, Jones, 2008; Wiggan, 2008). Specifically, access to the dominant discourse was hidden or guarded from students through denial of explicit information from whom were not identified by the school as high achievers by the 9th grade (Nasir, et al., 2008). Furthermore, minority students and female students

reported lower levels of self-confidence in terms of being academically competitive (Demerath, Lynch, and Davidson, 2008). In their research regarding the role of self-efficacy in mediating identity styles with regard to academic achievement, Hejazi, Shahraray, Farsinejad, and Asgary (2009) state that “schools should pay more attention to social developments and especially characteristics related to the concept of self” (132). This requires a shift away from the official curriculum towards a more democratic and student-centered curriculum.

In school, students move in and out of different identity construction which are dictated by the values validated in each space. Throughout the school day, starting with a transition from the neighborhood to the school grounds, entry into the building itself, and the repeated shifting between hallways into classrooms or other academic areas, students find themselves needing to renegotiate their identities which ultimately impact their attitudes towards school and academic achievement (Dickar, 2008). Language is often utilized as a tool of management by students in maintaining and negotiating identity (Dickar, 2008). Classroom space is negotiated in different ways by students depending on their orientation towards achievement. For instance, academically successful students used standard English as the dominant form of communication in the classroom, but those who were not oriented towards English as the dominant means of communication reported lower levels of achievement (Dickar, 2008). Despite the many spaces through which a student travels each day, it proves difficult to resist either conforming or rejecting out-right dominant norms. The idea of the cultural straddler, one who can code-switch with relative ease between difference spheres of power (Carter, 2005) is a complex task.

In regards to the habitual tendencies of identity construction with respect to the institution of schooling, Bulbeck (1998) quotes Stuart Hall (as cited in Terry, 1995, p. 61) as stating, “power always tends to gravitate back the binary...the binaries don’t go away because Hybridity is around, or because we make a theoretical critique of them. So you have to keep asking why the binaries reappear.” In a quest for this liberation, critical reflection can afford access into the discourse where knowledge can transcend, or cross borders of fragmentation (Lemert, 2004; Said, 2000b). Problematic though remains the division of labor within identity discourse (Said, 2000b; El Saadawi, 1997) in that strict surveillance of minority students’ access into the space of de facto dominance prevents changes in status. This is where the theme of justice and agency become vital to the framework.

Binaries of old reappear when political motives behind the discourse are spared critical critique (Said, 2000a; El Saadawi, 1997). Meier (2002) notes the role of a central myth; particularly that public schooling of yesterday was more

effective than current school, hindering discourse, or dialogue of a countering nature. This grand narrative can be viewed as an act of disciplinary power built through a promulgation of binary constructs (Cho and Lewis, 2005; Lemert, 2004; Monahan, 2005). As Habermas extends, binaries can be deconstructed through language and force motives revealed, illuminating space for more agency over one's own identity.

Nasir, McLaughlin, and Jones (2008) synthesized the complexity of identity formation and its subsequent impact on academic achievement. They report that the environment or space that schools provide for students significantly impact perceived racial stereotypes in the identities of youth (Nasir, et al., 2008). Higher academic achievement levels were linked to identities best described as hybrid, or as being a fluid sum of its parts, as opposed to being linked to attempts at switching between different identities (Nasir, et al., 2008). Additionally, the more conscious a student is of a global or national conception of race, the more his or her identity includes academic achievement (Nasir, et al., 2008).

Agbenyega (2008) adds to the discourse the notion that space restrictions, or access denied due to class or group membership, perpetuates negative identity constructions with regards to academic achievement. Demerath, et al. (2008) found that high academic achievers routinely engage in critical discourse regarding what is required to achieve goals and they actively seek out needed cultural capital. Furthermore, Ortner's term 'psychological capital,' which refers to one's ability to manage risk, is utilized to account for an aspect of identity construction that can cope or manage risk, which is arguably a neo-liberal state (Demerath, et al., 2008). Psychological capital is identified with the role of self-work, suggesting that to sustain competitiveness, a critical system for one's own benefit all leads to significant levels of confidence and sense of entitlement (Demerath, et al., 2008).

Dickar (2008) finds that peer group belongingness appears to trump a desire for academic success and while both can be negotiated, the default is usually to the peer group. Those that achieved consistently identified strongly with others of similar academic success, suggesting that academic performance not only helps construct one's identity, but reinforces peer groups as well (Dickar, 2008). Additionally, Dickar (2008) found that the classroom is the space where identity is most often contested, formed, influenced, and challenged because it is here where power is not under rigid control, unlike the hallways (where students reign) and the entryway (where authority figures dominate). Paulo Freire (2005) provides problem-posing education for the liberation of the student. In this way, the individual, of multiple, dynamic discourses can become conscious of oppressive discourses by engaging in situations that challenge his or her way of

knowing the world, and therefore way of knowing his or herself (Freire, 2005). Thus, it is plausible to argue that - that which plays out in the classroom can have a substantial impact on the incorporation of academic success into a student's identity (Wiggan, 2008). If the curriculum is accessed in conjunction with the formed identity of the student, then it is plausible that any denial of self is a denial of curriculum and the maintenance of denial strengthens the grand narrative that one curriculum and one pedagogy is viable and meaningful for all students. Dislocation of this hidden agenda is dependent on the conscientizing of each student's, and teacher's identity.

Hidden Meanings

For Collins (1990) a conscientizing curriculum and pedagogy are maintained through the sustained integrity of the goal. A theme of goal displacement (Bennett deMarrais and LeCompte, 1999) and termed 'mission creep' by Stiglitz (2002) is the result and the catalyst for acts of hegemonic control through acquired power and privilege, and educationally speaking, leaving privileged students, as well as likeminded teachers, administrators, and policy makers in control of the access to opportunity and knowledge available to a diverse population (Bennett deMarrais and LeCompte, 1999; Carnoy, 2000; Lipman, 2004; Monahan, 2005; Stiglitz, 2002; Stromquist, 2002; Zhao, 2007). Dickar (2008) argues that "the hidden curriculum of space operates on many levels. The systemic underfunding of urban schools, the impoverishment of urban communities, the deindustrialization of cities, and the segregation of urban and suburban space all undermine the education of students" (p.48). Monahan (2005) argues that the validation of binaries weakens the ability of marginalized populations to find consensus, form networks, and accumulate political status.

Dickar (2008) cites scanning and other surveillance measures as shaping student identities because it validates or condemns certain cultural religious, and academic identities and feedback elicited through metaphor work revealed how physical structures, policies, and procedures of school impacted their identity and relationship to academic achievement. This highly rationalized system of surveillance and accountability is emblematic of a prevailing economic policy on schooling (Lipman, 2004; Monahan, 2005). Such reform measures can be considered finance-driven where education is now defined by a quantifiable profit by means of decentralizing local management, participating in the market through outsourcing and recruitment, and increasing macro regulation (Carnoy, 2000). A

critical approach to unveiling this education reform points out that according to this dominate discourse, schooling goals are deemed met when test scores are proficient, thus indicating that the process is effective (Lipman, 2004). Surveillance measures such as closed circuit video and metal detectors represent a display of power and a reinforcement of an identity construction that those under surveillance are criminal (Dickar, 2008). Therefore, it is plausible to postulate that students who adopt dispositions deemed favorable, such as complacency within the surveillance, help perpetuate the myth that the system is just.

Students move in and out of different identity construction through the school day (Dickar, 2008). The tension of continual negotiations accompanying each transition impacts the attitude towards schooling and ultimately academic achievement, and language is often utilized as a tool of management in maintaining and negotiating identity (Dickar, 2008). Thus, the classroom space is often negotiated in different ways by students depending on their orientation towards achievement.

By failing to validate home cultures and student identities in school, by extolling official knowledge as designated by high-stakes testing, disconnections between students and content widen, pedagogies become less responsive to student needs, and overall academic achievement becomes less imperative to a student's self-concept (Au, 2009). Au (2009) cites data that "demonstrate that districts with high concentrations of low-income and students of color are institutionalizing high-stakes pressures at greater rates than their high-income counterparts, thus creating more restrictive, less enriching educational environments for the very students that high-stakes, standardized test based educational reforms like NCLB are supposed to be helping" (98). Mickelson's framework (2001) of abstract and concrete attitudes towards schooling prove helpful in discerning how school processes can impact school achievement. The concrete attitude, that which is formed through daily experience, has a greater impact on academic achievement than abstract attitude which tends to represent values, but not necessarily actions (Mickelson, 2001).

Abu El-Haj (2006) points to an institutionalized worldview that values culture as an absolute, displaying itself in rigid, prescribed, and totalitarian curriculum. Eaton (2007) reflects that test sophistication is promoted currently as entryway into the opportunities of education, a decidedly de facto form of segregation, perpetuating negative consequences of denial. The aim of hidden pedagogy is passivity on the part of its inhabitants (Abu El-Haj, 2006). It is in this space of latent constructs where Nawal El Saadawi argues for justice as a guide for discourse which would require the use of one's home language, grounded in political reflection, to construct knowledge of self and the world in which the self

lives. Where Said (2000a) discusses the exile identity as not only an articulated outsider, but as an experienced outsider, El-Saadawi (1997) is also unable to separate the art and science of identity stating that there is “no separation between body and mind, spirit or soul. With no separation between form and content, or art and politics or economics or medicine” (El-Saadawi, 1997, p. 23). Separations among curriculum, pedagogy, and student identity prevent a postmodern construction of knowledge which demands a constant interaction of all three factors in order to demystify boundaries and barriers of access.

Specifically, Dickar (2008) questions, “to what extent do students believe the official discourse in which they participate?” (173). Dickar contends that successful operation within the public discourse does not mean that the discourse is accepted and reproduced by the student (2008). Hidden transcripts and resistance can still manifest. This postulation coincides with Dooley’s (2008) notion of micro-transformations where change is not immediate, sudden, nor always radical, but that at a holistic level such changes are occurring, thought in small incremental stages, unique to each individual. Freire (2005) suggests the implementation of limit-situations to help students and teachers continually progress through a series of micro-transformations towards conscientiousness. El Saadawi (1997), Foucault (1977), Lorde (2007), and Said (2000a) discuss a space where the margins become viable locations for evolution, revolution, and inclusion. Moses (2001) utilizes the discourse of math, through the Algebra Project, in an effort to not only create these spaces, but to maintain them and activate intersubjectivity. Through the identification of consensus, Moses (2002) was able to help usher in political rights for Blacks in the early 1960s and translates similar principles to the provision of access to math for marginalized students today. For this discourse to be viable, Moses finds that demand must be identified and sustained by the students themselves, and requires a student-centered space, a teacher disposition of consciousness and commitment, and validation and utilization of a student’s cultural capital (2002). The creation of space, both physical and discursive, and agency of stakeholders cannot be definitive practices. Such processes reinforce the construction of binaries which in turn validate a grand narrative of which a postmodern, global multicultural education seeks to obliterate.

Despite the generalizations, Dickar (2008) contends that identity construction in relationship to academics exists along a continuum, in that it is possible to formulate a single discourse from a hybridity of discourses once the whole is accepted and professed by enough people. This perspective allows for a complex formation process that students operate in regarding identity construction within the context of schooling.

GLOBAL MULTICULTURAL EDUCATION: A PROPOSAL

A theoretical framework of multicultural education with noted exclusions is its own worst limitation. There is no doubt that our nation has come a great and important distance in accommodating diversity within the field of education, however, it is worth questioning whether accommodating is sufficient. It suggests an act of add-on ideology in the hopes that structural change will envelop under the auspices of a common goal. However, while a common goal of multicultural education exists, it is not necessarily valued by mainstream America, nor do consensual frameworks exist for its attainment. In the book, *Global Issues in education: Pedagogy, policy, practice, and the minority experience* (2009), Wiggan and Hutchison (Eds.) bridge the discourse on globalization and education with international studies on race, class, gender, ethnicity, culture, and global multiculturalism. The book addresses educational challenges globally, where postcolonial Ghana, the United Arab Emirates, the Caribbean, China, and Germany are studied juxtaposed against Western education in the United Kingdom and the United States. Salient issues of immigration and language rights, transnational identities, refugees, and cultural and linguistic minority experiences are explored around the world, which can be valued as currency into the construction of a global multicultural education. Refraining from a pan-ethnic approach to identity construction and educational practices, of which can be viewed as a creation of stagnant multicultural education reform seeking to pacify postmodern reformers, the framework proposed herein instead offers illumination of multiple ways of schooling and knowing the world.

An approach drawing upon the work of scholars that accounts for the dynamic cultural multiplicity demanded in our current society, the goal of this proposed theoretical framework is to begin a conversation on the positionality and inclusivity of validation, cultural capital, and the process in which those efforts are carried out in the classroom for the purpose of providing access to all students. Therefore, we propose a global multicultural education that values curricular inclusivity, intersubjective agency, and networks that support the validation, access, and educational growth of an individual.

RECOMMENDATIONS AND IMPLICATIONS

Policy

Educational policy can be seen as being driven by the goal of economic profit as gained through competition, efficiency and productivity, impacting policy on curriculum and accountability, which to the postmodern theorist raises issues of equality and equity and the role of education in reproduction (Stromquist and Monkman, 2000). Consequences of such policy have resulted in the form of English emerging as the global language, networking processes evolving, a rise in horizontal communication, and a dependency on computers and technology, of which redefine the answer to, “What is knowledge?” (Stromquist and Monkman, 2000). This question ultimately asks: “What is valued?”

The discourse of inclusivity is critical, dynamic, and subject to the agency, the values, and the beliefs of its creators. It is also conceived in the tradition of the dialogic, rather than the dialectic. Educational reformers should allow for a more dialogical connotation of dissonance. Specifically, assessment tools, the use of accountability data, and revisioning of curricular policy require reconstruction so that structural agents do not mitigate achievement, but instead operate under a primary aim of social justice. The use of assessment tools as descriptors of intelligence and subsequent access to knowledge is conceivably a denial of human rights to education. For policy to foster transformation the attainment of access into viable curriculum is needed.

It is imperative for the advocates, texts, and methods of global multicultural education be connected to all of these aforementioned agents. This heeds the recommendations of Foucault (Lemert, 2004) in his reference on how to expand discourse.

By entering into such contrapuntal space, unmarked by polarizing binaries (Said, 2002a) instability is validated and its existence helps to prevent the domination of one sphere over another, and permits for an increase in creativity (El Saadawi, 1997). This follows that policy needs to validate humanities-based subjects, arts, and sports, as well as other epistemologies, inclusive of varying worldviews if text-based multicultural curriculum is to ever be transformative.

In acknowledging the influence and importance of all realms of a student’s life, policy makers can make learning a more democratic pursuit where the ability to think critically and creatively is deemed more valuable than rote memorization. Additionally, the work herein finds that identity formation is greatly impacted by

one's relationship with the community, therefore any curriculum void of the community lacks the ability to be truly inclusive of the student.

In terms of sustainability, the buy-in, collaboration, and validation from multiple discourses can only be achieved if all stakeholders share a common ideology that the policies and practices of a global multicultural education is competitively advantageous for both an individual and his or her status groups. This is no small task, but essential for any systemic transformation with regard to a viable, global, multicultural education.

Schools

Incorporation into all spaces is imperative. Each school holds the potential to assert a new field in which to be creatively dissident (El Saadawi, 1997). Knowing that power comes from everywhere, it can be concluded that resistance comes from everywhere as well, including the school building and its technologies (Lemert, 2004). Therefore it is imperative that access to school space and technologies become inclusive to the needs of students and teachers for not only academic tasks, but for the validation and development of one's identity, since the identity of the actor is influential in overall academic achievement.

The use of Web 2.0 holds this power for public education, and specifically the ability to increase inclusivity in a global multicultural context. For instance, the use of various forms of media has not only increased the number of women who can participate in a global discourse, but has also transformed the ways in which their message can be expressed to a greater audience as is currently being seen from Iranian women in response to the 2009 Presidential elections. The use of technology as a space helps to dislocate the power of the ruling class (Monahan, 2005).

One of the ways transparency is achievable at the school level is through providing access to knowledge to all employees via Web 2.0 technology. Currently there exists a gap between the technology utilized in both the corporate and private sectors and the technology normally found in public schools. Interestingly enough, schools are charged with preparing students for post-secondary opportunities; however, unless a student has personal access to technology at home, he or she will not be able to access spaces where current technology is the norm. There are several issues here: 1) funding for technology is insufficient, 2) the reliability and availability of technology that does reside within a school is poor, 3) the high-stakes standardized assessments upon which students,

teachers, and schools are measured do not utilize current technology, even if it is emphasized in the content of the curriculum, and 4) the ability of school staff to utilize technology for educational purposes leaves much to be desired. Therefore the textualization of Facebook, blogs, vlogs, Twitter, and YouTube for learning, sharing, and collaborative purposes, within classrooms on a consistent and creative level can serve as viable platforms of access into the discourse of a transformative, emancipatory education. Web 2.0 promotes greater levels of access where as current modes of technology operate on a hierarchy of accessibility.

In order for a sustainability of a global multicultural education three processes and climates need to be created and maintained: 1) decentralization requires knowledge and processes to be transparent and accessible by all, 2) that technology utilization must be current, available, reliable, and reflected not only in content of curriculum but in assessments as well, and 3) collaboration, whether it is in the form of Professional Learning Communities (PLCs), districts-within-districts, or even student group work, must be supported throughout the process, valued in the end product, and serve as a vehicle for effective means of change.

While El Saadawi (1997) warns against an oversimplification of such unions, transferring a label for a common experience and identity would be a gross subversion of post-structuralist thinking. However, the ability to have discourse with other agents of education would be advocated. All stakeholders have voices, but not all have access to profess that voice into spaces where change, evolution in the discourse occurs. So long as the collaboration is based on intersubjectivity, and such respect is provided throughout dissemination, then the networking of women worldwide hold tremendous power.

However, without goal integrity and sincerity in its construction, all the benevolent means in the world will prove insufficient. In schooling, the end goal seems to be shifting daily, usually dependent on the time of year. It can range from saving money, raising test scores, teacher retention, documenting differentiation, raising a sub-group's test scores, passing children along, to once in a while, providing all students with access to learning.

Curriculum

It is recommended that curriculum reflect not only the students in the classroom, but students in every classroom. This ensures that homogeneous class populations, whether the result of residency or tracking, encounter validation and

rigor regarding the multiple ways of knowing the world, both locally and globally. As for specific topics, it is suggested that content knowledge expand to explicitly address noted exclusions. These include: transnational identities, sexuality, ELLs, the global study of women, and those of refugee status.

Furthermore, such topics should be presented using a diverse set of texts, and pedagogical techniques should be student-centered and seek the advancement of student inquiry and understanding. This requires either a radical revision of the traditional school textbook or an alternate source of text. We recommend the curriculum consist of multiple forms of written, oral, musical, and visual texts in order to align the content and form.

Teachers

For global multicultural education, teachers must adhere to the justice of intersubjectivity in our teaching, curriculum designing, and assessments. Without conscientized processes, reform runs the common consequence of becoming another homogenizing tool. The concern each teacher has for students is clear through the commitment to reflective practices, continually revising curriculum and pedagogical methods for the purpose of being facilitators of a conscientizing education. This demonstrates belief in the importance of and the complexity of a student's identity in his or her access to education, congruent with the work of Gollnick and Chinn (2009).

Recommendations for teachers in light of relevant literature include: gaining familiarity with the identities with which a student constructs a hybrid existence, conscientizing the cultural expectations held by the student and his or her family regarding schooling, and validating oneself as a source of social capital, and facilitating diversity.

One way that teachers can become culturally and linguistically conscious is to begin with a self-reflective, autobiographical approach to their own learning and worldview. By acknowledging one's own identity, investigating its evolving construction, teachers can better assist students in the same process.

Language used by pre-service and in-service teachers can dislocate grand narratives on what proficiency means and what ways of knowing are valuable. It is postulated that flexibility, locality, cross-cultural experiences, and a resistance to doctrine is required to effectively prepare students, and themselves, to be critically conscious learners. The research of Burbules (2008), Cline and Necochea (2006), and Grant and Gillette (2006) specifies that qualities can be

fostered in teacher education programs and professional development opportunities in order to facilitate a more validating and effective multicultural educational practice.

The attainment of such knowledge is dependent on having the space to which engage in these acts and then access to that space. Teacher education programs can make several structural changes in order to open such space and help make its discourse inclusive to any who wish to enter. Through language, experiential learning, dialogical collaboration and a true emphasis on critical scholarship teacher education can evolve, and perhaps lead the transformation into a global, multicultural education.

The recommendations for colleges of education and professional development are based upon our theoretical framework that posits 1) validation: membership for belonging, identity, and multiple ways of knowing, 2) cultural capital: conscientizing connections to ‘other’ capital, home capital advancement, and dominant capital fluency, through 3) a dialogical process: problem-posing pedagogy, student-centered design, inclusion models, aesthetic education, authentic community connections, arts-infused instruction, and web 2.0 technologies, as a means to create 4) access: to a transformative education for the purpose of liberation.

CONCLUSION

Koppelman (2005) states that, “Education means to bring forth the potential of an individual” (p. 293). In its most simple interpretation, this definition exudes grace, as situated in a worldview of hope and faith and good will for all. However, contextually, in a world of terrorism, economic meltdown, and bigotry, the word *potential* becomes twisted and perverse. A student who does not look like you, pray like you, speak like you, know like you, love like you, read like you, may receive scraps for an education and demoralizing detonations of dreams deferred.¹ But what if the other brand of potential is not only defined, but normalized, where

¹ *Dream Deferred* is a poem by Langston Hughes published in 1958 asking what happens when a well-educated, well-traveled writer, Hughes held a love of music, particularly jazz, and political interests in socialism. (Poetry Speaks, 2001). The poem inspired Lorraine Hansberry’s play, *A Raisin in the Sun*, where a black family attempts a move into a white Chicago suburb. Hansberry’s father was a real-estate broker who in his pursuit of moving his family into a white suburb, helped progress the repeal of restrictive housing covenants (NPR.org, *A Raisin in the Sun*).

we engage genuine anger and subsequent action at the thought of a student not learning because of whom he or she evolves in being?

Overall, there seems to be an evolutionary pattern of a bold, emergent challenge to the status quo, but at the same time it is deemed lacking and exclusionary in some way, too. Other movements and theories are then cast in response. Multicultural education can be viewed as a historically reactionary pursuit, leading to 'filling in holes' in the existing curriculum, while simultaneously seeking to provide space for a totally new future, one that is more inclusive and democratic.

Thus far in America public education, multicultural education remains a goal, but not a practice. In order to be wholly inclusive, the evolution of thought and action must never settle, but seek to always validate new ways of knowing and being and to give people the capital, the access to have that agency over their own existence. Education is a right for all people and a critical source of personal agency and reverence for others. A global multicultural education can aid in the progression towards fulfilling the tenant of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and provide viable access to academic achievement and personal and civic growth.

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Chapter 4

REPRESSION QUESTIONNAIRES COMPARED

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ABSTRACT

Literature on repression is abundant with terms such as repression, non-expression of negative emotions, emotional control, rationality, type C response style and defensiveness. However, it is uncertain whether these terms are synonymous with repression, denote a variation, or are essentially different from repression. In addition, a multitude of questionnaires has been developed in this field, which presents yet another problem for evaluating studies.

Elsewhere we have discussed overlap of and differences between the various repression-related concepts (Garssen, 2007a) and critically reviewed eleven repression-related questionnaires (Garssen, 2009). The present study compares various repression questionnaires in two groups of women with breast cancer (N = 102 and 145). A secondary factor analysis yielded two factors, which were labelled: repression and anxious defensiveness. The relevance of this finding for future studies is that only scales belonging to the repression cluster are valid measures for measuring repression. The Marlowe Crowne Social Desirability scale is recommended as the most adequate repression measure.

Key words: Repression, cancer, emotional control, type C, defensiveness

INTRODUCTION

People differ in their tendency to be open about or to hide negative emotions. This is an important topic in Behavioral Medicine, since studies have shown that repression is a potential health risk factor for disorders as diverse as chronic pain (Beutler, Engle, Oro'-Beutler, Daldrup, & Meredith, 1986) and cancer (Jensen, 1987; Weihs, Enright, Simmens, & Reiss, 2000). Another reason why repression may be considered a relevant topic for many researchers in this field is that the tendency to avoid expressing negative emotions (also labeled 'repressive coping style') is known to distort the assessment of a patient's distress. As a result, this tendency to repress negative emotions may lead to making false conclusions. For instance, if patients report levels of distress similar to healthy individuals but show more repressive tendencies, they may in fact be more distressed. This repressive tendency may even influence the reporting of somatic symptoms and quality of life (Koller et al., 1999; Linden, Paulhus & Dobson, 1986).

The possible influence of repression on disease development, health behaviour and symptom reporting has been investigated in many studies. Summarizing the findings proves problematic, however, as authors use different labels for 'repression-like' concepts, such as repression, suppression, non-expression of negative emotions, emotional control, emotional inhibition, rationality, anti-emotionality, type C response style, defensiveness, restraint, concealment, type D personality, denial, alexithymia and blunting. It is unclear whether this array of terms actually refers to the same concept or altogether different concepts. In addition, a multitude of questionnaires has been developed in this field, which presents yet another problem when evaluating studies. For instance, it is not certain whether findings obtained from an Emotional Control questionnaire and a Restraint scale can be equated.

In the present study, we analysed the comparability of several repression questionnaires by means of a secondary factor analysis to test whether they have to be combined in one or several dimensions. Elsewhere, we have presented a conceptual discussion on the various terms used in this field (Garssen & Remie, 2004; Garssen, 2007), which will be summarised below. This theoretical discussion will be used as a basis for formulating a hypothesis on expected factor analytic findings.

Repression is the general term that is used to describe *the tendency to inhibit the experience and the expression of negative feelings or unpleasant cognitions in order to prevent one's positive self-image from being threatened*. Several terms are considered to be synonyms of, or describe aspects of repression, namely non-

expression of emotions, emotional inhibition, emotional control, rationality and self-restraint (Garssen & Remie, 2004; Garssen, 2007).

The term anxious defensiveness was introduced by Weinberger et al. (1979), who made a distinction between two types of defensiveness, namely: Repression (scoring high on defensiveness, but low on distress) and Anxious Defensiveness (scoring high on both defensiveness and distress). In Weinberger's theoretical scheme, there is apparently a summarising concept, called Defensiveness, of which repression is a subcategory. Defensiveness may be described as *any restrictive strategy aimed to protect oneself against being psychologically hurt*. The two defensiveness groups appeared to be different on a number of personality variables (Weinberger & Schartz, 1990). Compared to the other groups, the anxious defensive group scored low with respect to assertiveness, ability to express oneself in close relationships, sensitivity to one's own needs and feelings, self-esteem and self-control. They also scored high on avoidant personality (shyness), dependency (emotional reliance on others and approval dependence), obsessive worrying and (minor) physical illnesses. The repressive group, on the other hand, were characterised by high scores for intimacy, self-esteem, self-control (tendency to use self-management techniques), defensiveness and alexithymia, while low on avoidant personality.

We have a special interest in Type C pattern, because it is believed to predict cancer development (Temoshok et al., 1985). It is not immediately clear where to place the concept of Type C pattern, a term first mentioned in 1980 in an abstract by Morris and Greer (1980). Temoshok independently developed a similar concept, which included several elements (Kneier & Temoshok, 1984). Temoshok described this coping style as "abrogating one's own needs in favour of those of others, suppressing negative emotions, and being co-operative, unassertive, appeasing and accepting" (Temoshok, 1987; pp. 558-560). The Type C individual is considered to be nice, friendly and helpful to others and rarely gets into arguments or fights. The Type C individual may be seen as being chronically hopeless and helpless, even though this is not consciously recognised in the sense that the person basically believes that it is useless to express one's needs. The Type C coping pattern, in our view, shows a remarkable resemblance to Anxious Defensiveness, as described by Weinberger et al. (1990). Descriptions of both concepts mention unassertiveness, low sensitivity to one's own needs and feelings/abrogating one's own needs in favour of others, emotional reliance on others, being co-operative, appeasing and accepting, and high level of distress (obsessive worrying/ helplessness and hopelessness). Because of this similarity, the Type C response pattern seems closer to anxious defensiveness than repression.

In summary, we propose to make a distinction between the following two domains: Repression and Anxious Defensiveness. Several defensiveness-related questionnaires, including Type C scales, are compared in the present study to determine whether they should be combined into clusters and, if so, whether these clusters represent these two theoretically-distinguishable domains. Elsewhere, we have critically discussed eleven scales measuring repression or related concepts (Garssen, 2009). In our view, repression scale scores should be negatively-related to distress measures, as repressors are expected to suppress their reporting of negative emotions. However, several of the eleven questionnaires or their subscales appeared to be positively associated with distress. This implies that they cannot be considered valid repression scales. Here, they are provisionally classified as anxious defensiveness scales.

We expect on the basis of earlier research findings (Garssen, 2009) that the following scales, which are described further on, will be grouped together under a repression cluster: the WAI restraint and repressive defensiveness scales, the Marlowe-Crowne social desirability scale, the EEC emotional control scale and the RAE understanding scale. The following scales are expected to cluster under the heading Anxious defensiveness: the EEC emotional-expression-in scale, the Type C questionnaire (TCQ) and the type C vignette. These predictions are based on the following two aspects: (1) associations with other repression questionnaires (present or not) and (2) associations with distress scales (negative or positive). Earlier findings were unable to provide predictions for some subscales, namely the RAE anti-emotionality and rationality scales, and the EEC emotional-expression-out scale, because findings were contradictory.

METHOD

Recruitment

Questionnaire data were collected in two samples of women who had been treated for breast cancer. The first group of women was recruited in order to study the relationship between various measures for repression: questionnaires, interview, computer tests and physiological measures, of which only the questionnaire findings will be presented here. Once enough participants had been recruited for this study, we asked a second group to complete questionnaires only. Although we could have combined both groups in the analyses to increase power,

the opportunity to produce findings that hold in two different groups was more appealing.

Most women were recruited by means of an article published in a women's magazine. The article included an invitation to women with breast cancer to participate in a study on expression of emotions. Women were invited to respond "who easily speak about their experiences, and women who find that difficult or unnecessary". The invitation also mentioned the following inclusion criteria: first diagnosis of breast cancer between 2-24 months ago, or diagnosis of metastatic breast cancer between 2-12 months ago; no other malignancies; between 18 and 70 years of age; and Dutch-speaking. As we needed a sufficient number of women with metastatic disease in the first sample for a later analysis on the possible influence of disease stage on repressive tendencies, a similar invitation was distributed in hospitals. All women who responded received a leaflet explaining the purpose of the study and a response form, including an informed consent.

Repression Questionnaires

The following questionnaires were used for measuring repression or related concepts:

The *Weinberger Adjustment Inventory - short form* (WAI; Weinberger, 1991). Five of its subscales refer to repression and related concepts, namely the four restraint subscales and the Repressive Defensiveness subscale. The four restraint subscales are labelled: Suppression of Aggression (avoiding harm to others when angry), Impulse Control (thinking before one acting), Consideration of Others (promotion of others' welfare in conditions where there is some personal cost) and Responsibility (adoption of social values, such as not cheating or lying). The WAI also includes four distress subscales, which are described further on. Internal consistency and test-retest reliability of the WAI restraint and defensiveness subscales are sufficient (Turvey et al., 1993; Giese-Davis & Spiegel, 2001; Weinberger, 1991). Their validity was demonstrated in several ways. Repression scores according to the self-report scales and according to informants appeared to be significantly related ($r = .35 - .39$) (Weinberger, 1991). Validity was also confirmed by demonstrating an association between the WAI restraint scales and other repression questionnaires (King, Emmons, & Woodley, 1992; Turvey et al., 1993; Derakshan & Eysenck, 1997). Repression scales are expected to be negatively-related to distress measures. Two studies found the restraint and

defensiveness scales to be negatively related to distress with the exception of the Consideration of Others and Anger suppression scales (Weinberger, 1991; Giese-Davis et al., 2001). However, such an association with distress scales was not systematically found in other studies (Emmons & Colby, 1995; Turvey et al., 1993; Derakshan et al., 1997).

The shortened Dutch version of the *Marlowe-Crowne Social Desirability* (MC SD, Crowne & Marlowe, 1960) scale was used (Rooyen & Smoor-van Son, 1978). According to Weinberger, Schwartz, & Davidson (1979), this scale should be conceived as a measure for defensiveness, rather than a measure for social desirability. The MC SD alone or in combination with a distress questionnaire is the measure most used for repression. Internal consistency of the MC SD is sufficient (Sincoff, 1992; Turvey et al., 1993; Fischer & Fick, 1993; Loo & Thorpe, 2000). Several studies showed a relationship between the MC SD and other repression measures (King et al., 1992; Swan, Carmelli, Dame, Rosenman, & Spielberger, 1992; Tomaka, Blascovich, & Kelsey, 1992; Turvey et al., 1993; Ritz & Dahme, 1996; Derakshan et al., 1997; Furnham, Petrides, & Spencer-Bowdage, 2002). Several studies also demonstrated the expected negative relationship with distress questionnaires (Turvey et al., 1993; Ritz et al., 1996; Egloff & Hock, 1997; Gick, Mcleod, & Hulihan, 1997; Phipps & Srivastava, 1997; Mann et al., 1998).

The *MC SD - distress combination*. In accordance to the proposal put forward by Weinberger et al. (1979), the MC SD scale is used in combination with the Taylor Manifest Anxiety Scale (MAS). In their two-dimensional approach, four groups are formed, depending on whether scores on the two scales are high or low. Repressors form one of these four groups and are defined as scoring high on the MC SD scale and low on the MAS. The validity of this measure for defining repressors was confirmed in numerous studies (see the reviews of Furnham & Trayner, 1999; Furnham et al., 2002). The four-group approach was also applied in the present study, using a median split for both questionnaires. However, for many analyses a continuous variable is preferred. Therefore, we only used the score on the MC SD scale in most of our analyses.

The *Rationality/Anti-emotionality (RAE) scale* is a 16-item Dutch questionnaire developed by Ploeg et al. (1989) on the basis of an 11-item interview questionnaire by Grossarth-Maticek, Bastiaans, & Kanazir (1985). The RAE assesses the tendency to use reason and logic to avoid negative emotions in

general and interpersonal conflicts in particular. A factor analysis yielded three dimensions: Rationality (trying to act rationally; 6 items), Emotionality (responding emotionally; 4 items) and Understanding (3 items) (Bleiker, Ploeg, Hendriks, Leer, & Kleijn, 1993). Psychometric characteristics were only determined in one study (Bleiker et al., 1993). The internal consistency and test-retest reliability of the three RAE subscales appeared to be sufficient, and the three RAE scales were weakly related to feelings of distress (anxiety, anger, depression) in the expected direction.

The *Emotional Expression and Control (EEC) scale* (Bleiker et al., 1993) assesses the extent to which negative feelings are held in, expressed toward other people, or controlled, respectively. In its design, the EEC is comparable to the State Trait Anger Expression Inventory (STAXI) by Spielberger (1988), but asks not only about control of anger, but also of other emotions. The EEC contains three subscales of six items each: Emotional Expression-In, Emotional Expression-Out and Emotional Control. Each subscale is composed of two items referring to anxiety, two items about anger and two items about depression. Internal consistency and test-retest reliability of the three EEC subscales were sufficient (Bleiker et al., 1993; Verissimo, Mota-Cardoso, & Taylor, 1998). One of the subscales, Emotional Control, appeared to be negatively related to feelings of distress, as is to be expected from a repression measure (Bleiker et al., 1993; Verissimo et al., 1998). However, in one study (Bleiker et al., 1993), the EEC-Out scale was sometimes positively related to distress, and the EEC-In scale was often positively related to distress. These two scales were unrelated to distress in another study (Verissimo et al., 1998).

We used two methods for assessing Type C behaviour, both proposed by Temoshok: vignettes and a Type C Questionnaire. Both measuring methods were included in this study, because of the interest in the Type C pattern. Temoshok considers her concept as being close to repression, whereas we are of the opinion that it is closer to anxious defensiveness (see introduction). The three *vignettes of* Temoshok (2004) describe the reactions of a person who is confronted with a stressful situation, e.g. having to deal with the emotional and practical consequences of a large-scale fire that has destroyed many houses in the neighbourhood, including the subject's home. Each vignette describes a different individual with a different coping style representing Helplessness, Type C and Active Coping, respectively. Participants are asked to indicate whether each coping style corresponds to their own reaction pattern in stressful situations, using a ten-point scoring scale ranging from "totally different" to "quite the same". Only the responses to the Type C vignette were analysed in the present study. The

Type C questionnaire (TCQ) consists of twelve items referring to non-expression of negative emotions, non-assertiveness, abrogating one's needs in favour of others, and being nice, positive and helpful to others. Answers are scored on a five-point scale. Temoshok, who presented to us the text used in the Vignettes and the TCQ, has not published about her conclusions on their psychometric characteristics. Her vignettes have also been used in a study about psychological aspects of HIV progression (Solano et al., 1993).

Distress Questionnaires

The *Profile of Mood States* (POMS; McNair, Lorr, & Drappelman, 1971). The Dutch validated, shortened version was used, which consists of five dimensions: depression, anger, fatigue, vigour and tension (Wald & Mellenbergh, 1990). In the analyses, the total mood disturbance score (sum of all negative mood subscales - vigour score) was used.

The four distress subscales in the *Weinberger Adjustment Inventory* (WAI; Weinberger, 1991) are labelled anxiety, depression, low self-esteem and low well-being. The sum of the four subscales total scores was used in the analyses (WAI-distress).

The 20-item version of the *Manifest Anxiety Scale* (MAS; Taylor, 1953) was used.

The *Impact of Event Scale* (IES; Horowitz, Wilner, & Alvarez, 1979) was translated and psychometrically tested by Brom and Kleber (1985). This 15-item questionnaire assesses the degree of subjective distress experienced following a stressful event, in this case having breast cancer. It has two subscales, Intrusion and Avoidance. The total score to all items was used in the analyses.

Statistical Analysis

Items were recoded in such a way that a higher score to repression questionnaires indicate more repression and a higher score to distress questionnaires indicate more distress. Differences between the two groups were tested using t-tests and Chi square tests.

The relationships between repression, distress, socio-demographic variables and disease variables were analysed using simple correlation coefficients. Because all questionnaires contained Likert scales with a limited range, the nonparametric

Spearman correlation coefficients were used. The relationships between repression and distress were also studied partialing out the contribution of relevant socio-demographic and disease variables. The effect of using these control variables was necessarily based on a comparison of Pearson correlation coefficients.

A secondary factor analysis was used to determine whether the various repression measures could be best considered as belonging to one cluster or to several clusters. Principal component analysis was used, followed by Varimax rotation. The number of factors was determined by parallel analysis (Hayton, Allen, & Scarpello, 2004). To test whether the factor solutions of both groups were similar, confirmatory factor analysis was used. Although the sample sizes were rather small for this analysis, it is the only acceptable technique for comparing factor solutions. The following fit criteria were used: TLI $\geq$.90 (Hair et al., 1998, pg 657), CFI $\geq$.95 (Thompson, 2005; pg. 129) and RMSEA $\leq$.06 (Thompson, 2005; pg. 130).

Because Weinberger's MC SD - MAS combination is a categorical variable, it did not lend itself to be included in the previous analyses. Therefore, we ran a separate set of tests by means of an ANOVA to analyse whether the four MC SD - MAS groups differed with respect to distress and repression-related scales. As the division into the four MC SD -MAS categories already yielded small groups, we combined the study groups 1 and 2 in this analysis.

RESULTS

Study Group

More than 600 women responded to the invitation published in a women's magazine and placed in hospitals. Approximately 400 women fulfilled the inclusion criteria. These women received the information flyer and informed consent form, which was returned by 308 women. The first 103 women from this sample (group 1) were interviewed and completed computer tests. They also received a set of questionnaires. The interview and the computer tests were held in their homes. One woman dropped out of the study because of the aggravation of her illness. As a result, group 1 consisted of 102 women. Another 205 women with breast cancer who also met the inclusion criteria received the set of questionnaires only i.e. they were not interviewed nor did they participate in the

computer tests. Complete questionnaires were returned by 145 women (71%), who formed study group 2.

Table 1. Socio-demographic and disease variables of the two study groups.

		Group 1 (N=102)	Group 2 (N=145)
Age (years)		49,3 (SD:8,2)	48,9 (SD: 8,0)
Partner relation (%)	yes	82	90
	no	18	10
Outdoors work (%)	yes	58	34
	no	42	66
Education (%)	primary school and lower vocational training	17	22
	secondary school	56	53
	higher education	28	25
Diagnosis (%)	no metastasis	58	79
	lymph node metastasis	16	11
	distant metastasis	26	10

The two study groups did not differ on any of the repression or distress variables (t-tests; significance level of $p = .05$). Socio-demographic and disease variables are presented in Table 1. There were more patients with a serious diagnosis (metastatic disease; $p=.001$) and less people with a job outdoors ($p=.000$) in the first study group (Chi-Square test). Both findings were found to be related: Having a more serious diagnosis was related to working outdoors less ($p=.004$; Chi Square test). There were no differences with respect to age, partner relation and education.

Internal Consistency

Data about the internal consistency of the scales is presented in Table 2. Reliability was sufficient (Cronbach's alpha was about .70 or higher) for most subscales, but modest for the second and fourth Restraint subscales in the WAI and Temoshok's Type C Questionnaire (alpha was about .60 for these scales). The first distress subscale in the WAI was unreliable, but internal consistency was adequate for the total WAI distress score, which was used in following analyses.

Table 2. Reliability of scales in the two study groups

Repression questionnaires					Distress questionnaires				
			Cronbach's alpha					Cronbach's alpha	
		No. of items	N=102	N=145			No. of items	N=102	N=145
WAI-restraint	anger suppr.	3	.77	.61	POMS	depression	8	.85	.92
	impulse contr.	3	.64	.53		anger	7	.88	.86
	consid. others	3	.69	.69		fatigue	6	.92	.93
	responsibility	3	.57	.67		vigor	5	.82	.88
	defensiveness	11	.72	.77		tension	6	.83	.87
MC - SD		15	.74	.69		tot	32	.84	.86
RAE	anti-emotion.	4	.73	.75	WAI-Distress	anxiety	3	.49	.66
	rationality	6	.79	.67		depression	3	.67	.72
	understanding	3	.68	.71		low self-esteem	3	.74	.69
EEC	in	6	.80	.79		low well being	3	.64	.75
	out	6	.88	.90		tot	12	.77	.83
	control	6	.83	.89	MAS		20	.86	.90
TCQ		12	.60	.66	IES	intrusion	7	.84	.86
						avoidance	8	.79	.80

Distress Measures: Intercorrelations and Associations with Demographic Variables

The four distress measures that were used in the following analyses, namely the total scores on the POMS, WAI-distress, MAS and IES, were highly interrelated ($.35 \leq r \leq .82$). There were hardly any associations between these distress measures and age, partner relation and diagnosis. Higher education was associated with less intrusion and avoidance of stressful events (IES), and with less anxiety (MAS, though only in group 2).

Repression Measures: Intercorrelations and Associations with Demographic Variables

Repression measures do not constitute a cluster of homogenous indicators, as apparent from the intercorrelation coefficients shown in Table 3. Several of these measures appeared to be unrelated.

Some repression measures were related to demographic variables, but relationships were never consistently found in both groups. Older participants showed more repression (only in group 1). The relationship for education was not consistent; sometimes positive, but more often negative. Having a partner was virtually unrelated to the tendency towards repression (not shown in Table 3). A more serious diagnosis was sometimes associated with more repression.

Factor Analysis

The outcome of factor analyses is shown in Table 4. Parallel analyses and scree plots of both groups indicated a two-factor solution. The findings for the two study groups are reasonably comparable and the variable with the highest loading for each factor was similar in both study groups. The explained variance was 41% and 42%, respectively.

**Table 3. Interrelationships of repression measures and their relationships to control variables (Spearman's rho).
The coefficients for the first and second study group are placed one below the other.**

		WAI					MC-SD	RAE			EEC			TCQ	Vign
		Suppr.	control	others	respon	Defens		underst	anti-em	rational.	in	out	control		
WAI	Impulse control	.23 * .36 **													
	consid. others	.03 .17 *	.38 ** .34 **												
	responsibility	.19 .31 **	.44 ** .36 **	.24 * .20 *											
	defensiveness	.30 ** .38 **	.48 ** .36 **	.36 ** .22 **	.50 ** .31 **										
MC-SD		.28 ** .40 **	.37 ** .39 **	.27 ** .24 **	.49 ** .22 **	.65 ** .59 **									
RAE	understanding	.28 ** .33 **	.07 .20 *	.14 .27 **	.08 .11	.22 * .27 **	.31 ** .29 **								
	anti emotionality	.09 .08	.02 -.02	-.13 -.10	.12 -.11	.18 -.14	.10 -.09	-.05 .09							
	rationality	.00 -.05	.25 * .15	.13 .08	.09 -.10	.15 -.15	.15 -.08	.31 ** .13	.19 .41 **						
EEC	in	-.12 -.21 **	-.10 -.08	.11 .03	-.21 * -.13	-.03 -.35 **	-.21 * -.27 **	-.01 -.04	.00 .00	.21 * .34 **					
	out	.18 .05	.17 .04	.06 .03	-.04 -.01	.04 -.17 *	.08 -.04	.10 -.13	.25 ** .17 *	.25 * .31 **	.42 ** .41 **				
	Control	.22 * .37 **	.35 ** .27 **	.21 * .32 **	.18 .07	.22 * .23 **	.25 ** .29 **	.35 ** .49 **	.17 .08	.36 ** .29 **	.10 .00	.35 ** .08			

Table 3. (Continued)

		WAI					MC-SD	RAE			EEC			TCQ	Vign
		Suppr.	control	others	respon	Defens		underst	anti-em	ration.	in	out	control		
TCQ		.24 ** .26 *	.18 .26 **	.42 ** .25 **	.08 .13	.22 * .18	.15 .26 **	.26 ** .21 *	.00 -.08	.27 ** .22 **	.38 ** .32 **	.44 ** .38 **	.29 ** .29 **		
Vignette		.26 ** .04	.25 ** -.07	.10 .02	.06 -.03	.22 * -.24 **	.13 -.01	.11 .09	.07 -.05	.08 .19 *	.27 ** .34 **	.28 ** .33 **	.29 ** .09	.35 ** .34 **	
Age		.13 .03	.31 ** .19	.16 -.05	.04 -.02	.08 -.07	.18 .04	.20 .00	.05 .01	.30 ** .11	.08 .11	.08 .16	.24 * .13	.17 .10	.03 .13
Education		.14 .31 **	-.22 * -.03	-.15 .06	-.23 * .11	-.16 -.08	-.24 ** .01	.13 .16	.06 .08	-.16 -.12	-.08 -.12	.00 -.26 **	.01 .21 *	-.06 -.15	.02 -.06
Diagnosis		-.03 .05	.26 * -.05	.09 -.03	.21 * .12	.22 * .08	.08 .05	.12 .03	-.02 .03	.05 -.03	-.06 .03	-.03 .06	.11 .08	.03 .05	-.03 .01

* $p \leq .05$

** $p \leq .01$

Table 4. Factor analysis of the repression measures for the first and second study group. Presented are factor loadings after Varimax rotation.

		factor loadings			
		factor 1		factor 2	
		Gr 1	Gr 2	Gr 1	Gr 2
WAI	anger suppression	.47	.65	.15	-.02
	impulse control	.64	.63	.19	.04
	consideration of others	.41	.51	.28	.13
	responsibility	.70	.28	-.17	-.03
	defensiveness	.81	.71	.10	-.39
MC - SD		.81	.72	-.02	-.21
RAE	understanding	.39	.62	.25	.09
	anti-emotionality	.16	.00	.15	.32
	rationality	.18	.13	.52	.68
EEC	in	-.32	-.28	.70	.72
	out	-.01	-.02	.74	.69
	control	.33	.65	.55	.28
TCQ		.17	.45	.74	.57
vignette		.14	.00	.56	.60

Bold: factor loadings $\geq .40$

The RAE – Anti-emotionality scale did not show sufficiently high loadings on any of the two factors. The EEC control scale could not be reliably classified. It belongs to factor 2 in group 1 and two factor 1 in group 2. Both scales were therefore further ignored. The first factor included the four Restraint scales and Defensiveness scale of the WAI, the MC Social Desirability scale and the RAE Understanding Scale. This factor can be identified as ‘Repression’. Example items are: “I become ‘wild and crazy’ and do things other people might not like” (WAI-Impulse control), “I am never unkind to people I don’t like” (WAI-Repressive defensiveness) and “I am always polite, even to unpleasant people” (MC SD). The second factor includes the Expression In and Out scales of the EEC, Temoshok’s Type C questionnaire and the Type C vignette, and could be labelled as ‘Anxious Inhibition’. Example items are: “When I feel afraid or worried, I hide my feelings” (EEC-in), “I show my feelings, when I am angry or get annoyed” and “I think that I am very nice to other people” (TCQ).

Then, the classification into the two clusters was used in a confirmatory factor analysis to determine whether the factor solution holds for both groups. Some

adjustments were needed to find a solution that fitted for both groups: (1) One scale with loadings that differed considerably for the two groups in the exploratory factor analysis had to be removed: RAE understanding. (2) Two scales with relatively high loadings on both factors in the exploratory factor analysis were conceived as being related to both factors in the confirmatory factor analysis: EEC-in and TCQ. (3) The error terms of two scales –WAI impulse control and responsibility of others– were conceived as being related. The resulting factor analysis solution is presented in Figure 1. It shows that the EEC-In and TCQ did load on the Repression cluster, but their regression weights also indicate that their contribution to this factor is considerably lower than their contribution to the Anxious Defensiveness cluster. Figure 1 also shows that the regression weights ('factor loadings') are comparable for both groups, but that the latent variables Repression and Anxious Defensiveness are unrelated in group 1 ($r = .03$), but show some association in group 2 ($r = .24$).

We first tested whether the pathways were similar for both groups. Chi-square was 100, $df = 84$ and $p = .04$ for this unrestricted model. Fit measures were adequate: TLI = .94, CFI = .96 and RMSEA = .03. Next, we tested whether the regression weights were comparable for both groups. The fit was somewhat less - Chi-square = 127 ($df = 90$; $p = .005$); TLI = .92, CFI = .93 and RMSEA = .04 - but this restricted model is still acceptable.




Figure 1. Confirmatory factor analyses of the two samples.

Table 5. Relationships between measures of repression and distress (Spearman's rho). The coefficients for the first and second study group are placed one below the other.

		POMS	WAI -distress	MAS	IES
WAI	Anger suppression	-.07	-.03	-.01	-.13
		-.21 *	-.22 **	-.20 *	-.16
	impulse control	-.01	.10	.07	.11
		-.11	-.13	-.08	-.05
	Consideration of others	.15	.14	.22*	.08
		-.17	-.08	-.01	-.01
	responsibility	-.15	-.12	-.06	.05
		-.06	-.21 *	-.10	-.06
	defensiveness	-.14	-.18	-.07	.12
		-.17	-.37 **	-.27 **	-.20 *
MC-SD		-.24 **	-.26 **	-.29 **	-.11
		-.34 **	-.43 **	-.33 **	-.27 **
RAE	understanding	-.31 **	-.24 *	-.22 *	-.20 *
		-.04	-.14	-.06	.02
	anti-emotion.	-.03	-.06	-.08	.02
		-.09	.04	-.11	.02
	rationality	-.07	.03	-.11	.04
		.08	.19 *	.11	.31 **
EEC	in	.37**	.39 **	.42 **	.26 **
		.34 **	.58 **	.53 **	.44 **
	out	.06	.13	.11	-.10
		.13	.28 **	.17 *	.25 **
	control	-.23 *	-.09	-.20 *	-.05
		-.18 *	-.21 **	-.33 **	-.01
TCQ		.17	.27 **	.21 *	.08
		-.05	.04	.12	.14
Vignette		.03	.19	.06	.06
		.17 *	.18 *	.16	.21 **

* $p \leq .05$

** $p \leq .01$

Relationship between Repression-Related Measures and Distress

Table 5 shows the relationship between measures of repression and distress (Spearman correlation coefficients). Divergent associations were found for the various repression-related measures - positive, negative and no associations - which points to the different character of these measures. If a significant association with distress was found, it was negative for the scales belonging to the

repression factor. The only exception was the positive relationship between “consideration of others” and the MAS for group 1. On the other hand, scales belonging to the Anxious Defensiveness factor showed, if significant, positive relationships to distress.

Partial correlation coefficients were also determined, controlling for age and education. This led to a few changes compared to the zero order correlations. Of the 112 correlation coefficients mentioned in Table 5, 41 Pearson correlation coefficients were significant, and 35 were still significant after controlling for age and education. However, these changes did not affect the general conclusions formulated above.

The Combination MC SD and MAS

Weinberger's classification includes four categories: truly high anxious (low MC SD - high MAS), truly low anxious (low MC SD - low MAS), defensive high anxious (high MC SD - high MAS) and repressive (high MC SD - low MAS). Using a median split for the MC SD scale and the MAS, the number of patients in each category was: 30%, 21%, 19% and 30%, respectively. A series of ANOVAs was run to determine whether the MC SD - MAS categorical variable was related to distress and repression-related scales. Findings are presented in Table 6. The first two columns present the F-values, p-values and partial eta's squared for the overall-tests (partial eta's squared are effect size measures). The repressive category was the most interesting category, therefore, follow-up contrast tests concerning the differences between the repressive groups and the remaining three groups were determined. Follow-up test findings are presented in the last three columns.

The first half of Table 6 presents the data for distress. It is evident that the repressive group differs from the two high anxious groups in terms of level of distress, as the repressive group was formed on the basis of low anxiety scores. In addition, no or small differences are expected between the repression and truly low anxious groups. In view of this, the overall tests and the follow-up contrasts should be seen as no more than a check, and this check was passed in all cases. It is also evident that the largest effect (largest partial eta squared) was found for the MAS, as the four categories are based on the MC SD scale and the MAS. Figure 2a is presented as an example of the differences between the four MC SD - MAS subgroups and shows the findings for the POMS total scores.

Table 6. Differences in distress and repression related scales among Weinberger's four MC SD - MAS categories. The outcome of the overall ANOVA and of the follow-up contrasts is presented.

		Overall test		Contrast ^a with repression		
				truly high anxious	truly low anxious	Anxious defen- -sive
		F	η^2_p ^b	η^2_p	η^2_p	H^2_p
Distress questionnaires						
POMS		29,90	.27 **	.24 **	.03 **	.15 **
WAI- Distress		59,90	.43 **	.38 **	.05 **	.26 **
MAS		202,31	.71 **	.63 **	.01	.52 **
IES		16,14	.17 **	.13 **	.03 **	.12 **
Repression-related questionnaires						
WAI	Anger suppression	6,56	.08 **	-.07 **	-.03 **	.01
	impulse control	10,11	.11 **	-.05 **	-.07 **	.00
	Consideration of others	3,44	.04 *	.00	-.04 **	.00
	responsibility	1,89	.02	.01	.00	.00
	defensiveness	25,83	.24 **	-.19 **	-.14 **	.01
MC-SD		180,63	.69 **	-.61 **	-.52 **	-.02 *
RAE	understanding	4,90	.06 **	-.04 **	-.05 **	.01
	anti-emotion.	.29	.00	.00	.00	.00
	rationality	.26	.01	.00	.00	.00
EEC	in	18,55	.19 **	.17 **	.01	.07 **
	out	1,63	.02	.01	.01	.00
	control	6,54	.08 **	-.06 **	-.03 *	-.04 **
TCQ		4,22	.05 **	.00	-.04 **	.00
Vignette		.83	-.01	.00	.00	.01

* = overall test or contrast is significant at $\alpha \leq .05$

** = overall test or contrast is significant at $\alpha \leq .01$

- In case of a significant difference, a sign indicates the direction of the difference (higher distress scores and lower "repression" scores are expected in the three groups, compared to the repression group)
- The partial eta squared (η^2_p) is a measure of effect size




Figure 2. (a) Total scores to the Profile of Mood scale and (b) scores to the repressive defensiveness scale for the four MC SD - MAS categories

We also determined the relationship between the MC SD - MAS categories and other repression-related scales. The findings are presented in the lower half of Table 6. The overall test and the contrast between the repressive subgroup and the other three subgroups in particular, is a check to verify whether the repression-related scales correspond with the MC SD - MAS combination. Differences were expected between the repression group and the truly high and low anxious groups, and no or small differences between the repression and anxious defensiveness groups. It is no surprise that this applied to the scales that loaded in the factor analysis on the same dimension as the MC SD scale (the 'repression factor') namely several of the WAI restraint and repressive defensiveness scales. It was also found for the RAE Understanding scale, which has an uncertain relationship with the repression factor. By way of example, the pattern in the WAI repressive defensiveness scores is presented in Figure 2b. It is neither a surprise that the largest effect size (partial eta squared) was found for the MC SD scale, as the four categories were based on the MC SD - MAS combination. Several repression-related scales did not at all follow the pattern indicated by the MC SD - MAS combination; their overall tests were not significant. Not surprisingly, these are the scales that loaded on the second dimension in the factor analysis, namely the RAE Rationality scale, the EEC Out scale and the Type C vignette. Although the overall tests were significant for EEC In and TCQ, these scales followed a totally different pattern than the repression measures of the 'repression factor'.

Similar tests for age and education revealed that educational level was different for the four groups, caused by a low educational level among the group of anxiously defensive people, compared to the other three groups. Therefore, all ANOVAs were repeated, using education as a control variable. None of the conclusions mentioned above changed when controlling for education. Age did not show a group effect.

DISCUSSION

Secondary factor analysis revealed that the different repression-related scales clustered in two dimensions, which were labelled 'repression' and 'anxious defensiveness'. The exploratory factor solutions of the two groups of breast cancer patients that participated in this study showed reasonable correspondence. Confirmatory factor analysis showed that a somewhat adjusted solution fitted for both study groups. These findings were largely in agreement with the predictions.

The only exception is that the emotional control scale did not clearly belong to the repression cluster.

People who score high on the first dimension feel inhibited to express their negative feelings, because this is seen as socially undesirable. This should not be conceived simply as the need to follow external norms, but rather as reflecting a self-concept that depends on the approval of other people. The relationship with level of distress, if significant, was negative for the scales loading on this dimension, as is to be expected from repression scales. This dimension includes the restraint and repressive defensiveness scales of the WAI, the MC social desirability scale and the emotional-expression-in scale of the EEC (the last scale had a negative association with the repression factor). The RAE Understanding scale seemed to be part of this cluster in the exploratory factor analysis, but its association could not be confirmed in the confirmatory factor analysis.

People who score high on the second dimension also have a defensive coping style, but they report relatively high levels of anxiety and other distress symptoms in contrast to those scoring high on the Repression dimension. They behave - more or less anxiously - in a socially acceptable way: They are nice in order not to get hurt and avoid social confrontations. This dimension includes the RAE Rationality scale, the EEC In and Out scales, and the two Type C measures by Temoshok. If the association was significant, these scales were positively associated with distress. We have labelled this cluster provisionally as an 'Anxious Defensiveness' cluster. The reason for reserve is that the positive association could also be an artificial product of unreliable scales. The clear differentiation between scales belonging to these two dimensions, labelled here as Repression and Anxious Defensiveness, is the most remarkable finding of this study. The various scales did not only form two clearly distinguishable dimensions, but they were also related differently to distress. Those who have developed these scales are not always explicit about whether their scales measure repression or not, but they do at least suggest that the scales measure a concept related to repression. For instance the Type C individual is described by Temoshok as "suppressing negative emotions", "the Type C individual does not even try to express needs and feelings; these are hidden under a mask of normalcy and self sufficiency" (Temoshok, 1987, pp. 558-560). The present study clearly demonstrates that the Type C measures do not measure repression.

It is intriguing and still puzzling that many items of repression scales, at first sight, do not seem to ask about a repressive tendency, such as "I am always polite, even to unpleasant people", whereas many items of anxious defensiveness scales ask straight away about such a tendency, such as the item "When I feel afraid or worried, I hide my feelings". It could be that asking about the tendency to hide

one's negative emotions, is interpreted by subjects as also asking whether one often experiences such negative emotions. Therefore, especially anxious defensive people might score high on such questions. Indeed, more scales of the Anxious Defensiveness dimension include questions of the type "When I feel afraid or worried, I hide my feelings".

The validity of the division into the four MC SD - MAS categories as proposed by Weinberger et al. (1979) was again confirmed in the present study. The difference between the four subgroups in their scores to distress and repression scales followed the expected pattern. Although this categorical variable is a valid method for assessing repressive tendencies, it is questionable whether this combination measure is a more useful and interesting measure than the MC SD alone. Every finding with the combination measure was already implicated by the findings with the MC SD scale alone. Other studies have also shown that associations with other repression measures and associations with measures of physiological activity are no more convincing, or even less convincing for the combination measure, than for the social desirability scale alone (Tomaka et al., 1992; Ritz et al., 1996; Furnham et al., 1999; Ashley & Holtgraves, 2003).

Three other studies also performed a secondary factor analysis on repression-related questionnaires, though a hypothesis that could be used in the interpretation of the findings was not formulated in advance in these studies (King et al., 1992; Turvey et al., 1993; Giese-Davis et al., 2001). The first study compared sixteen scales. Several of these scales measured concepts that are different from repression, such as self-concealment, alexithymia and ambivalence about emotional expressiveness (Garssen et al., 2004, 2007). The best solution appeared to be a two-factor model. One factor included these non-repression aspects, whereas typical repression questionnaires loaded on the other factor (King et al., 1992).

The best solution in the second study (Turvey et al., 1993) was a one-factor model. This factor included the WAI restraint, defensiveness and distress scales, MC SD scale, self-deception questionnaire (SDQ, Sackeim & Gur, 1979; Paulhus, 1984), repression-sensitisation (R-S) scale (Byrne, Barry, & Nelson, 1963) and the Miller Behavioral Style Scale (MBSS; Miller, 1987). So, the somewhat meagre conclusion from this study is that repression scales measuring related concepts, especially self-deception (SDQ) and the monitoring scale of the MBSS, come together in one factor.

The third study compared the WAI restraint and distress scales and the Courtauld Emotional Control Scale (CECS; Watson & Greer, 1983) and found four factors consisting of 1) distress scales, 2) subscales of the CECS, 3) WAI restraint scales, and 4) WAI defensiveness scales, respectively (Giese-Davis et al.,

2001). The CECS has some similarity to the EEC, used in the present study. The finding that the CECS scales clustered in one factor and the WAI restraint and defensiveness scales clustered in other factors, could be seen as support for our division into anxious defensiveness scales (CECS) and repression (WAI).

To summarise the findings of this study, only some of the various repression-related scales appeared to be valid measures of repression. Scales not belonging to this cluster seem to measure anxious defensiveness, including the type C measures. The scales of the two clusters show different relationships with distress. If a significant association is found, it is negative for the repression scales and positive for the anxious defensiveness scales. We consider this an important conclusion. Some researchers could be inclined to use scales such as the In and Out scales of the EEC, the Rationality scale of the RAE or Type C measures as indicators of repression. In the same line, reviewers may lump together studies using such measures with studies that applied proper repression measures. This ignorance will lead to false conclusions.

It is advisable to use the Marlowe Crowne Desirability Scale for measuring level of repression. This scale had, together with the repressive defensiveness scale of the WAI the highest loadings on the repression factor. The MC SD scale is preferred, because this scale is most clearly (negatively) related to distress.

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Chapter 5

**WHERE ARE ALL THE BLACK MALE
STUDENTS? AFRICAN AMERICANS' SCHOOL
ACHIEVEMENT, THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY
OF DENIAL, AND ARTS EDUCATION
AS A MEDIATING INFLUENCE**

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ABSTRACT

Research has indicated that African Americans are often displaced in schools and males in particular, are denied access to quality academic programs and are tracked into vocational training, and some are even forced out of schools. Since the establishment of the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) of 1975, there has been growing interest in understanding the relationship between African American male students and special education assessment. In this research we explore the impact that the historic denial of educational equality and culturally responsive pedagogy has had on the disproportionately high placement of African American males in special education programs for the mentally disabled, and behaviorally and emotionally challenged. Our research reveals three primary catalysts for special education placement of African American male students: 1) persistent patterns of discrimination, 2) biases in assessments, and 3) social differences

in students' behaviors and learning styles. The findings further reveal that the integration of culturally responsive and reflective arts education into teacher pedagogy and curriculum helps to mediate school disengagement, and addresses the multiple intelligences and learning styles of African Americans. This research has important implications for teacher education programs, as it increases awareness and provides strategies and techniques for arts integration that may lead to higher levels of cognitive development and academic achievement in African Americans and the broader student population.

Throughout the history of the United States, access to educational opportunities has been a major concern for Native Americans and African Americans (Anderson, 1988; Cooper, 1999; Wiggan, 2007). Racial differences have served as the primary rationale for denying equal educational opportunities for minority students, and particularly for students of African descent (Woodson, 1933/1998). The social and psychological aspects of denial have to do with the creation and perpetuation of institutional barriers that prevent a target group from obtaining equal rights and opportunities. In the context of schools, the systemic denial of educational equity to minorities is intricately woven into the fabric of the nation's history, and is crucial because it lays the foundation for today's school failures (Irvine, 1990; Kozol, 2005).

During the antebellum era, southern states prohibited the education of free blacks and made it a crime to teach slaves to read or write (Evans, 2007; Williams, 2005). Although southern states established schools for blacks during Reconstruction, public schools in the South would remain separate and grossly unequal until the second half of the twentieth century (Douglas, 2005; Wiggan, 2007). The *Plessy v. Ferguson* Supreme Court decision of 1896 supported the legality of racially segregated education in the South, and upheld the ideology that separate but equal public accommodations and facilities were constitutional. This ruling served to create a system of social inequalities, which was designed to deny African Americans an education that would enable them to compete economically with their white counterparts, and subsequently create a permanent class of laborers who would fuel the southern economy by providing menial agricultural, domestic, and industrial labor (Anderson, 1988; Jewell, 2007; Johnson, Ford, Wiggan, & Quick, 2009). Since then, the challenges and outcries have been intense with mounting public awareness regarding re-segregation and school failures, particularly in districts that were previously desegregated (Orfield & Lee, 2007; Stiefel, Schwartz, & Chellman, 2007; Wiggan, 2008).

The denial of equal educational opportunities for African Americans was not exclusive to the southern states. Prior to the Civil War, school officials in the

northern states often excluded blacks from the newly created common schools. After the war, black children were sent to separate, inferior schools (Williams, 2005). Prompted by black political activism, many northern states developed legislation, which prohibited racially segregated public education. To circumvent efforts to create more egalitarian school systems, many northern school districts employed residential and school processes to segregate black and white children. Some northern segregation occurred due to racial disparities in wealth, which prevented African Americans from buying homes in more affluent white neighborhoods where their children could attend better schools (Myers, 2000). Other segregation methods blatantly violated state laws where in schools black students were placed in separate "colored classrooms." Furthermore, racially designated time periods for black and white students were used to ensure the least amount of interracial interactions during the school day.

In an effort to address specific racial barriers in education, the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) successfully mounted the *Brown v. Board of Education* Supreme Court case in 1954, which in effect, removed the legal basis for segregation in schools and other public facilities. The outcome of this case led to a movement to end racial segregation in schools which would last for more than 50 years, carrying the nation into the 21st century.

In spite of the outcome in the *Brown v. Board of Education* case, African American students continue to be underserved in public schools and they often lack the resources that are needed to catch-up. Within today's public education system, black students are often challenged by failing schools in districts that are re-segregating. In schools, tracking has led to many African American students being placed in lower-level courses aimed at vocational training, or in special education classes for the behaviorally and emotionally disturbed (Orfield & Lee, 2007; Wiggan, 2007). Special education (SE) has become the place to refer black male students who teachers and administrators perceive as being problems. In schools where ability group tracking is the norm, research indicates that the academic level of a course can be easily identified by examining the racial composition of the classroom. Generally, the highest-level academic classes are mostly white, while the least challenging, most basic classes are disproportionately black (Mickelson, 2001).

Within the African American student population, males in particular, are denied access to quality academic programs and are tracked into low-level courses, and some are even systematically forced out of school (Fine, 1991). Discrimination and cultural differences often lead to the overrepresentation of African American males in SE (Adkison-Bradley, Johnson, Rawls, & Plunkett,

2006; Kunjufu, 2009). Since the establishment of the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) of 1975, black males have been disproportionately placed in SE classes and programs for students with mental, emotional, and behavioral challenges. By SE, we mean classes that are designated for low performers or students believed to have behavioral and or cognitive impairments. African American males continue to be overrepresented in academic programs for students who are considered slow, retarded or disabilities; and they graduate from high school at rates significantly lower than the population of students in regular programs. Nationwide, 56.5% of disabled students (NCSE, 2007) and 47% of African American males (Schott Foundation for Public Education, 2008) graduate from high school with an actual diploma. And nationally, only 27% of African American males in SE programs graduate with a high school diploma (Kunjufu, 2009).

In this chapter we examine the impact that the historical denial of educational equality and culturally responsive pedagogy has had on the excessive placement of African American males in SE programs for the mentally disabled, and behaviorally and emotionally challenged. We discuss three of the primary catalysts for the placement of African American males in SE; 1) persistent patterns of racial discrimination, 2) biases in assessment practices, and 3) socio-cultural differences in learning styles. Finally, we explore the potential and implications of culturally responsive and reflective arts education for teacher pedagogy and curriculum in addressing the multiple intelligences and learning styles of African American males and the wider student population. The findings are discussed in the context of teacher education programs. We begin by reviewing the literature on school achievement and SE and then connect this to culturally responsive arts education.

The intersections of race and class allows for a framework through which we can understand school inequities and student outcomes (Ladson-Billings & Tate, 1995). In 2009, school data indicates that 11.5% of black students drop out compared to 6.1% of white students. In addition, 15% of black students are suspended from school annually, while only 6.1% of white students are suspended. These trends are consistent with school expulsion rates, where black students are five times more likely than their white counterparts to be expelled from school (Kunjufu, 2005, 2009). In terms of access to quality schools for black students, educational inequities inextricably linked to what neighborhoods students live in, makes it difficult for poor students and minorities to receive an effective education.

FEDERAL SCHOOL REFORM

The issue of improving public education has been a silent topic discussed by parents, teachers, administrators, policymakers and the general public. As a result, school reform became such a pervasive issue, that in 2001 the federal government launched its No Child Left Behind Act (NCLB). NCLB is a federal education reform that is intended to improve public education and raise student achievement to international levels. It acknowledges continued patterns of underachievement amongst African American and Latino/Latina students, and holds schools accountable for the educational progress of all children (Stiefel, Schwartz, & Chellman, 2007). In spite of the efforts through NCLB, racial and class disparities in educational placement and academic achievement continues to be a problem in the nation's public school system (Kozol, 2005). NCLB emphasizes market-oriented school prescriptions like increasing competition and school choice to address school failures, while ignoring school finance reform and systemic inequalities and improvements in instructional practices that address the cultural, economic, and social backgrounds of students. Improvements in access to education – and the delivery of quality instruction to students, provide much promise for mediating low school performance and SE placement (Blanchett, 2006).

The overrepresentation of African Americans in SE programs effectively demonstrates the impact the systemic denial of access to high quality, culturally responsive educational opportunities has had on these students. Since the Individuals with Disabilities Act (IDEA) of 1975, the law that serves as the legal and institutional foundation of present-day SE programs in public schools, and later the 2004 Individuals with Disabilities Education Improvement Act (IDEIA), which was intended to provide needed improvements in SE; the phenomenon of special needs placement has been the subject of much research and criticisms. When gender is taken into consideration, it becomes evident that black males are the target of assessment for emotional and behavioral disorders (EBD). Since the inception of publicly mandated SE programs, African American males have constituted the highest placement, not for the gifted, but for the mentally and behaviorally challenged. With regards to gender, there is a four-to-one ratio of African American males to females in SE (Kunjufu, 2005). While African American males comprise only 9% of the total student enrollment in public schools, in specialized settings for mental retardation and behavioral and emotional disturbances, they make up 21% and 20% of the SE placements respectively (Kunjufu, 2005, 2009).

When examined in the context of the total number of placements in the general population, African American males comprise almost 30% of the students in SE (Kunjufu, 2005). Contrasted to white females, who have one of the lowest placements in SE, African American males are three times more likely to be in a classroom for mentally retarded students, two times more likely to be in a learning disabled classroom, and are five times more likely to be in a classroom for emotionally disturbed children.

SE placement is supposed to provide students with services based on their needs to help them with skill development so that they can return to mainstream classrooms. However, it has become a space for racial segregation, the place for black males, a kind of incarceration within schools. The disproportionate placement of African American males in more restrictive settings and learning environments is most apparent for students who have been categorized as EBD. In an official report submitted to Congress, it was revealed that while 52.9% of white children with EBD spent less than 2 hours of their school day in segregated placements, black students with the same diagnosis spent most of their learning time in separate environments. Thus, SE serves as in-school segregation, and where black students are placed in more restrictive self-contained environments or in resource classrooms (Kunjufu, 2005, 2009).

AFRICAN AMERICAN MALES AND SPECIAL EDUCATION: THE ROLE OF RACE

The influence of race and white privilege must be considered as possibly playing a role in SE placement. White privilege is defined as any phenomenon, whether individual, structural, economic, political, or social, that serves to privilege whites or provide them with unearned advantages (McIntosh, 1995; Wiggan & Wilburn, 2009). Concurrently, racism has to do with the structural, political, economic, and social forces that serve to create barriers that discriminate against disadvantage groups, generally minorities, on the basis of their race for the purpose of maintaining dominance and power (Traoré, 2007). The predominance of African American males in SE programs can be viewed as a manifestation of both privilege and racialization in assessment. SE placement becomes oppressive to black males in that it serves as a structural barrier – the containment of students, which denies – rather than provides them with opportunities to access a rich, rigorous, and culturally responsive academic experience.

The high placement of African American males in SE is a major concern and warrants serious investigation because it leads to the perpetuation of schooling in which students have few positive experiences. Being in SE might signal to other students that one of their peers is slow or has low abilities, and for some teachers it means that a student has low capacities for learning; therefore, to teach them less or not to waste time teaching them at all. Furthermore, SE students are more likely to experience isolation and a disengaging curriculum. The majority of these students avoid school and eventually dropout, or opt for a certificate of attendance, which does not qualify as a sanctioned high school diploma. After high school, SE students generally have difficulties gaining access to postsecondary education, and they often experience high unemployment rates, and high rates of incarceration.

SE was designed to provide effective educational support for students with disabilities that were not being offered in general education (Blanchett, 2006). In its original conceptualization, SE was not a place or location, but rather a service delivery system. As a service delivery model, SE was supposed to provide individualized instruction to students who were identified as having disabilities based on an objective referral, assessment and evaluation, eligibility determination, placement and exit process (Blanchett, 2006). Based on this model, once appropriate accommodations, modifications, and strategies were implemented, students were to be reintegrated back into regular classes. For African American students in general and black males in particular, SE has become a form of segregation from the mainstream student population, a barrier to an engaging learning experience.

The placement of African American males in SE programs may be a direct manifestation of the inequitable allocation of resources to schools that serve black and white students. The systemic underfunding of schools that serve predominantly black students increases the prospects of them receiving an inadequate general education, and also increases their chances of being placed in SE. Access to high quality general education may decrease the rate at which black students are placed in SE, since improvements in the quality of African American students' general education experiences impacts their school performance positively (Schweinhart et al., 1993, 2005).

Research has consistently demonstrated that significant inequalities in funding and resource allocation exist between schools that serve predominantly white and black student populations. Jonathan Kozol (2005) reports that black students in East St. Louis receive a per pupil expenditure of \$8,000 annually, while their white counterparts in the Chicago suburb of Lake Forest, receive \$18,000 per year. Similarly, students in the Long Island suburb of Manhasset

receive an education worth \$21,000 a year, while children in the New York City Public School System receive about \$10,500 annually, half of what their predominantly white upper middle class peers are afforded. In February 2009, the Chicago Urban League filed a lawsuit against the State of Illinois and the Illinois State Board of Education, calling for the school funding scheme to be declared unconstitutional. The Chicago Urban League proposed that for decades, the State of Illinois has discriminated against families based on race and has deprived African American, Latino/Latina, and other minority children of a high quality education (*Chicago Urban League and Quad County Urban League v. Illinois State Board of Education and the State of Illinois*). In the press release announcing the case, the Urban League states that “Illinois ranks 49th in the nation for parity in funding to rich and poor students, and white and minority students. It should come as no surprise that Illinois also ranks near-last for the achievement gap between these groups of students” (Chicago Urban League, 2008). For states like Illinois, school finance reform presents a lifeline for improving students’ educational opportunities.

In addition to problems related to inequities in per capita student spending, schools that service predominantly African American populations face other issues such as uncertified and unqualified teachers, substandard physical structures, and a minimum skills training curricula. These schools are often considered high-poverty and they generally have limited access to technology, one or no foreign language programs, few educational specialists, few advanced classes, no opportunities to travel abroad (Kozol, 2005; Orfield & Lee, 2007), and many students who are in SE.

BIASES IN ASSESSMENT PRACTICES

What are the school processes that relate to African American students being placed in SE? One major area of concern is the influence of racially biased decision making in the processes that determine eligibility, referral and placement in SE programs. Assessment for SE depends greatly on school professionals who make decisions based on what they perceive about students’ attitudes, beliefs, communication styles, and academic performance.

In terms of the referral process, subjectivity and racial and cultural presumptions can complicate the assessment process. Academic referrals to SE often depend on the performance and norms of students’ peer group, while behavioral referrals often follow no systematic process. Children’s behavior can

vary from classroom to classroom, where some students are well-behaved in one classroom and may misbehave in another (Harry, Klingner, & Cramer 2007). In classrooms where there is a great deal of misbehavior, the decision about who is referred for SE is often arbitrary or left to the teacher's perception of who creates the most problems. In addition, referral rates vary from school to school and teacher to teacher. Some teachers refer up to a 1/3 of their classes for SE services, while others use teacher support systems to develop plans for meeting students' needs, rather than resorting to the referral process. Other teachers rarely or never refer students for SE placements.

Consistent pattern of biased assessment practices contributes to the overrepresentation and segregation of African American students in SE programs. The use, or misuse, of standardized testing practices is a primary concern in relationship to the SE evaluation process. Standardized tests are 'normed' based on the majority group, which excludes cultural and linguistic minority groups. Since most tests largely reflect white middle class experiences, values and attitudes, and fail to account for the culture and linguistic styles of minority groups; assessments may present barriers for some students and access for others (Harry, Klingner, & Cramer 2007; Hilliard, 1995). Cognitive assessments are not an objective part of the student evaluation process, so teacher's perceptions of students can be a problem. In this way, the unmet social, emotional and educational needs of students - when coupled with the mandates of government enforced high stakes testing, makes SE labeling a common phenomenon for black students who may not test well on standardized measures. The consequence of this is that SE identification and referral becomes the place for black males who are branded as deviants or mentally disabled. The discourse on black males as deviants in schools is exacerbated by media images of African Americans committing crimes, where they are framed as villains in the local news and in popular television shows, and music videos.

For many concerned parents, educators, researchers and advocates, the placement of African Americans in SE programs is an indication that commonly held school policies and practices illustrate how within school segregation works. Concerns about SE placement as an emerging form of racial segregation led to the *Larry P. v. Riles* case [1984], a court case in which the representatives from a number of black elementary school children asked the California Circuit Court to issue an order that would prevent the San Francisco school district from using IQ tests to place black children in special classes for the mentally retarded. Plaintiffs argued that because the IQ tests themselves were biased, the use of such tests for placement purposes violated their Fourteenth Amendment rights. The judge ruled that culturally biased testing disadvantaged black children and led to low-level

tracking and appointment to SE. In spite of this finding, IQ and other mental tests continue to pose challenges to African American students with regards to ability group tracking. Furthermore, complicating the school experience of African American students is a curriculum and pedagogy that is culturally unresponsive, and creates alienation and disengagement.

USE OF UNRESPONSIVE CURRICULUM AND PEDAGOGY

In American public schools, the mainstream curriculum is based on the culture and interest of the dominant group, at the expense of the minority experience. An examination of school curriculum and pedagogy must be considered as part of our discussion, because this is the curriculum that has guided instruction for the African American males who are placed in SE. This mainstream, or official school curriculum referred to as *master scripting*, represents the dominant culture's monopoly on determining the essential content of the canon and subsequently the pedagogical practices used to deliver it (Blanchett, 2006). *Master scripting* is utilized individually and institutionally to silence the voices of African Americans and it fails to incorporate their history and culture, as well as their unique place in the social class system. Through the process of *master scripting*, schools use the curriculum to limit the inclusion of instructional materials and pedagogical practices, such as the employment of culturally responsive pedagogy, Afrocentric curricula, women studies and other resources that might enrich students learning experiences.

In addition to the strict institutional control over the official curriculum through *master scripting*, African Americans often experience schooling that discourages questioning and critical thinking, and an in-school placement system that ultimately leads to SE referral. The systemic failure in providing African American male students with opportunities to develop critical literacy skills is a likely contributor to them being referred to SE at rates that are much higher than they are for their peers from other demographic groups. A rigorous curriculum and a culturally responsive curriculum go hand-in-hand, and they should be used to enhance learning and students' exposure to new materials and different ways of thinking (Delpit, 1995; Ladson-Billings, 1994).

ARTS EDUCATION AS A MEDIATING INFLUENCE

In regards to addressing the disproportionate placement of African American males into SE programs in American public schools, the full integration of arts education programs into the curriculum serves as a promising part of the solution. Arts education programs have great potential for addressing the learning needs of African American males because their implementation can effectively address the learning styles and cognitive development needs that are not being met through the official curriculum.

Public school curriculum is geared towards meeting the socio-cultural background and learning styles of dominant group members, and is often diametrically opposed to the unique learning and cognitive styles exhibited by African American students in general, and black males in particular. The traditional curriculum model is aimed towards students who display the following characteristics (Kunjufu, 2009):

-  Are quiet
-  Can sit for long periods of time
-  Possess a long attention span
-  Can work independently
-  Like ditto sheets
-  Are left brain learners
-  Are passive
-  Speak standard English
-  Come from two-parent homes
-  Learned reading before second grade
-  Have well developed fine motor skills

Many African American students possess learning styles that have a right-brain orientation, and benefit greatly from instruction that emphasizes freedom, variation, movement, cooperative learning, visual imagery, tactile perception, creativity, and expressive individualism (Kunjufu, 2005). Their ability to access the curriculum would be greatly enhanced by the infusion of music and art into the curriculum as one of the multiple intelligences (Gardner, 1999).

The benefits of participation in arts education programs can be noted by examining the cognitive function and school achievement of children who participate in meaningful arts education experiences (Harris, 1998). The African American Arts Traditions and Developments project as part of the Portland public

school district's efforts to develop a multicultural education, and an arts infused curriculum might provide school districts with a model for implementation (Harris, 1998; Portland Public Schools, 1998). Some of the most compelling arguments for the full integration of the arts into the public school curriculum lie in the relationship between arts training and cognitive development and the mental processes people use to complete complex tasks, process information, and solve problems. Arts education and training have been associated with higher academic performance. The question researchers have grappled with concerns whether "smart" people are drawn to "do" art – to study and perform music, dance, and drama – or does early arts training cause changes in the brain that enhance other important aspects of cognition (Gardner, 1999). In a concerted effort to address this question, researchers have begun using brain-imaging technology to examine and quantify the impact of arts education and training on cognition.

Taken together, these studies have produced significant results that have implications for expanding and increasing arts training and education in public school programming and curricula. An interest in a performing art leads to a high state of motivation that produces the sustained concentration necessary to improve performance and the training of attention that leads to improvements in other domains of cognition (Posner, Rothbart, Sheese, & Kieras, 2008). Cognitive benefits from having high-level skill development in arts extend to school achievement (Posner & Patoine, 2009). In children, there appears to be a specific relationship between musical abilities and acquiring skills in geometry (Spelke, & Kinzler, 2007). The relationship between music training and reading and sequential learning can help students make connections. Some of the main predictors of early literacy and phonological awareness are related to both music training and cognitive stimulation (Posner, & Patoine, 2009). Training in the performing arts can lead to improvements in cognitive development and general reading and social skills development. Learning to dance by effective observation is closely related to learning by physical practice, both in the level of achievement and also the neural substrates that support organization of complex actions. Effective observational learning may transfer to other cognitive skills. In addition, early and extensive music education has a direct, positive effect on adults acquiring a new language.

While SE assessment continues to be a problem for African Americans, only a few of these students will graduate from high school, and an even smaller amount will enter colleges and universities. As early as elementary school, black boys are tracked on a path that leads to increase school surveillance and containment, and permanent placement in SE. This awareness can help to inform

teachers and hopefully change school practices and policies that are biased against black male students. Furthermore, the prospects of culturally responsive pedagogy and arts education may provide opportunities for students to learn cooperatively and creatively in an enriching classroom environment.

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Chapter 6

HIGH DENIAL AND MODERATE ACCEPTANCE LED TO SUCCESS AND REDUCED GUILT

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ABSTRACT

From the first moment of consciousness in the intensive care unit when I did not recognize my husband or son to today, when I sit writing in my office, this journey continues to take me further than any of the doctors predicted and only my husband envisioned. Through redefinition of denial and acceptance has come continued success and reduced guilt. I, through denial, was able to focus on the positive aspects and reduce the negatives such as guilt, remorse, blame and preoccupation with shame, self-reproach and contrition.

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HIGH DENIAL AND MODERATE ACCEPTANCE LED TO SUCCESS AND REDUCED GUILT

It has been nine years since I last wrote about my experiences as a stroke survivor and I am continuing to make marked improvements. With my type of stroke there is about an 80% death rate and those who live usually have severe one-sided (arm and leg) paralysis, and varying speech and cognition problems. Much literature has been published about stroke but not much has been written by stroke survivors themselves. This article describes the aftermath of a severe stroke as it was, and still is, experienced by the patient.

I was convinced from the beginning that not only would I get better after the stroke, but I would get “completely” better, despite what my doctors said. They said a great deal, very negative as far as I was concerned, but to be fair, they only advocated the conservative approach. However, my conviction gave me the strength to prove their prognosis wrong. The bottom line is that if I had listened to the professionals, I would not have tried so hard and I would not have the life that I have today. The will can make a huge difference.

To summarize, my first recollection after the stroke was waking up in the intensive care unit. It seemed to me that I had just been asleep, but in fact I had been in a coma for three days. I did not understand that I really had had a stroke. I had no precursors: I was thin, drank very little, never smoked, and had low blood pressure. I was in good health, was active, and had no family history of stroke. The doctors still do not know why it occurred.

I am in the somewhat unique situation that I have experienced both sides of healthcare. I have a doctorate and have worked almost 36 years in nursing, contributing to patient care by research and publishing so I am, therefore, discussing my stroke from both a nurse’s position and from that of a severely ill patient.

When I woke up after the stroke, I knew that I was 52 years old and could remember my maiden name. I did not know that I was married and I had forgotten my married name. I vaguely recalled that I lived somewhere in the north but that was the extent of my memories. My son, who was 23 at the time, seemed to be the same age as my husband. They both expected me to be happy to see them but I did not recognize them at all. In about six days I started to remember some people’s names and in another three months, I began comprehending what had happened to me.

My mental change was profound. My thinking, and consequently my ability to express myself verbally or in writing, was severely compromised and that,

combined with aphasia, made communicating my wants and needs, even about trivial things, nearly impossible. For example, when filling out my food choices at the hospital, I would check “corn muffin”, even though I did not completely understand what a corn muffin was. I ordered yogurt and was given the regular kind, which I did not like. I was not able to explain that I wanted diet yogurt instead. The dietitian patted my arm, told me that I was too thin and that I would eat my yogurt. Well, all I could do was to just not eat yogurt at all until somebody finally realized that I only wanted the low fat variety. It sounds trivial but I had so little control of my life that little things became very important to me.

People think my determination to become “completely better” came from a positive attitude. Nothing could be further from the truth. I was extremely depressed and angry, not at any one person, but in general. I do not think that I was a particularly difficult patient. I refused to accept having become so disabled and this, combined with my anger, made me obsessed with getting “completely better” and often made me defy doctor’s orders.

I was hospitalized for two months and was then an outpatient in a day treatment program for an additional four months. The first day at the rehabilitation hospital was terrible. I climbed over the bed’s safety rails and fell to the floor – twice. This was a serious risk because I was on blood thinner medication. The hospital staff thought I had poor impulse control, which is common for stroke patients. I do not know if this was the case for me or not, but I could not make the nurses understand when I had to go to the bathroom. They pointed to a call button, which I did not recognize at first and asked me to use it when I needed something. However, when I tried it, it did not work and I did not know how to explain to the staff that it was defective. The change in my ability to think made it impossible to formulate a thought, let alone express myself verbally. I would cry in utter frustration. I just wanted what I wanted and that was it.

Stroke victims often cannot speak for themselves and yet they must make decisions that affect their entire future such as the type of treatment required ¹. Therefore, it is extremely important to have a patient care advocate, which in my case was my husband of thirty plus years. He was the only person who shared my conviction that I would improve enough to resume my life, including horseback riding, water-skiing, and using a computer. However, at times, I may not have been as steadfast in my belief as he was; a small part of me could not help fearing the future outcome repeatedly predicted by my doctors. My husband’s positive attitude of expectation did not change, though, and therefore, he was very active in my dispute with managed care, the cost of which was based on my doctors’ poor prognosis.

My right side was totally paralyzed with no movement in my arm and leg so I was confined to a wheel chair. When I started physical therapy, I was not given much hope of improvement, and after a year, I was told not to expect to get any better physically. This only strengthened my determination and made me work even harder at my physical therapy. In our daily lives, we do not need to think about how our muscles work but before I could even start training a movement, I had to relearn how to connect with my muscles and make them react the way I wanted them to. Only then, could I begin training that movement. Though I still cannot stand on one leg, I now walk briskly without a cane or brace. I still have some joint restriction that affects my fingers and I still have minor tremors at times but the movement of my right hand is 70% normal. However, I am still working on getting my fingers to cooperate so I can type with both hands.

The physical therapy is time-consuming – three 2 ½ hour sessions a week. Again, I am grateful for being so stubborn because progress requires constant training. However, after 9 years of therapy, it is sometimes difficult to muster the needed energy but I almost always manage to keep sight of the goals I have set for myself and keep working towards them.

Physical limitations have a huge impact on psychological wellbeing. For about a year after the stroke, my mood reflected intense anger and deep sadness. I have been given much medication and I still have a weekly session with a psychiatrist. My mood is normal, though my temper is much shorter than it used to be. I get angry very quickly, sometimes over minor things, but then it is over.

I sometimes felt strange and detached from reality, like I was watching myself from an outside vantage point and, for a long time, this was so stressful that I would break down and cry. Much later, it was hypothesized that I suffered from a posttraumatic stress (PTSD) reaction to my stroke, which would explain my detachment. I used to feel distant or dissociate about 90% of the time but now it is down to 5%. It seems to happen mostly when I have to leave someone that I am close to, even for short periods of time. People who dissociate are usually victims of assault, sexual abuse, or incest. I have suffered none of this. Because I was unconscious for three days and awoke gently, I did not think my stroke qualified as an assault with a consequent PTSD reaction but my psychiatrist said that having a stroke is comparable to such an assault and it explains the dissociation.

Most stroke victims experience denial and then, ultimately, acceptance. In my case, denial has stayed with me and has helped me a lot. My friends and the medical professionals tried to move me beyond denial to acceptance, but I resisted. Now, I am glad I did. I was not expected to work but, if I did, I would have to work only part-time at a much diminished level from my former

employment. However, I decided I still wanted to be a researcher and that decision has helped me accomplish many things that no one expected, except, perhaps, my husband.

I became obsessed with minute details but this has allowed me to see progress. Even something as simple as tying my shoes myself became an enormous obstacle, which I never thought I would overcome. It sounds trite but to find out that I did not need someone else to tie my shoes for the rest of my life was overwhelming. Even though it took me half an hour to finally tie my shoes myself, I considered it an outstanding achievement and it became a major turning point in my progress. I remember crying uncontrollably. I had been afraid that I would never be able to accomplish even minor tasks again, that I would have to get used to the fact that I was different. Now it turned out that I was not that different after all. This small success reinforced my belief that I would overcome the obstacles to full recovery.

Unconsciously, I became very repetitive. For instance, I would park my car in the same spot every morning, even though there were perhaps ten parking spaces to choose from. One morning, it snowed and the only space that had not been cleared of snow was my space. My husband asked me why I was struggling to park right there instead of choosing one of the other parking spaces, which were in fact much easier to negotiate. His question made me stop and think and I realized that I did many things by rote. There was nothing sacred about my parking spot. I could park next to my spot and it would be fine but I was missing the awareness that I actually had choices. It became obvious to me that I could decide where best to park by any number of things, including the amount of snow left in the parking space. This sounds banal but after a stroke, such inflexibility may happen. Now I am less obsessive but I find I am more resistant to change than prior to my stroke. (The word “my” is interesting. It took me a long time to call it “my stroke” instead of “the stroke” just as I would say “the affected leg and arm” and not “my affected leg and arm.” I guess I am still changing in my acceptance of “my” stroke.)

My personality went through changes, too. Sometimes I would be afraid of appearing “crazy”, a feeling which is confirmed by Letters to the Editor in the journal *Stroke Connection*. One stroke survivor writes, for example, that in addition to the physical loss, “the stroke has also damaged and shattered my mind.” Another person writes “my reality is a lonely dark, empty place. I too often ask if this is what losing your mind feels like?”².

Looking back, I realize that I had trouble trusting people with my illness but when I did, I monopolized their time. I was so absorbed with my stroke and it was all I talked about³. A close friend became tired of listening to me. She missed the

conversations we once enjoyed but it was a stage that I had to navigate and repeated conversations about the stroke were my way of coming to terms with what had happened to me and how it had affected me and my life.

I also acted impulsively and said whatever occurred to me – good or bad. For example, I would tell total strangers that “they didn’t work hard enough” or were “too fat”. I knew I was rude but I could not control it.

I became much more fearful. I felt extremely vulnerable and depended greatly on my husband. A year after my stroke, while on a cruise, I became hysterical during a practice lifeboat drill realizing how catastrophic my helplessness could be.

Reading was a problem. I could read the words in lay publications but I could not relate what I read to the world around me. Even watching television was too difficult. However, surprisingly enough I was able to concentrate on my research, which made sense to me and this was a major contributor to my continued improvement.

I sometimes wondered to what degree my unconscious might be affected by the stroke. Sometimes, I will remember details from long ago, things that I had never thought of before my stroke. Now I may dream of relatives that I have not seen in 40 years and, in the dream, I can easily remember their address and phone number.

My unconscious also helped me solve perplexing problems such as figuring out how to get a video recording tape ejected. I thought there had to be a button to push but did not know which one. Finally, I just pretended that I had not had a stroke and that I was taking out the tape. The motion was correct and I found the button.

When I get the least bit excited or anxious, which happens more now than before the stroke, my mind goes blank. This is extremely frustrating because when anxious, I do not speak as well as I normally do. I also try to simultaneously hear what I am saying instead of just saying it. For instance, while trying to listen to what I am communicating, I will stumble over the words but if I stop talking, I lose my thought. I used to be able to do many things at once and having problems with something as simple as talking has taught me “one thing at a time” but it is extremely hard for my unlimited mind to accept my physical limitations. I finally just tell people that I may make mistakes or may not be able to find a word. Most times, I will realize when I use a wrong word but sometimes I will not. The worst is to pretend that a possible error did not occur. When I relax, things go better.

My anxiety became apparent in another way. I would answer the phone in my office by simply saying “hello”. I knew that I needed to make a proper

introduction but I just did not feel that the call was intended for me and this made me feel as if I was not on top of things.

I had difficulty remembering details of my work but often, just as it had with the videotape, a particular stimulus would “open the door.” I have never been a computer genius but what little I knew seemed to have been eradicated. I did not even know how to turn on my computer. My assistant labored to teach me how to turn it on but then once I could do that, I started remembering other details. It seems as though much of my work is still like that. I read the first couple of lines of one of my, seemingly unknown to me, manuscripts, and then everything slowly comes back, even most of the reference list. It is my recall of perhaps unconscious material becoming conscious again or a gargantuan response to a small stimulus.

Teaching was part of my job and when I think of my own perception as a teacher compared to the ratings the participants gave me, I realize that I may have felt much more “out of it” than perhaps I was. I have been given outstanding ratings when I thought I just did fair and sometimes not even that well. I became aware that I felt I had to start “at the beginning” or “at the bottom”, since I did not know what to expect of myself. I think I will have to keep proving to myself that I can do something well, before I will trust myself completely again.

As part of my recovery, I had to learn not to always aim for perfection, that there was such a thing as “moderation.” I knew this intellectually but could not apply it to myself. I had to learn that I could make steps towards something without it having to be all or nothing. I had to learn to be “reasonable” with myself and not expect to be perfect – it was possible to have a few cookies and not eat the whole box. Being “reasonable” also gave me back the feeling of being an adult and not a child who wants more.

I have become more human as I have grown. There is a balance between self-improvement and acceptance. For me, self-improvement means you strive to the nth degree. Acceptance is that you can see how things are temporarily and know that it is only temporarily. My degree of denial is very high in general, and in this case, very useful. Denial has allowed me to achieve what few had imagined.

I used to have times when I would feel sorry for myself. However, when I went to a group for aphasic people as a guest speaker, it was amazing and disheartening to see these people – my people – try to speak. I was less limited and I could help them. For example, I would give them much more space to talk rather than rushing in to “help” them finishing their sentences, something that often happened to me in my conversations with other people. In a way, I feel that my work may help bridge the two worlds, that of the stroke survivor and the rest of society.

Parts of my personality are still intact and evolving from before the stroke. I still cannot decide if the stroke is a huge obstacle that I must surmount and start all over again or if it is just a “hiatus.” The other way of looking at stroke is that it is a major setback but that life moves forward regardless. Only now do I think that I may be flirting with some small amount of acceptance; that I may have to negotiate some compromise.

Despite all the progress I have made over the last 9 years, writing about my experience as a stroke victim and stroke survivor is still very painful and I expect that this will always be the case. I still do my research and I am learning to be grateful for the life I am able to live in spite of the stroke.

Scott Prunier is the rehabilitation therapist who has been working with me for nine years. After all these years, he is still developing new programs for me in an effort to reach the highest level of improvement. I want to share Scott Prunier’s perspective:

I will start off by saying that I can not believe it has been nine years that I have been working with Marilyn Lanza. In our time together training and rehabilitating, I have seen her make tremendous strides with her recovery. I remember the first day we met in my office. She came in with a walker/cane, had minimal right arm and leg movement, and was told that she was not going to get much better physically. Fast forward nine years later, Marilyn is doing almost everything she was doing prior to the stroke, not with the same fine motor control that she had before, but has made huge strides with her recovery due to determination.

Marilyn’s road to physical recovery has not been easy. It has required a lot of patience, focus with gross and fine motor skills, as well as understanding how the movements are developed by feeling (something we all tend to take for granted). In our earlier training sessions we used to focus on getting muscles to make a small movement (contraction) and learn how to connect that movement with the feeling so she could remember it and replicate it for her next workout. Once we had some movement established we would then take that movement and try to make it into an exercise. This could be anything from raising the arm up to shoulder height or squatting down and picking something up off the floor that she had dropped.

Marilyn also had a significant decrease in flexibility of muscles and range of motion of joints, specifically the shoulder region, due to the stroke. We spent quite a bit of time doing low load passive stretching, proprioceptive neuromuscular facilitated stretching, and active isolated stretching of the shoulder internal rotators to help restore tissue length and improve joint range of motion. These stretching techniques help the agonist and antagonistic muscle

groups to work in a more efficient manner while performing resistance or daily exercises.

Fast forward a few years and now our focus has been improving fine motor skills, such as typing or tossing a tennis ball in the air, and mastering the gross motor patterns such as squatting, lunging and single leg stance. Still to this day Marilyn has some muscle groups that are overactive while performing some of certain exercises. We have started using a more advanced technique to help improve the squat, lunge and single leg stance pattern.

The use of RNT (reactive neuromuscular training) has helped these movements become more stable. To get a better idea of how RNT helps correct movement patterns I will use the squatting pattern to gain a better understanding. Since Marilyn had a problem with her knees tracking inward when trying to perform a body weight squat I would have her start by placing a mini band just above the knees. Next I would have Marilyn slowly descend into a squat pressing the knees out to the side (laterally) and tell her not to let her knees move inward. This puts her into a short foot posture, engages the glute maximus and medius, and allows her to keep her torso upright while squatting down. A simple exercise correction like this allows Marilyn to have better balance when picking things up off the floor, develop strength in the legs for skiing and tennis. Seeing the improvements with her joint stability places the stress into the muscles on the appropriate muscles and decreases the unnecessary wear and tear on the joints.

Marilyn had to overcome another obstacle this past spring, a hip replacement. I knew she had been in pain for a while in her right hip and she was contemplating surgery. Personally I was a little hesitant for her to undergo the procedure because it was on the side that had been affected by the stroke. I was unsure how her physical recovery would be and that it might take a long time for her muscles to develop again. I am glad to say that it was much better than I had expected. All of her previous work done prior to the surgery had helped her recovery at a nice steady pace. It is also due to the fact that Marilyn does everything to a "T". If you tell her what exercises she needs to do and how many sets and repetitions she does exactly what you tell her (wish I had more clients with commitment level).

At this stage of the physical recovery process we are still working on improving every area: flexibility, strength, balance, proprioception, and cardiovascular health. Marilyn is still making progress with her training and I feel that will continue for some time. This is important not only because she had a stroke but as we age we as tend to lose muscle mass, see a decrease in bone density, and lose the ability to get around with ease. I know Marilyn enjoys riding horses, skiing, and playing tennis, my goal is to help her continue to do these activities for as long as she possibly can and have a quality lifestyle.

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Chapter 7

THE CONDITIONAL ADJUSTMENT HYPOTHESIS: TWO WAYS OF DEALING WITH DISSONANCE

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ABSTRACT

Political science has been described as a borrowing discipline. Social psychological theories are often used to explain public opinion, yet Festinger's theory of cognitive dissonance has received only limited attention in this branch of political science. In short, this argument outlines how to solve a psychological state of discomfort when one experiences inconsistency of having conflicting thoughts. I argue that Festinger's work can be helpful in explaining why some people agree with the dominating views in their countries, while others disagree. This paper is an elaboration of the theoretical arguments outlining the conditional adjustment hypothesis, a hypothesis which argues that confidence in institutions will indicate how disposed a person is to adjust to or react against the economic policies of his regime. In addition, I provide an overview over the use of Festinger's theory in political science. Derived from Festinger's work, the conditional adjustment hypothesis is thoroughly explained in this paper. My contention is that it can help us better to understand public opinion.

INTRODUCTION

The *conditional adjustment hypothesis*, a variant of the adjustment hypothesis and based on Festinger's (1957) theory of cognitive dissonance was first presented by me in an article in *European Sociological Review* (Jakobsen, 2009). This was a novel approach that aimed to utilize social psychological theories to explain public opinion on the role of government in OECD countries, with a special focus on economic left-right issues. The phrase "public opinion" is used as a description of the beliefs or opinions of a population, as opposed to the opinions of the established elite. Public opinion is a very general term that can be divided into three categories; *ideals*, *perceptions*, and *policy attitudes*. Ideals point to the basic values held by the public, and as such they represent a lasting idea of what is desirable; perceptions pertain to a person's view of reality; and attitudes refer to normative judgements of actual situations or policy implications (Aalberg 2003, pp. 5f).

There are many factors explaining a person's opinion regarding government influence, both at the individual level and at the macro level. The present article focuses in particular on cross-level effects, i.e. the effects of macro-level factors on the beliefs of individuals. State policy is an important determinant not to be disregarded when explaining public opinion. The activities of the state influence people's ideals, perceptions, and policy attitudes. This article offers a thorough theoretical treatment of the subject matter. First, I present an introduction to and a brief history of, the theory of cognitive dissonance. Second, I show how Festinger's theory has played a part in previous studies of public opinion and voting behavior. And third, I offer a thorough presentation and description of the conditional adjustment hypothesis and its underlying logic.

Table 1. Average ratings for each condition

Question on Interview	Experimental Condition		
	Control (N = 20)	One Dollar (N = 20)	Twenty Dollars (N = 20)
How enjoyable tasks were rated (from -5 to +5)	-0.45	+1.35	-0.05

Source: Festinger and Carlsmith (1959).

COGNITIVE DISSONANCE

The theory of *cognitive dissonance* was introduced by Festinger (1957), and it draws on other literature within social psychology (i.e., Merton, 1936; Lewin, 1939; Newcomb, 1953; Osgood & Tannenbaum, 1955). This theory describes a psychological state of discomfort when one experiences inconsistency of having conflicting thoughts. When this *dissonance* appears, a person will try to reduce it using one out of two strategies: (a) he can change his cognition about his own behavior by changing his actions; or (b) he can change his knowledge about what is the proper behavior. One of these two courses of action has to be taken in order to achieve what Festinger (1957) names *consonance*, or, in other words, consistency of one's opinions with those of one's surroundings. This theory has been tested and confirmed using the experimental method; one example of which was the experiments performed by Festinger and Carlsmith (1959) under controlled laboratory conditions:

Let us consider a person who privately holds opinion "X" but has, as a result of pressure brought to him publicly stated that he believes "not X" (...) Let us then see what can be said about the total magnitude of dissonance in a person created by the knowledge that he said "not X" and really believes "X." With everything else held constant, thus total magnitude of dissonance would decrease as the number and importance of the pressures which induced him to say "not X" is increased. Thus, if the overt behaviour was brought about by, say, offers of reward or threatened punishments, the magnitude of dissonance is maximal if these promised rewards or threatened punishments were just barely sufficient to induce the person to say "not X." From this point on, as the promised rewards or threatened punishment become larger, the magnitude of dissonance becomes smaller (Festinger & Carlsmith 1959, pp. 203f).

Seventy-one male students then took part in a dull and boring experiment. Afterwards one group of students was given one dollar in reward for convincing a girl (who was part of the plot) that the experiment in fact had been enjoyable and fun, and another group were paid 20 dollars to do the same thing. A third group functioned as a control group and was given no reward and did not have to tell the girl that the experiment had been fun. At the end of the experiment, the participants had to give an evaluation of it. The results are summed up in table 1.

The conclusion was in accordance with Festinger's (1957) theory of cognitive dissonance: when an individual is induced to do or say something that contradicts his private opinion, he is likely to change his opinion to achieve *consonance*. For

instance, following the example above, if a person is told to do a boring task, and he is paid a small amount of money (in this example, one dollar) to convince another person that the task was fun, he will also have to convince himself (change his opinion) that the experiment had been enjoyable. If he is given 20 dollars, the money in itself becomes the reason for persuading the girl, and the individual in question does not have to convince himself to the same degree as when the monetary incentive is smaller. This is an example of an experiment within the positivist or naturalist tradition of science. Festinger and Carlsmith used this method to obtain a better understanding of the real world. They tested their notion under controlled, laboratory conditions using one control group and two experimental groups where they varied the amount of reward used to convince the participants to make a statement that contradicted their personal views. They exposed two groups to two different stimuli (one dollar and twenty dollars respectively). An individual who received twenty dollars then made a statement that contradicted his personal views. However, he did not adopt the views of his statement, as he regarded the monetary reward as sufficient motivation for him to make that proclamation. Therefore, there was no need to convince him of the truthfulness of the statement in order to achieve consonance. On the other hand, a person receiving only one dollar would have to justify to himself the very argument that he was told to give the girl, since the amount of money in itself was insufficient as a motivating factor. Thus, in order to achieve consonance that individual had to adopt the view that the experiment had been fun.

Aronson and Carlsmith (1963) conducted a similar experiment with regard to forced compliance in children. Dissonance is found to be particularly strong when behaviors that are important to the person in question are involved, and that will increase the effort to either add 'consonant' cognitions or by changing one of them to make them more consonant (Aronson, 1968). Wicklund and Brehm (1976) added the variable of personal responsibility to the cognitive dissonance equation. In their modified version of dissonance theory, they argue that dissonance reduction appears when an individual sees himself as responsible for the cognitive inconsistencies. The cognitive dissonance theory has since been subjected to numerous experimental tests (e.g., Scher & Cooper, 1989; Harmon-Jones *et al.*, 1996; Gosling, Denizeau, & Oberlé, 2006; Sénémeaud & Somat, 2009). In a recent addition to the literature Harmon-Jones, Amodio, and Harmon-Jones (2009) present their action-based model of dissonance. They posit that the dissonance effect comes into play as it has the potential to interfere with an organism effective action. The organism is thus motivated to reduce this dissonance in order to behave effectively (Harmon-Jones *et al.*, 2009, p. 121). In

other words, some level of cognitive dissonance may be beneficial as it increases the efficiency of an organism. This is done through the mechanism of managing to make decisions without being hampered by conflicting thoughts and second regards. However, too much dissonance may actually be harmful if it is employed to situations where conflicting thoughts actually are useful, and the following action is disadvantageous. Even so, Harmon-Jones *et al.*, 2009) find that dissonance reduction is more often functional than not.

The Use of Cognitive Dissonance Theory in Public Opinion Research

Festinger's (1957) theory has reached great popularity, not only in the literature on social psychology, but also in fields like, e.g., economics and medicine. Examples are plentiful. Stock market analysts have been found to be subject to cognitive dissonance bias (Friesen & Weller, 2006), and alcohol has been proven to function as a dissonance-reducing mechanism (Steele, Southwick, & Critchlow, 1981). The use of cognitive dissonance theory has not been prominent in political science, however. Other theories rooted in social psychology have been more influential. One example is the *theory of cognitive schema* which posits that individuals use "cognitive shortcuts" in order to process information – i.e., they utilize already established notions in a structural manner (Fiske & Taylor, 1991). This is related to what is known as the *Michigan school* which argues that voters' preferences are determined by psychological factors (Campbell *et al.*, 1960; Converse, 1964). The *theory of social identity* was developed by social psychologist Henry Tajfel. He proposed that individual behavior is determined by membership in social categories and that individuals' perceptions are strongly influenced by conventional attitudes and values (Tajfel, 1981, 1982).

To be sure, there is a tradition for theories based on social psychology in the field of public opinion research. Both political science in general, and the study of public opinion in particular, are known for adopting theories from other disciplines. Or, as Lau and Sears (1986) put it:

Political science has been a borrowing discipline, adopting psychological learning theory to understand political socialization, psychological theory to understand the careers of political activists, economic theories to understand the public policy process, sociological theories to understand the activities of interest groups, and so on (Lau & Sears 1986, p. 4).

Examples of Festinger's theory can be found – although sparingly – both in political science and more narrowly in literature on public opinion. The theory has, for example, been employed on the study of how opinion polls influence opinions (e.g., Morwitz & Pluzinski, 1996); in other studies of voting behavior (e.g., Anderson, Mendes, & Tverdova, 2004); and also in organizational theory (e.g., Brady, Clark & Davis, 1995).

One of the early attempts to use cognitive dissonance theory to explain public or mass opinion was made by Charles E. Osgood, professor of Psychology at the University of Illinois. Osgood (1960) introduced a model of congruity which contended that changes in belief follow from the psychological stress created by inconsistencies. Yet another professor of psychology, James O. Whittaker, explained how most effectively to change public opinion in order to advocate a policy change. His research showed that it is easiest for the elites to change policy not when the discrepancy is greatest or smallest between what is advocated and the mood of the people, but rather at some intermediate point (Whittaker, 1964). Since Whittaker's article, cognitive dissonance theory has been employed to explain voting behavior (e.g. Regan & Kilduff, 1988; Øverbye, 1995; Dimock & Jacobson, 1995; Beasley & Joslyn, 2001; Page, Sander, & Schneider-Mizell, 2007). One example thereof is a study of the 1997 British elections where Anderson, Mendes, and Tverdova (2004) argued that cognitive consistency is a robust mechanism for linking opinion and behavior. Their analysis found persons who voted Labour or Liberal Democrats to perceive the past state of the British economy (which were then under Tory government) more negatively after they had casted their ballots in the 1997 election.

THE CONDITIONAL ADJUSTMENT HYPOTHESIS

My contribution to the literature is the *conditional adjustment hypothesis*. This is derived from the *adjustment hypothesis* promoted by Lishaug and Aalberg (1999), who claim that mass opinion adapts to the attitudes of the policy elites. The adjustment hypothesis looks especially at one of Festinger's (1957) many examples of situations where cognitive dissonance can occur, namely inconsistency between one's own cognition and a more encompassing cognition. An easy-to-grasp example of this would be the conflicting thoughts a Democrat would experience by voting for a Republican, or a Tory supporter voting for Labour. According to this hypothesis, the solution to reducing dissonance would

be to modify one's beliefs so as to make them congruent with those of the surroundings.

I contend that, with regard to mass opinion, there is more to the adjustment hypothesis than what is presented by Listhaug and Aalberg (1999). My theoretical argument is also based on the theory of cognitive dissonance. I agree that in those instances where an individual experiences psychological discomfort or cognitive dissonance, he will try to reduce this dissonance and thereby achieve consonance or consistency in opinions. Festinger (1957), however, suggests several avenues through which consonance can be achieved. One such avenue is certainly in accordance with the adjustment hypothesis: a person can simply alter his opinions to accommodate those that are prominent in his surroundings. Another way would be to influence the surroundings so that the majority's opinion corresponds to one's own. This latter strategy would, of course, be a less likely way of reducing dissonance than the former, at least with regard to the study of mass opinion.

Yet, Festinger also suggests another, alternative solution for achieving consonance. The person who experiences dissonance might simply change his "knowledge" (Festinger 1957, p. 6). That is, if one's actions contradict the norms and views of the surrounding society, one might choose to look for other sources of support for one's views. An example thereof, which is given in Jakobsen (2009), is that of a person in a Social Democratic regime holding pro-privatization views. He would, following the theory of cognitive dissonance, feel psychological distress. The options on the table would be: (a) to adjust his attitudes and become pro-government, as this is the policy of his country; or (b) to look for other sources than his own state for inspiration – for example toward a more liberal regime, like that of the United States. In a globalized and technologically advanced world this is by no means impracticable, as people, especially in industrialized countries, have easy access to a variety of media outlets from other countries than their own. Moreover, people often turn to mass communications that are in accordance with their existing opinions (Klapper, 1960). A topic like politics is more likely to result in selective exposure than other topics, and political beliefs are certainly related to their media exposure (Stroud, 2008). This line of reasoning is also supported by Festinger (1957, p. 177), who states that "one of the most effective ways of eliminating dissonance is to discard one set of cognitive elements in favor of another, something which can sometimes only be accomplished if one can find others who agree with the cognitions one wishes to retain and maintain."


Then the vital question becomes which type of people chooses option (a) and which type chooses (b). The more important the group is to the person in question, the more important it will be for that person to achieve consonance of

opinions with the group as a whole (Festinger 1957, p. 180). The vice versa should also be true: one can assume that the less important the group is to a person, the more likely he will be to look for other sources to achieve consonance. When pertaining to mass opinion on economic left-right opinions, I argue that *confidence in institutions* is the mediating factor at play. In a state, institutions function as the glue which gives its citizens a sense of community and loyalty toward their government (Seligman, 1992, 2002; Eisenstadt, 1995; Mishler & Rose, 1997). So how would confidence in institutions determine who chooses (a) and who chooses (b)? The level of trust can tell us something about how important a country's values are to a person. In Jakobsen (2009) we find the following example: a U.S. American with confidence in U.S. institutions will also have trust in his country's political and historical value base. This implies that he is more receptive to his country's prevailing opinions and policies, which in the case of the United States means relatively little government interference. The acceptance of these values can in many cases be viewed as a way to achieve consonance (if, that is, there was a state of dissonance at the onset). On the other hand, a U.S. citizen who lacks confidence in institutions, and thus also in the "American way," will less likely be influenced by the state's policy. Yet, this person will still feel dissonance if his own values are not in line with his surroundings, something which creates psychological distress for the individual in question. To solve this, he may opt for solution (b) – i.e., he will likely find other sources of encouragement if he does not share the American ideals. An illustrative example of such a person is the filmmaker Michael Moore, who is clearly dissatisfied with at least parts of the American ideals, and who (therefore) tends to look to other countries for inspiration, like e.g., Canada and the United Kingdom.

If a given country has a large *public* sector, a person with strong confidence in its institutions should be more negative toward privatization than a person with a lower trust score. In a country with a large *private* sector, the effect should be the opposite – i.e., strong confidence in institutions will imply an extra positive attitude toward the market. In other words, one needs to differentiate according to an individual level of trust, and from this reasoning the *conditional adjustment hypothesis* is deduced:

Confidence in institutions will indicate how disposed a person is to adjust or react against the economic policies of their regime.

The conditional adjustment hypothesis is illustrated in figure 1.



Note: The signs show whether the individual has a high or low value on “Trust in institutions.”

Figure 1. The conditional adjustment hypothesis: two ways of dealing with dissonance

The conditional adjustment hypothesis is supported by findings from the World Values Survey with regard to economic left-right opinions. In the study of public opinion, there is a tendency for confidence to act as a mediating factor that decides which of the two ways of dealing with dissonance a person chooses to opt for (Jakobsen, 2009).

CONCLUSION

By introducing the conditional adjustment hypothesis I seek to provide a better understanding of public opinion when combining social psychological theories and statistical methods. Of course, it is essential not to rely on statistics alone, but also have strong theoretical reasoning at hand. My hypothesis is based on the theory of cognitive dissonance (Festinger, 1957), which – like many other theoretical directions in the study of public opinion – hails from the field of social psychology. The use of Festinger’s theory, I argue, strengthens the causal claims of my analysis, since it is based on the experimental design, which the positivist tradition ranks as ideal with regard to making causal claims. Results have shown that there is indeed a cross-level effect of “state opinion” on public opinion, where the critical mediating factor at play is whether or not a person has confidence in his or her country’s institutions (Jakobsen, 2009). This article has elaborated on the theoretical part of this claim.

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Chapter 8

EXPLORING THE USEFULNESS OF “DENIAL” AS A CONCEPT FOR UNDERSTANDING CHRONIC ILLNESS AND DISABILITY

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Being diagnosed with a chronic illness or disability requires ongoing adjustment in order to adapt and cope successfully (Green-Hernandez et al. 2001; Lindsay 2008; 2009a; Paterson 2001). There is little doubt that coming to terms with such a diagnosis can be particularly difficult. Thus, shock and disbelief are often followed by a period of denial in which patients attempt to overcome the disruption to their lives (Bury 1982; Green-Hernandez et al. 2001). Denial can involve many different cognitive strategies including avoiding thinking about something, contradicting it, or focusing on alternative explanations (Kirmayer and Looper 2006). It is often an initial response that is used to fend off anxiety when encountering a life-altering event or threatening situation (Freud 1961; Joachim and Acron 2000; Martz et al. 2005; Rapley 1998; Treharne et al. 2004). Some researchers argue that denial can be a useful coping mechanism early on in the illness experience (Freud 1961; Kubler-Ross 1969); however, prolonged denial

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can cause strong, negative pathological connotations and hinder a successful adaptation (Fernando 2001; Seligman 2000; Telford et al. 2006).

Patient characteristics often influence how and the extent to which denial is experienced. For example, there is some evidence to support that patterns of denial vary by gender (Ketterer et al 2004), age (Treharne et al. 2004) and ethno-cultural status (Halstead et al. 1993; Roy et al. 2005; Njoku et al. 2005). Denial of emotional distress tends to be more common among men than women and may also contribute to a lack of clinician recognition and help seeking (Ketterer et al. 2004). In terms of ethno-cultural differences, Njoku et al. (2005) found that Latinos and African Americans used denial significantly more often than European Americans. Furthermore, differences in denial have also been found by length of time since diagnosis and age. In particular, patients who have been recently diagnosed tend to have greater denial than patients who have had their illness for longer (Treharne et al. 2004). Similarly, younger patients also report having greater difficulties coming to terms with their illness than older patients (Lindsay 2008; 2009b; Treharne et al. 2004).

Examining the construct of “denial” of disability/chronic illness can further develop our understanding of the structure of adaptation to loss of body integrity (Livneh et al 2006). Psychoanalytic and grief theories can be drawn upon to inform current understandings about what constitutes a “normal” adjustment following loss or trauma (Bowlby 1980; Glick et al. 1974; Telford et al. 2006). For example, Livneh (1991) identified over forty interrelated stage models, all of which identify “denial” as an early phase of adjustment. Such models continue to have a strong presence in today’s understandings about the grief process and adaptation to illness (Holmes 1972; Schuchter and Zisook 1993).

Evidence suggests that disengagement types of coping (e.g., denial, avoidance) are linked to lower levels of adaptation to a chronic condition (Martz et al. 2005), lower quality of life (Klein et al. 2007) greater anxiety, depression, externalized hostility (Livneh et al. 1999), delayed treatment seeking and poor adherence to treatment regimens (Grace et al. 2004; Katz et al. 2002; Shore 2001), poor psychological adjustment and poor physical health (Bechtold et al 2003; Jones 2003).

Despite the potential usefulness of using denial as a concept for understanding chronic illness and disability several gaps and limitations exist. First, a key criticism of coping and grief models that involve denial is that they tend to focus on “matching” behaviors and emotions with stages of the model (Telford et al. 2006). Given that health care providers’ understanding of patients’ illness experiences often rely on the acceptance/denial framework, they may be less likely to listen as carefully when patients tell their own unique story (Telford

et al. 2006). Instead, they may be focused on trying to fit an individual's experience within the stages of adjustment. This can be problematic because patients may internalize a label of 'denial,' which may obstruct the reshaping of self-identity that is fundamental to living well with an illness/disability (Green-Hernandez et al. 2001; Telford et al. 2006).

A second gap to consider when using denial as a concept for understanding the experience of chronic illness and disability is that there is often less consideration of developmental, social and contextual factors (Kirmayer and Looper 2006). For example, some chronically ill or disabled people may experience more stress due to societal discrimination and prejudice (Olney et al. 2004; Major and Schmader 1998; Shultz et al. 2000). Members of stigmatized groups may psychologically disengage because of the impact of negative stereotypes and discrimination in order to maintain their self-esteem (Major and Schmader 1998). This, in turn, can influence adaptive behavior and overall psychological well-being. When a person is constantly faced with such challenges, their ways of coping with their condition may often need to evolve to match their experiences (Njoku et al. 2005).

This leads to a third criticism. The process of adjusting to a chronic illness/disability is complex and involves fluctuations and movement back and forth as an individual comes to grips with strong reactions to the loss of life as it was before they were diagnosed with their condition (Bury 1982; Kralik 2002; Lindsay 2009a; Paterson 2001; Telford et al. 2006). It is not a simple linear progression from denial to acceptance (Corbin and Strauss 1988; 1991; Paterson 2001). Adapting to a chronic condition changes over time as patients age and as life evolves around them (e.g., life events, stressors etc.). Thus, individuals with chronic illnesses/disabilities often need to make a continuous effort to overcome the effects of their condition and societal reactions towards them by maintaining levels of functioning (Njoku et al. 2005).

A final criticism is that the concepts of denial/acceptance often do not fully explain the complex relation between individuals with disabilities and the labels ascribed to them (Olney et al. 2004; Telford et al. 2006). Adjusting to the onset of a chronic illness or disability is often conceptualized as an internal process; however, this does not fully take into account societal reactions to illness and disability (Bury 1982; Corbin and Strauss 1988; 1991; Hahn 1988; Lindsay 2009a; 2009b). An individual's response to a chronic illness or disability does not occur in a closed system, nor is adjustment a one-time event (Hahn 1988; Lindsay 2009a; Paterson 2001). Chronic illness and disability are experienced within the structures of everyday life and the onset of an illness/disability (Bury 1982). Medical, social, political, economic, biographical and psychological forces can

shape the course of a disease (Wiener and Kayser-Jones 1990). Even though a disease/disability may be the same physiologically, each individual's trajectory is different and takes into account the different circumstances of each individual (Jablonski 2004).

Indeed, people's experiences of chronic illness and disability often fluctuate over time while trying to fit with social norms and maintaining a sense of power and control (Corbin and Strauss 1988; 1991; Telford et al. 2006).

In adapting to a chronic condition there is an ongoing, continually shifting process where people experience a complex dialectic between themselves and their world (Paterson 2001). It is likely for this reason that Paterson (2001:8) argues, "the terms acceptance and denial of illness as they are traditionally used by health care professionals have little or no meaning for those with chronic illness." Instead, Paterson (2001) argues for a better understanding of the experiences of optimism and pessimism that patients continually negotiate. Therefore, it is important that broader social contextual factors be taken into account when attempting to understand a patient's illness experience (Lindsay 2008). Health care providers should try to understand and support patients' unique perspective as a response to their particular socio-cultural and psychological situation rather than helping people simply to "accept" their limitations and losses (Paterson 2001).

Several directions for further research should be considered. Most of the research in this area has examined adults and specifically those who have acquired their illness/disability later in life while much less is known about children and those who were born with their condition. The research that does explore the use of denial amongst children with chronic conditions focuses on the parent's perspective while less attention has been paid to children's experience. More research is needed to explore whether children experience denial, and if so, to what extent. For example, is children's experience of denial different from those who acquire their condition later in life? More examination is also needed of the role of social and contextual factors in shaping how individuals experience denial in the process of coping with their illness or disability (especially age, gender, social class, ethno-cultural status etc). Finally, more longitudinal research is needed to explore how denial within chronically ill/disabled people changes over time, and particularly through key life events.

In sum, responses to illness should be viewed more holistically in terms of the experience of adjustment rather than being understood only as stages (Kingsbury 2000). Health care professionals need to challenge the stage model of adjustment as a way of understanding the response to illness and use a more client-focused approach that incorporates the wider social context of people's lives (Telford

2006). Using denial as a concept can be useful for shedding light on how people experience chronic illness and disability, however, other socio-cultural factors should also be considered.

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